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ABSTRACT
A study of the political integration* of a minority group in a new 
state can undertake little more than to suggest the relative importance 
of positive and negative current responses to the new political environ­
ment , and the result will be an analysis in terras of movement towards or 
away from an essentially notional goal of integration. This technique 
may, however, have relevance in the older states too, where no integration 
of a minority, and common political identity between groups, should ever 
be regarded as immutable. On the other hand, while this study of the Buddhist 
Thai of Kelantan concludes on a pessimistic note concerning future trends, 
it is not intended to subscribe to the proposition that a plural society 
is by definition non-integrable. The plural society of colonial Kelantan 
was distinctly an integrated society, and the situation of the Kelantan 
Thai today is, on balance, still an integrative one. The observer's ex­
pectation of a future movement towards alienation arises from a projection 
of current political trends and a prediction that the changing environment 
will be increasingly perceived as hostile in terms of the Thais* received 
or evolving political values. The integrative ambience of today is likewise 
explained in terms of a consonance between the political environment and 
the values, or political culture, moulded by historical experience both 
colonial and pre-colonial - albeit a lack of political structure and 
leadership inhibit resistance. But more fundamental and unchanging than 
any value prescriptive of an ideal political or social system and roles 
within it, is ethnic identity, chiefly defined and perpetuated in the
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Kelantan Thai case by the Buddhist religion. More significant (for 
alienation) than an incipient political dimension of religious identifi­
cation with Thailand may be a sense that democratic politics demands 
submergence of a minority's identity.
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PREFACE
This dissertation, a socio-political study of the Buddhist Thai of 
Kelantan, in the north-east of the Malay Peninsula, had its logical 
origins in the earlier experience and training of its author and the 
author's wife, although neither the experience nor the training were chosen 
with a view to this particular study* The author was a teacher of history 
in the principal English secondary school of Kelantan from 1962 to 1965» 
During this time he and his wife learned Malay, and became very attached, 
as people will, to their adopted home* In 1965 the author was offered a 
'state-studentship* by the British Department of Education and Science to 
pursue research in South-East Asian politics at the School of Oriental and 
African Studies, London, for three years* Anxious to extend his field of 
interest beyond Malaya, he sought, and was generously encouraged, to take 
a course in another language* The language chosen was Thai*
There was as yet no notion of returning to Kelantan; indeed Thailand 
seemed a more attractive field for investigation* But the author's previous 
experience in Kelantan and lack of contacts and local knowledge in Thailand, 
made a study of the Kelantan Thai^ look more plausible than any other pro­
ject, when the time came to settle for a subject* The London Committee of 
the London-Comeli Project for East and South-east Asian Studies (financed 
jointly by the Carnegie Corporation of New York and the Nuffield Foundation) 
took the same view on being approached for a travel grant* Thus the present 
study came into being*
This is an appropriate point at which to acknowledge the generous help 
of the London-Cornell Project, which sent not only the author, but also his
wife and young daughter, into the field and reimbursed a number of expenses 
not covered by their maintenance grant. Equally indispensable, however, was 
the guaranteed three-years' income and fees from the British government 
state-studentship, without which the author would probably never have entered 
Asian studies at all.
It is . a pleasure to acknowledge with gratitude the watchful advice and 
encouragement of Professor Hugh Tinker, who has coaxed the dissertation 
forward and inspired some truly valuable insights in the course of its 
development.
Information used, in the dissertation and communicated by individuals 
Is often acknowledged in the notes, but many persons remain unmentioned by 
name: particularly staff of the School of Oriental and African Studies who
have given training, encouragement or assistance, from time to time; mem­
bers of the Civil Service in Kelantan and in Bangkok, who helped courteously 
and painstakingly; and countless others who assisted in small and large 
ways with facilities and information - most of all the Thai farmers and 
their families who generously welcomed the visitors and answered their ques­
tions tirelessly to the end. Acknowledgements will be made more fully if 
the opportunity arises to rewrite the study in the form of a book.
Transcription. Malay words in the text are written in the standard penin­
sular spelling, without any attempt to reproduce the Kelantan phonology.
Thai words are given in an adapted version of the phonemic trans- 
cription of Professor Mary Haas familiar to all students of Thai. The 
author assumes that this study will have as strong an appeal to students
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of Thailand as to any other group, and he would rather not have this group 
misled by abandoning the familiar transcription for the greater convenience 
of non-readers of Thai. The advantage gained in communication with non­
readers (to whom the words, even if correctly pronounced,- have scant sig­
nificance), would not outweigh the loss of communication with those who do 
read Thai. In fact the phonemic transcription is easy to follow, and is 
made even easier here by the replacement of four phonetic symbols by letters 
from the English typewriter (under partially Germanic inspiration). The 
following comments will help to elucidate what is not self-evident.
Long vowels are indicated by a double letter, as : uu 
Aspirate consonants are followed by an 'h', as: th. This combination 
is simply pronounced like an English 't' but rather more explosively.
is an unaspirate form of ch and does not sound like the palatal k:. 
Final consonants are always 'stopped', just as in Malay. They are 
written with d., b^, and
The symbol £ indicates a vowel roughly equivalent to the sound of the 
English word 'or'; it here replaces the D of the Mary Haas transcription* 
y  does not indicate the close German 1U' (this is not heard in Thai) 
but the curious Thai vowel in words like myang (a city, a state) which 
sounds to non-Thai ears like u. Technically, it is described as a central 
unrounded high vowel.
The of the Haas transcription is rendered here by ug and becomes 
self-explanatory.
is equivalent to the English consonant 'y' (in 'yell') if appearing
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in the initial position in a Thai syllable. It is also the equivalent of i_ 
if at the end of a.diphthong.
5. stands for the sound familiar to us from German 'RBhre1, etc. It 
replaces here the B of the Mary Haas transcription.
±, c>, u, je, and JL ( 6 in Haas), correspond to German equivalents and are 
not diphthongised.
Diphthongs are indicated phonetically in both their parts, w in a 
diphthong sounds like u.
Short a, (except in a diphthong) is rather close to the English vowel 
in 'cup'; long aa sounds like the English vowel in 'park*. As the second 
element (short) in a diphthong, and (infrequently) as an unstressed short 
initial syllable in polysyllabic words, it sounds like the unstressed 
English indefinite article 'a1. This a. figures too in the diphthong iaw, 
which most people would transcribe on first hearing as io.
Readers of Thai will want to know how dialectal variations from stan­
dard Thai are to be handled. The answer is that they will be ignored, and 
all words given as if pronounced by standard Thai speakers. (Tones, however, 
will not be indicated in any form.) The vowel uu, which is always pronounced 
oo in the village where most of the author’s research was done, will be 
rendered with uu. ii, which often changes to e_e in that village, will re­
main ii. j., which usually sounds like n.i- and in certain words like t,i. 
will appear as j.* Loan words will be spelt with a notional standard Thai 
phonology.
The policy on spelling will have the advantage of helping the reader
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of Thai to recognize the words. The inclusion of standard tones on the 
other hand would hardly further recognition. But the omission even of
dialect tones is due to a two-fold, special problem. Firstly, the only
3
dialect of Kelantan and Harathiwat treated by Marvin Brown is the Taag 
Baj dialect, to which he gives eight distinct tones. Some of these 'wobble' 
in a way not easy to indicate with a combination-of strokes above the word, 
even were these the tones one wished to indicate. Secondly, and more 
importantly, the Thai dialect of the village of Sambbrag, where the author 
stayed for ten months with his family, is not the Taag Ba^  dialect des­
cribed by Marvin Brown and spoken with minor variations (according to the 
author's impression) in all but two of Kelantanfs Thai villages. The 
Sambbmg tones are both easier and, in a way, more difficult to transcribe 
than those of Taag Baj.
Transcription should be easier in that there appear to be only two 
(perhaps three?) basic tones: a high tone, characteristic of HI, H3, Ml
and M3; a shallow falling tone for MO, L0; and a steeper falling tone 
(which sometimes seems to start scarcely higher than for the first two) 
for HO, LI, L3, L2, M2 and H2; while H4, M4 and L4 appeared generally and 
indiscriminately high. Apart from the question whether there are two 
falling tones, the only difficulty here is the promptings of an inner 
scepticism which tells one that a Thai tone system cannot be as simple as 
this!
Yet this simplicity is disturbed by an equally astonishing flexibility 
in the use of the high tone. A word 'normally' pronounced with a falling 
voice will invariably be high if it is the second word in a phrase where
- l i ­
the first word is the important one: e.g., khwaa^ raw (my buffalo) becomes
not khwaaj raw in the dialect but khwaa| raw. On the other hand a villager
\ A 'stressing his possession of the buffalo would say: khwaey raw lb, the
first, unaccented word having a level or low tone (perhaps because the 
second word pulls the voice away before it can fall?) A high pitch is sus­
tained in the dialect, too, at the end of the first of a pair of statements
which are to be contrasted, thus: wad nii ngaam: kh^ng nan maj ngaam
('this monastery is beautiful but that one isn't' - standard Thai tones) 
becomes: wad nii ngaam: khppng nan maj ngaam. Actually the mere implication
of a contrasting statement to follow is enough to lift the voice, so that 
'it's not my buffalo, /.it's his/' will be: maj chaj khwaaj raw.
A completely new tone intervenes - a high rising one - where a speaker 
wants to correct a negative assumption, or even to give a positive answer 
to an open question, sometimes; or to emphasize the distinction between 
what we call 'critical pairs' of words. Thus if you ask a Semerak Thai to 
give a name to the horse (maa in standard Thai) he or she will say: nii maa 
(note the high unaccented nii). You then say "Well, what's that animal
under the house, then?" (meaning the dog: in standard Thai maa) and your
informant will reply in amused surprise: nan maa. The result is the same 
if you ask for the dog first and the horse afterwards. The second of the 
pair is always given on a high and rising tone,
p
Mild consternation was provoked when a group of ladies were asked to 
distinguish between 'hungry* and 'poor'. Hungry in Sambbrag is jaag (standard 
Thai jaag^). The ladies gave this high tone correctly. Then they were
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asked for 'poor*. This is normally inSamdbrag, as in standard Thai, jaag , 
but in the interests of contrast the answer could only be nan jaag - which 
the ladies admitted to their own surprise and dismay was pretty much what 
they had just said for hungry. This was not a kind trick to play, because 
the two words are normally distinct. Only pairs of the dog and horse type 
are normally indistinguishable (to the outsider at any rate).
In such a situation, the author feels little confidence in stating 
what the ’normal* tone really is for any given word* In this state of 
indecision it would be unwise to attempt to devise a set of tone marks.
A short description of the conditions and location of the author's
work belongs properly here in the preface.
Such historical background as it was possible to gather for Chapter III -
time is a hard master - was gathered mostly from secondary English language
sources, to a small extent from documents at the Public Records Office,
London, and, also to a small extent from verbal enquiry among the Thai
people of Kelantan. The author found no time to visit the national archives
at Kuala Lumpur or Bangkok, to search for material in South Thailand, or
even to make rigorous enquiry after documents in the temples of Kelantan.
The author had hoped to be able to read the annual reports for Kelantan
from 1904 to 1909 for references to the, Thai community, but these reports,
6said to be held at the State Secretariat, Kota Bharu , were missing, presumed 
stolen, by the time of the author's first visit to the Secretariat in 
October 1966.
11
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The paucity of solid historical material in Ghapter III is a matter for 
real regret, because the historical situation of the Kelantan Thai is not 
incorporated in the dissertation out of any mere desire to *fill out* space 
or ffill in* a background. The postulated historical condition of the com­
munity occupies an important place in the total argument.
The author and his family occupied a small tiled house in Baan Sambbrag 
for ten months, from October 1966 to July 1967. ICampong Siam, Semerak, is 
a Thai village with one wat, situated in the last meander of the slow Semerak 
river, close to the sea (but not a fishing village) in Pasir Puteh district 
(see the map, page 49 )• It lies only 4-2' miles from the Trengganu border 
and Besut estuary, and 33 miles (one hour) by taxi from Kota Bharu the state 
capital. The distance as the crow flies to the Thai border at Rantau 
Panjang or Pengkalan Kubor is some 36 miles, but the Kelantan river has to 
be negotiated on the way. Until the Kota Bharu road bridge was opened in 
1965 this had to be done by ferry. The road and/or rail distance to the 
border crossings is about 45 to Pengkalan Kubor (to cross to Taag Baj) and 
to Rantau Panjang (for Sungai Golok) over 50. ICampong Siam Semerak is more 
isolated from other centres of Thai culture in Kelantan, and more distant 
from Thailand, than any other Kelantan wat (but there are two further Thai 
hamlets in Trengganu without wats),
Semerak was chosen as a base because of its isolation. It was hoped 
that one could assess here the persistence of ties and identification with 
other parts of the Kelantan Thai community, and with Thailand, in a situation 
of long isolation. Equally one would hope to find integration with the Malay 
world more developed, and suggestive of more widely applicable hypotheses,
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them in the villages of north Kelantan, Most of the latter seemed too 
close to Thailand not to he strongly attracted to identification with the 
homeland (or this was the author's surmise before arriving in the field),
The north-ICelantan Thai villages tend also, in combination with each other, 
to make up large concentrations of Thai population which would probably be 
less prone to contact with the Malays than an isolated centre like Sambbrag 
If one were to study political integration at all in a nation, where 
democratic politics was only 12 years old (the first elections in the 
countryside were held in 1955)» and sovereignty only 10 years old, one would 
need to find a community where some degree of practical identification with 
the environment was difficult to avoid or reject.
In thus assuming that Sambbrag might reveal differences with other 
Kelantan Thai villages, the author was taking a calculated risk that the 
findings about leadership, political attitudes, political organisation, and 
the like, would have a limited relevance for the Kelantan Thai as a whole.
To discover something about these matters in other villages he went on tour 
with his family to five other villages in August 1967» after ten months at 
Sambbrag. The tour took in Baan Maalaj (Baan Sambbrag's sister village near
<7
Bachok ); Baan Bposamb.d outside Tumpat; Baan Jaamuu and Baan Jung Kaw in 
west-Tumpat district; and Baan Bangsb,' at Batu Tiga in Pasir Mas district, 
the site of Wad Udtamaaraam where the Chief Abbot of Kelantan has his seat. 
The travellers stayed for four or five days at each place. During the period 
of residence at Semerak there had been opportunity to become acquainted with 
the two hamlets in Trengganu and three more in Pasir Puteh district (see 
map, page 49 ) none of which has a wat.
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These hamlets, and the five villages visited on the tour, showed 
characteristics which distinguished them in various ways from Sambbrag.
Yet contrary to the author's fears, there was much that identified them 
as one community with Sambbrag, hoth in the problems faced and in their 
adjustments to them. Closeness to the border makes physical migration less 
intimidating but if the migratory option be once rejected there is no re­
course to mental migration and flights from political reality. Thus it 
has seemed possible to write of "the state of the Kelantan Thai" in spite 
of the preponderance of Semerak and Pasir Puteh district data. But no 
generalisations from this data are hazarded without good reason, and the 
village to which specific data refer is made clear at every point in the 
dissertation.
The three visitors were quickly welcomed at Sambbrag village. This 
was due in part to the nostalgia for British rule which is an important 
political phenomenon: and due in part also to the readiness of the visitors
to take part in the activities of the wat. The author found his Malay still 
more fluent than the Thai learnt in London, and he used Malay for some 2%; 
months before switching to the Sambbrag dialect. His wife began a study 
of household economy, using Thai, after ^  months. The youngest member, 
the surest key to people's hearts, spoke the dialect fluently after 7 months, 
to the envy of her parents.
The idle and sometimes malicious curiosity of certain Malays of the 
district was unpleasant for the visitors and a plague on the Thais in the 
first two months. But the visitors were able in due course to make an im»
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pression of friendliness and goodwill among people outside the village - 
probably a visit to the P.M.I.P. assemblyman did more good than any other 
single act - and towards the end the Thais were being generally complimented 
on their good fortune in having the Europeans to stay with them* This, 
incidentally, revealed an undercurrent of good will between the communities 
which was not apparent in the earlier statements of the Semerak Thais.
Apart from the expectation of a greater degree of integration in a
village long isolated from other Thai centres and from Thailand, the author
approached the study with as few as possible hypotheses and preconceptions.
The theoretical considerations which follow in Chapter X were stimulated
essentially by the experience of the research itself in combination with
some methodological literature studied, for better or worse,, only on the
author's return from the field. The author is happy to align himself with
the sentiments of Fred W. Riggs, who admits, in the introduction to his work
8on the Thai bureaucracy , to a "lack of a priori conclusions and hence a 
shamefully imprecise and unpredictable research methodology", finding him­
self "in the position of Pirandello's roles in search of a play."
The characters in the 'play' which follows spoke their parts during 
I966 and 1967 with very little prompting from the 'dramatist*. The usual 
research'technique' was that of participant observation - with a lack of 
hypotheses little else was possible anyway in the early months. In an 
attempt to establish a correlation between wealth and leadership the author 
undertook a survey of all the land in the village - a monumental task which 
answered the question (negatively) long before it was finished, but had to 
be carried through to the end because it was a godsend to the villagers.
The villagers, in any case, now know the official lot numbers and correct 
rent of the land they occupy, and this was the least service the author 
could perform in return for all their help to him. Questionnaires were 
never made or handed out. The author memorized the questions and the ans­
wers in interviews to assess public opinion and communications, and wrote 
them up immediately afterwards. Only statistical data such as age, 
nationality status, number of children, were ever noted down in the pre­
sence of the informant. A portable tape recorder was used to record the 
dialect - the subjects chosen for conversation were village history, mid­
wifery, magic, etc. No interviews relating to political questions were 
recorded - indeed they most frequently took the form of passing the time 
of day and lacked an interview-like 'structure' altogether. Because of 
unfailing good will there were 110 inhibitions about answering any question, 
but some would ask cautiously about the statistical data, after the author 
had noted it down "where are you going to send all this to?" One could 
never explain the purpose of the work too often; and it might have been 
unfortunate in some cases to try to write down confidential opinions or 
record them. Everyone knew the findings would be published eventually, in 
the English language, but some would have disliked the idea of 'being quoted' 
personally. Besides this, tape recordings have to be played over afterwards 
immediately afterwards - which may be difficult to arrange; and once the 
living context is absent, in a language where one is at a very early and 
elementary stage of understanding, not a great deal of the meaning of the 
interview would survive from the live event.
The author visited Bangkok in August and September 1967 to enquire into
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the attitude of the Thai government and press and the Buddhist Order to the 
Kelantan Thai question. The state of the Kelantan Thai became an internat­
ional question in November 1966 by the action of the first Thai Consul in 
Kota Bharu (see Chapter VII). The author of this study has no responsibility 
for this development, but clearly his data could be used by interested par­
ties on both sides to damage good relations. This is an occupational 
hazard for any researcher. The author trusts that his admiration of the 
reciprocal tolerance and restraint of the Malaysian and Thai governments -
especially towards each other’s instinctive concern for minorities beyond 
9the border - will testify to his own wish for-a harmonious outcome. The 
author trusts that if his findings and conclusions are useful in any way it 
may be in pointing the path to just such a happy and honourable integration 
of the Kelantan Thai minority in the nation of Malaysia as the two govern­
ments are committed to worm for.
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FOOTNOTES
1. Without previous acquaintance with Kelantan, indeed, the author might 
never have become aware of the existence of a Thai community there. 
Outside of the official Malayan censuses (e.g. J.E.Nathan, The Census 
of British Malaya. 1921. London 1922; and Federation of Malaya, 
Department of Statistics: 1957 Population Census. Report Wo.10 State
of Kelantan, Kuala Lumpur, 1959J the Thai of Kelantan receive scant 
recognition in the South East Asia literature. W. A. Graham*s gem 
(W.A.Graham, Kelantan: a State of the Malay Peninsula. Glasgow 1908) 
remains the best authority ancient or modern but is even then not 
wholly reliable. Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff (Minority 
Problems in South East Asia., Stanford. 1955* see pp.160-1) limit the 
Malayan Thai by implication to the State of Kedah. An ethnic map in 
a publication of 1964 (viz. Le Bar, F.M. et al., Ethnic Groups of 
Mainland South-east Asia. Mew Haven, Mass., 1964) shows Thai culture 
penetrating* the Malay area of the Kra-Malay Peninsula no further than
a line drawn from Phuket Island on the west down to Thalee Luang on the 
east - i.e. to the north even of Songkhla! One would like to enjoy 
Stewart Wavell's colourful, sensual travel-book, The Naga King*s 
Daughter (London 1964) as a travel-book and not drag it into the present 
discussion at all. Unfortunately, it has an intellectual theme which 
calls for a response, given the likelihood that students will refer to 
it in the absence of other sources. However, as neither the book nor 
the response deserve the prominence of the front page, a short dis­
cussion will be found appended as Appendix X. at p*254*
2. See: Mary Haas, Thai Reader. American.Council of Learned Societies, 
Washington D.C., 1954; and Thai-English Student’s Dictionary. Stanford, 
1964.
5. See; J.Marvin Brown, From Ancient Thai to Modern Dialects, Bangkok,
1965; pp. 15 & 155.
4. W.B. The gloss of jaag in standard Thai is somewhat different - it 
means *to want* in the sense of 'to desire to*.
5. jaag is not used for 'poor* in the standard language, but the gloss, 
'difficult* is common to Sambbrag and standard Thai.
6. See; K.G.Tregonning, ed., Malayan Historical Sources, History Depart­
ment, Singapore University, 1962.
7. c.p. Chapter III, p. 81 , infra. This village speaks the same dialect 
as Sambbrag. Dialect, even within the small Kelantan Thai population, 
is an unfailing indicator of historical relatedness between individual 
villages.
8. In Fred W. Riggs, Thailand. The Modernization of a Bureaucratic Polity. 
Honolulu, 1966. See Introduction, pp. 6 & 8 .
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9. See Chapter VII, p. 195 , infra# et seq.
- 21 -
CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION 
This 'socio-political' study of an ethnic minority in South-east Asia ex­
amines several sociological as well as strictly political aspects of the life 
of the Kelantan Thai, hut it is offered as a dissertation in political science, 
and its theme is political integration. Consideration of the sociology of the 
community is geared and subordinated to this theme.
The author understands 'political integration1 fundamentally, in the first
1
of the five senses enumerated by Myron Weiner in a well-known article :
"...the process of bringing together culturally and socially dis­
crete groups into a single territorial unit and the establishment 
of a national identity. When used in this sense 'integration' 
generally presumes the existence of an ethnically plural society 
in which each group is characterised by its own language or other 
self-conscious cultural qualities, but the problem may also exist 
in a political system which is made up of once distinct indepen­
dent political units with which people identified. National inte­
gration thus refers specifically to the problem of creating a sense 
of territorial nationality which overshadows - or eliminates - 
subordinate parochial loyalties,"
The Federation of Malaya became independent on 51 August 1957* The author
began his field research just nine years and a month after that event - a point
in time too early for a complete Malayan national identity to have emerged
among the Kelantan Thai, although the territorial conditions were satisfied
2
long before: on 15 July 1909* to be precise. What this dissertation considers
then, is not, simply, 'the Malayan identity of the Kelantan Thai', but the pro­
cess of growth towards or decline away from a notional state of national iden­
tity. The process of growth towards identity will be called 'political inte­
gration' ; its opposite, a decline from identity, had best be called 'reversal 
of political integration' or (incipient) 'alienation* since 'disintegration* 
is too suggestive of anarchy to be appropriate in the case under study. The 
term 'failure of integration' is too suggestive of immobility to be useful for 
a situation where change is of the essence.
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Nevertheless, what the observer catches of the reality in the space 
of a few months is more like a static than a dynamic state. He gets to 
know his subject at a particular point on the ongoing process of integration.
How shall one identify this state of integration? There may be room 
for confusion in the twin referents of the word 'assimilation*. One could 
incorporate the 'state of assimilation* into the definition of integration: 
a group which is 'integrated* or 'integrating* (conceived as a quasi-static 
state of being) is one which is 'assimilated* in such and such ways. 
Alternatively, the 'process of assimilation’ may be one which leads to the 
quasi-static state of integration. A choice must be made between assimi­
lation which defines integration, and assimilation as a notionally prior 
factor. The advantage of the latter approach would be an ability to iso­
late a group's earlier experience and identify the integrative significance 
of it.
Keeping causes and results separate is not difficult if ones contact 
with the living situation is relatively brief. One is hound to look out­
side the brief months of ones contact to earlier events, for much of the 
explanation of what one sees. In so doing one comes easily to order the 
data into two classes: what one had observed and the postulated causes of
what one observed - even if some of the causes, such as the ongoing process 
of assimilation itself, can be observed in the living situation. Assimil­
ation and integration are not necessarily separate in time. But since they 
can very usefully be separated in the case under study, this dissertation 
will employ a fairly systematic periodicization*
Yet it is hard to achieve a total and pure divorce of the two classes
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of^  data, even at the conceptual level* Can one identify and describe a 
state of political integration1 without betraying a preference for a 
particular type of explanation? In identifying political integration* 
this author is inclined to pick out a syndrome of positive behavioural 
responses to the social and political environment on the part of the 
minority. But 1responses* imply a previous conditioning experience. The 
type of explanation is already indicated by the description of the observed 
situation.
Another preliminary point to be made clear is that, just as Weiner's 
completed national identity is political in the very broadest sense of all 
that makes for identification with a nation, this dissertation will attempt 
to describe and explain both conventionally political behaviour (such as 
effective integration with given political and governmental structures and 
modes on the basis of acquired skills and associated values) and identi­
fication with the overall societal structure on the basis of legitimacy 
stemming from its varied impact on and perception by the minority. But 
identification too may often have to be deduced from behaviour of a non­
verbal kind: not all the statements of informants should be accepted un­
critically. 'Consciousness* may not exactly reflect 'existence* in the 
early stages of change. (Nor need it be consciousness that lags behind the 
latter - it may forerun a process like alienation.) To put it another way, 
in the early stages of nation-building, when a group is not 'integrated* but 
at best 'integrating', we are necessarily referred to various functional 
pre-conditions of integration as indicators of the existence of such a 
process: conditions related, for instance, to Weiner's concepts of good
elite-governed communication, and capacity to organise for common purposes. 
(Weiner gives these among his assembled definitions of integration: of course 
these forms of integration are complementary, not exclusive, to integration 
in the sense of the achievement of common identity; the latter indeed can 
only come about and be completely understood through the contribution of 
such cultural and structural changes - which should be regarded as means 
towards a common end - even if we find it convenient to make a distinction 
between 1 general identification*, as revealed most strikingly in good re­
lations with other races, and 'integration with political structures, etc.')
Needless to say, we are not interested in how far the Thais have become 
"like Malays". This sort of total assimilation might immeasurably help the 
emergence of common nationality, but such a process is so little advanced 
among the group in question that it would be futile to attempt to operate 
with such a definition and model of national integration. What we are com­
mitted to study is how far our group are behaving "like Malayans", i.e. have 
assimilated to common social values or an incipient common identity with 
the social environment (this aspect to be dealt with in Chapters XI and III); 
and assimilated habits and values relevant to particular political modes and 
structures (a theme which will be postponed to Chapter V),
Regarding the conditioning-and-response approach foreshadowed above: 
its function is to facilitate the analysis of historical cause and effect, 
not to reduce political behaviour to a mere mechanism. While habits and 
skills are certainly part of the learned response to specific contemporary 
structures and groups, the situation in which that learning or assimilation
took place also constituted a nominative experience in implanting values for
present and future conduct, and expectations from the environment* Values 
imply freedom of future choice. They are particularly apparent in attitudes 
to the overall societal structure and its legitimacy. They are the normative 
element in political culture. A concept of 'models1 will also he invoked 
below in delineation of the descriptive side of political culture - and to 
give further point to our anti-mechanistic bias.
But first consideration in this opening study of some of the literature 
of the plural society and political integration will be given to a work which 
in fact seems irrelevant in some ways and even wrong at times in the light of 
the realities of the ICelantan Thai situation* Nevertheless its hypotheses 
are stimulating and offer a valuable starting point: even if ones conclusions
&re often in contrast and reaction to its own. That book is Deutsch's
3Nationalism and 3ocial Communication,
An important difficulty of this work seems to be its failure to make a
clear distinction at all times between different types of assimilation.
Linguistic assimilation appears to be equated, by implication, at, several
points in the book, with integration to a national identity. For example:
"...The Slavic settlers of the Peloponnesus were assimilated to the 
Greek speech of the towns during the 'dark ages'; the peasants of 
Fgypt gradually changed their Coptic speech for Arabic between the 
seventh and twelfth centuries A*D. (although the process may not 
have been completed until the sixteenth); and the Wendish peasants 
of Eastern Germany gradually became Germans between the tenth and 
the eighteenth centuries."4
This, of course, is a too exclusive definition of nationality (even if, 
as we shall later show, unassimilated language and ethnicity are a potentially 
important inhibiting factor in integration). Deutsch is writing, however,
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with the intention of seeking factors for nationality other than those put 
forward in the many facile accounts of the past. He recognises, when address­
ing this problem consciously, that linguistic assimilation is neither a
5necessary condition - as in Switzerland - nor a sufficient condition - as
g
in Ireland - for common nationality. This study of the political integration 
of the Kelantan Thais will take as one basic assumption that it is not 
necessary to be assimilating linguistically in order to integrate to a 
nationality.
What is not at all ambiguous in Nationalism and Social Communication 
is the view that once a process of assimilation in some kind has been inaug­
urated, only social mobilisation of the affected groups is necessary to create 
a common nationality between them. Mobilisation and intensive social com­
munication appear to be a sufficient condition for nationality. The quality 
or type of assimilation are disregarded and the 'impartial' (because quanti­
fiable?), forces of social communication hold sway over the process.
"...assimilation can be accelerated very greatly by increasing 
the rate of new experiences from society. This may occur by a
total change of environment, such as in a group migration....
/but/ immigration is not the only way in which a greatly incr­
eased stream of new similar experiences may come to bear upon 
the members of two different peoples. Instead of packing up and 
going where the new experiences are, the members of several
peoples may stay put and have a flood of new experiences come
to them in a period of major social change." 7
There is no doubting the significance of periods of intensive communi­
cation and rapid change, in the relations of groups. But is the process of
national integration as ineluctable as Deutsch would seem to have us believe? 
Must every development be unilinear? When a group first begins to assimilate
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in some way to its environment - be it before the era of mobilisation or 
during it - this involves a change of direction. Why, a priori, should 
there be no more than one change of direction in the history of a group so 
long as it remains an identifiable group? May there not be intermediate 
cases between groups which assimilate progressively to the point of dis- 
appearance and the groups (whose existence Deutsch recognises ) which re­
sisted assimilation from the start?
If we consider assimilation to occur not only in terms of language but 
also of political structures and values, assimilation involves a reidenti­
fication of the self which, however elementary the level, is within the area 
of the cognitive. A purely mechanistic, behaviouristic interpretation of 
cultural change cannot be satisfactory for any human society at any period 
(given our understanding of the term homo sapiens). But if choice can be 
exercised once, may it not be exercised again, in an opposite direction, in 
circumstances where changing internal values and changing outside conditions 
cease to be compatible - and provided the group retains some of its identity 
(in the form of a language, for instance, or perhaps an independent political 
structure)? As Kunstadter points out in his discussion of the same problem;
"Many of the minority peoples in South-east Asian countries 
(such as the Shan in Burma and the Tai groups in Worth Vietnam) 
were, and still are, internally organised on a level which 
necessarily brings them into structural opposition with the 
1 central government1." 9
Ihis is a serious matter for integration, even though;
"One book more than any other has destroyed the illusion that 
tribal groups are isolated, independent, homogeneous, self- 
sufficient, stable entities; this is Edmund Leach*s Political
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Systems of Highland Burma, published in 1954."*^
In other words, notwithstanding a centuries-long symbiosis and mem­
bership of one overshadowing political system, integration in the new nation 
states is not an inevitable outcome. In a period of heightening self-aware­
ness - the period of mobilisation to which Deutsch attaches great importance - 
it might be appropriate to shift the position from a denial of the a priori 
probability of integration to an a priori expectation of integrative decline 
in societies which retain tangible elements of plurality. This is the ulti­
mate bias of the present study - although in earlier chapters, elements of 
ongoing integration among the Kelantan Thais will be picked out, and the 
conditions for such a phenomenon. (And the Kelantan Thai lack - unlike many 
upland tribes of South-east Asia - an independent political structure.)
The seeming paradox of the Kelantan Thai case arises from the fact that 
in the first half of the present century, a period of incipient but not in­
tensive mobilisation for all groups in the state, the trend appears to have 
been integrative; and this trend has not yet worked itself out, given a 
certain continuity of political conditions since Independence (i.e. contem­
porary conditions evoke a positive response from a group whose most recent 
political values were acquired in the colonial period - see Chapters II &
III). On the other hand, apart from the nostalgic preference for British 
rulers as such, the new values relating to socio-political structure, 
acquired during the colonial era and under the special impact of intensifying 
social communication, are less easily satisfied in a state now ruled by an 
extremist Malay party, and future prospects for integration are not entirely 
encouraging. Even under an Alliance government alienation could develop.
Thus the integration made possible by assimilative processes during the 
(limited) mobilisation of colonial rule was predicated on certain socio- 
structural conditions (in terms of rights and relative status in the 
society) associated with colonial rule itself. Its legacy is equivocal. 
Moreover, while the environment may become less favourable, values relating 
to desired status would seem to be able to change in only one direction: 
towards an ever greater insistence on equality.
At the root of the problem, always, is the persistence of Thai identity, 
enhanced, but not created, by colonial rule. Before giving consideration to 
a number of writings on the plural society and the conditions for the inte­
gration of diverse groups, it will be in place here to suggest the importance 
of this kind of study in the world context*
The politically developed nations, the complacent breeding grounds of the 
very ideas of political unity and integration, are now in the throes of 
political upheavals consequent upon the upsurge of long-dormant regional and 
ethnic nationalisms. These upsurgings are often - as in Belgium and Canada - 
the product of a prior experience of improving status granted in the interests 
of ultimate integration. A generation later, if equal status is still felt 
to be more nominal than real, demands can arise for a fulfilment of the 
promise, even to the point of political independence from the majority, or 
previous dominant, cultural group. An era in which even Great Britain can 
no longer feel certain of her future territorial Integrity, is one which needs 
new models of the national integration process. Appropriate models will 
have to retreat from the advanced positions of political science in that any
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pretensions to predict political development (however modest and cix^ cum- 
scribed) must be given up. If we do hazard to project a course of possible 
development we must try to err on the cautious side as to the likelihood of 
integration. The present study is offered partly as a contribution.to such 
a more cautious mode of analysis of the plural society. Integration in 
South East Asia - or any other place - is bound neither to succeed nor to 
fail. The past is complex and the programmes and policies of the present 
must be chosen to elicit positive responses to nation building. For every 
positive response there may be a negative one in reserve.
It was stated above that the earlier part of the study would deal with 
elements of integration. 3ince views have differed on the possibility of 
achieving any integration in diverse societies, it may be useful to see where 
the present study stands along the continuum of learned assessments of the 
question.
Discussions of the concept 'jjhe plural society1 generally go back, by
almost ineluctable convention, to the author who fathered the term: J.S.
11Furnival . This is not an undesirable convention to observe here if we 
want to examine a representative selection of models of social relations in 
the plural society - for the view of Furnivall has come to occupy, in recent 
years, the position of 'minority opinion', and almost has to be quoted if 
his species of view is to be represented at all.
However, Purnivall does not stand at the extreme end of the spectrum.
1-Ie himself took pains to criticize the views of the 'plural economy' school 
of Dutch writers, who could not conceive of any assimilation of new values 
and behavioural traits by rural communities whatsoever, even in the economic
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sphere. J. H. Boeke sums up his own view in the following words:
"Trekken wij een voorloopige conclusie uit het voorgaande 
betoog, dan moet deze aldus luiden; dat de individualistische, 
kapitalistischey op het vrije,, niet door sooiale normen ge- 
bonden, ruilverkeer betrokken theorie voor het begrijpen van 
de oostersche samenleving onbruikbaar is, omdat deze samen- 
leving niet individualistisch* en niet kapitalistisch is, in 
hoofdzaak buiten het marktverkeer en de geldhuishouding blijft en, 
voorzoover daarin.opgenomen, aan alle zijden door sociale nor- 
men gebonden is. Aan den anderen kant moeten de opgesomde 
kenmerken van deze theorie haar juist bij uitstek bruikbaar 
maken voor het westersche en verwesterschte deel der dualis- 
tisohe samenleving: hier een zakelijkheid, rationalisme,
individualisme en economische doelstelling, vollediger en ab~ 
soluter dan in de homogene westersche landen.,,1 12
Boeke*s theme is in reaction to other economists who had tried to
analyse the Netherlands Indies economy wholly in terms of the working of
the profit motive; he describes the native economy as "bound by social
norms on all sides", and would limit the capitalist economy (analytically)
to the European or westernized sectors, noting however that these sectors
are as insensitive to social norms as the native economy is unpermeated by
capitalist principles.
Furnivall argues colourfully and convincingly for the revolutionary
transformation of peasant economy in Indonesia since the coming of the
Dutch:
"¥e have noticed that, in the early days of Dutch rule, the 
people took to new crops when these were profitable, and that 
a rise of price for any commodity increased the supply to an
extent that was sometimes embarrassing, whereas a fall in
price led to a shortage of supply. It may be argued that these 
variations were due to official stimulus, but we are told that 
officials failed, even by penalties, to prevent the people 
from cutting down their coffee plants when prices were inade­
quate, and it must have been more difficult to make them plant
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crops; thus, the variations in supply would seem to have an 
economic explanation in variations of demand. A few years 
later Muntinghe tells how people had taken to specialising 
in tobacco and vegetables, and again a few years later we 
find Van HoSvell, even at the height Of the Gulture System, 
reporting that there had grown up in East Java a differen­
tiation of function purely economic in character....Again 
although native agriculture is largely for home consumption, 
we are told of native money-lenders who add field to field 
no less rapaciously than the banias of British India, and 
it is not quite easy to accept as wholly satisfactory the 
explanation sometimes put forward that in this matter they 
aim at improving their social status rather than their econ­
omic standing.... among some classes, notably the people of 
Menangkabau, there are individuals who can hold their own 
against the Chinese, and the native hajjis have long been a 
byword for extortion,..one is impressed by the avidity with 
which Natives in Java as elsewhere in the East, have seized 
on the opportunity given them by the petrol engine to set up 
business on a small scale with taxis and motor-buses,.." 13
This is a description of change; yet Eurnivall's plural society is
essentially characterised by a lack of convergence between the groups which
constitute it. They only have the economic motive in common. In Eurnivall's
famous words, Netherlands India is "an example of a plural society: a
society, that is, comprising two or more elements or social orders which
14live side by side, yet without mingling, in one political unit,"
How plural is the 'plural society'? One can approach this question as 
a cultural and psychological one, as was done in this section so far: can
and do groups assimilate to each other's behaviour and culture, or at least 
to certain common values? One can, alternatively, or in combination with 
this, approach the question as one concerning the structure of social re­
lations between ethnic groups: how absolute are their divisions, which type
of structure best facilitates mutual assimilation or learning of common 
values, and whioh structural scheme offers the most reliable description of
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known 1plural societies'?
J. Rex states the problem on both levels:
•What is needed on the theoretical level to systematize 
Furnivall's most important insights is an explicit state­
ment, both of the way in which pre-existing cultures are 
brought into relation through the market, and of the way 
in which the market, which draws people together into a 
single social system, also divides them into new dynami­
cally related grotips. * 15
As to cultural, convergence, we can choose between the view of M. G.
Smith that:
’’when groups that practise differing institutional systems 
live side by side under a common :government, the cultural 
plurality of this inclusive unit corresponds to its social 
plurality... ” 16
or the contrary (and to this author more convincing) comment of Vera Rubin;
’’....Smith’s view of cultural homogeneity as a condition 
of societal homogeneity ma^- seem Utopian in the sense that 
such a society would not only eliminate cultural differences 
but provide a harmonious setting in which there is no con­
flict of interests. Such a Utopia is neither in the line of 
evolutionary trends to greater complexity and heterogeneity, 
nor is it a necessary prerequisite for an integrated social 
order. We may have racial and cultural pluralism in a single 
territorial unit without conflict where there is an opport­
unity through communication and through channels of mobility 
for core values and desired statuses to be diffused to the 
various segments of the social structure.” 17
Lloyd Braithwaite, in the same symposium, is seen to be aligned with 
Vera Rubin on the sharing of values. He also writes with insight on the 
nature of assimilation under colonialism and on the usefulness of Furnivall’s 
stratified plan of the structure of a colonial society (to which point we 
shall recur shortly):
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"The concentration on the phenomenon of the lack of social 
will of which Furnivall speaks obscures the really important 
fact that society cannot exist without a minimum sharing of 
common values, without a certain amount of ’social will1... 
he tends to lay too great stress on the economic factors 
affecting policy and too little on the necessary existence 
of sentiments favourable to the metropolitan power and the 
ways and means by which such sentiments are inculcated and 
encouraged....” 18
We read later, in Braithwaite’s conclusion;
"A discussion of the various groups on the island e.Trinidad/ 
would show a varying degree of assimilation to the dominant 
social values and culture. The analysis in terms of social 
stratification serves the useful purpose of stressing the 
common values of the society." 19
To pass any judgement on. Furnivall*s idea of the structure of the
plural society, we must try to reach a clear view of what the idea is.
Furnivall's writing is somewhat ambiguous. A society such as Canada he
20sometimes calls a 'plural society' , elsewhere distinguishes it as a
21'society with plural features' because of its common values. The Hindu
society of India is characterised at another point as a plural society,
although Furnivall seemingly withdraws the epithet in the next sentence:
"Perhaps the only plural society inherently stable is the 
Hindu society of India. Here there are separate groups or 
classes, partly racial, with distinct economic, functions.
But in India caste has a religious sanction, and in a plural 
society the only common deity is Mammon. In general the 
plural society is built on caste without the cement of a 
religious sanction...." 22
Through the latent ambiguity one is able to trace a thread of consistent 
meaning. The colonial plural society is the plural society par excellence. 
Culturally it is without shared values. Structurally it may be conceived as 
a stratified society (notwithstanding the characterisation 'social orders
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which live side by side’):
'One consequence of the emphasis on production rather than on 
social life, which is characteristic of plural society, is a 
sectional division of labour; although the primary distinction 
between the groups may be race, creed or colour, each section 
comes to have its own functions in production, and there is a 
tendency towards the grouping of the several elements into dis­
tinct economic castes...' 23
The European caste rules, the immigrants have economic power at the 
middle level, the indigenous people are at the bottom of society as the 
agricultural caste. Such a structure, did it exist, would not strongly 
conduce to common values - which perhaps explains Furnivall's pessimism on 
that score. In the context of the Kelantan Thai and the present dissertation, 
the point must not be allowed to pass un-noted that our group is a rural 
minority, and the assimilation which is in question today is that to the 
rule of the majority rural group, the Malays, not of any immigrant group 
higher in a notional economic hierarchy. However, this point is well made, 
not in disqualifying the Kelantan Thai from further consideration in the 
discussion - they are, in fact, at the present time, in a subordinate posi­
tion in a socio-political structure, which might seem to earn them a place 
in the Furnivallian scheme of things! - but in suggesting the question 
whether, in the post-independence situation that most troubled Furnivall, a 
rural indigenous majority ever has to make adjustments of values to realise 
a genuine accommodation of alien groups* in their polity. Is it not they 
who occupy the top place in the hierarchy (if there is a hierarchy) after 
independence? Is it not the immigrant entrepreneurs and shopkeepers who 
have to 'fit in', however favoured their status before? If the latter are a 
minority, assimilation to certain common values might be achieved, if only
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by force! (Furnivall stresses the primacy of force as a cement to the
different social orders of the plural society). But this is to speculate
along lines indicated by Furnivall's hierarchical scheme, without questioning
its validity as such.
Two writers who have commented recently on Furnivall's stratified
analysis will now be quoted. The first two commentaries are by H.S.Morris;
the third is an extract from the article by Braithwaite already cited.
"Bast Africa is an example of a plural society in which the 
various sections of the population are marked off from one 
another by criteria of physical and cultural differences. The 
inhabitants of the country conceptualise the structure of 
their society in a slightly simpler version of the scheme 
used by Furnivall to describe the mixed or composite societies 
of the Far East. In Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda, Europeans 
are thought to constitute an administrative, legal and direc­
tive upper class, the Indians are said to form an economic 
and trading middle class, and Africans.are believed, by them­
selves as much as by the other sections of the population, to 
be the urban and rural working classes of the society.
The physical and cultural differences which correspond with 
these divisions of the people and the relative lack of mingling 
among them allow the members of the society to overlook the 
differentiation into groups and categories within each section, 
even though these latter divisions may in fact be structurally 
more significant in the composition of the total society than 
the broader 'racial* categories. This stereotyped view of the 
society also allows its members to overlook the actual mingling 
of members of all sections which occurs, and which is comparable 
with that found in stratified societies which are not usually 
classified as plural." 24
Thus stratification is more characteristic of the internal organisation
of the ethnic categories than of the ordering of the whole categories in
relation to each other. The idea is developed later for Malaya:
"In a large scale society like that of Malaya today, members 
of the Malay, the Chinese, the Indian and the European sections 
of the population are employed in the Civil Service and are
ranked in it without ostensible regard to race. Put in 
another way, in an area of ranking in the social system 
ethnic affiliation is theoretically ignored. On the 
other hand, since political independence from.Britain, 
ethnic sections have increasingly begun to behave as 
corporate groups (Freedman I960). In other words, all 
members of society in Malaya are now expected to enter 
relationships of ethnic incorporation, which for an in­
dividual are limited to one set of ethnic assets. It 
should be noted, though, that these relationships are 
not those of corporate ranking. It would be almost im­
possible to place the Malays as a group above or below the 
Chinese or the Indians; and the overall system of group 
relations is not one of stratification, whatever hierarchies 
may or may not exist within the separate ethnic sections.
In short Malaya and other similar "federal" plural soc­
ieties display relationships of universal and sectionally 
limited incorporation, but not of universal corporate 
ranking." 25
The sharing of various occupational roles among the races in this 
type of structure evidently lends it a culturally unifying character, and 
few would deny the validity of this structural scheme for Malaya as a whole, 
On the other hand, as we have seen, Braithwaite accepts the notion of strati­
fication in colonial society because It facilitates our understanding of 
assimilation to a set of ’dominant social values’. After all, even if the 
several races in a colonial plural society interact as categories at all 
levels, they are certainly subordinate, collectively, to the colonialist, 
the metropolitan power. Psychologically,
■ "...a major need of the individual in a subordinate social 
system whose particularistic-ascriptive values have been 
torn asunder would appear to be acceptance of another set 
of such values. Hence it comes about that the first reac­
tion of many colonials is toward the acceptance of the 
superiority of the scale of values of the subordinate 
social system." 26
Certainly the Kelantan Thai became Integrated with colonial Kelantan 
partly because it was colonial. Chapters III to V will address themselves
- 33 -
in part to the question of the extent to which the 'superordinate values' 
favouring British rule are distinguishable or not from values for an inte­
grative relationship with the society as a whole (in spite of Britain's 
departure). In one sense colonial society is hierarchical; power is 
monopolised by the meti^opolitan power. But in terms of the structure of 
relationships between the ethnic communities -the society is more character­
ised by 'side-by-side*, interlocking and interacting categories. Is such 
sense of community as may arise in these circumstances legitimised solely 
by European sponsorship- or is it an autonomous reality (arising from a 
general social assimilation - assimilation to non-ascriptive social values) 
which can survive Independence (so long as the .structure itself survives in 
important respects)? As a sense of inter-racial equality should grow not 
merely from the knowledge of common subordination to the colonial power,
but also from day-to-day interaction on a footing of practical equality
27(see Chapter II) there may be grounds for some optimism.
Nevertheless, the British departure has not constituted simply the
removal of the top segment in the structure. The Thais' situation today is
not, on-the face of it, comparable to that of the Chinese. Let us refer to
Freedman's comparison of Malayan society before the Pacific war and since
Independence. In the former period,
"The plural society...consisted not of ethnic blocks but of 
ethnic categories within which small groups emerged to form 
social ties inside and across ethnic boundaries. In any one 
locality a balance was struck between the interests of Malays,
Chinese and Indians, A rich and influential Chinese in one 
of the states, for example, maintained his position vis-a-vis 
Chinese and non-Chinese partly as a result of his relations 
with Malay power-holders.•." 28
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Thus again the idea of interacting and interlocking categories. This leaves 
its mark on the new political structure; but politics in turn causes a 
sharper definition of ethnic boundaries and a new consciousness of membership 
in an ethnic block* This new political alignment is the real pluralism for 
Freedman :
"The compromise in the Alliance has an important economic aspect*
There is in Malaya no neat hierarchy of Furnivallian 'orders* endowed 
with specific economic functions. The Asian 'immigrant' population 
does not sit squarely in the middle of the occupational pyramid 
performing only intermediate economic roles, Chinese and Indians 
are distributed over a wide range of economic functions, while in 
the period since the end of the Second World War, a sizeable num­
ber of Malays have appeared in the ranks of industrial employees...
One of the disadvantages of the notion of the plural society, as 
Morris has pointed out, is that it tempts us to argue from cultural 
and 'racial* appearances to social reaiiities. Through most of its 
modern history Malaya has shown important cultural and 'racial' 
divisions but these divisions had not created cleavages running 
the length and breadth of society,... there was no framework for the 
massive alignment of ethnic forces. In the Federation of Malaya 
the attainment of independence has furnished conditions for such an 
alignment..." 29 .
Yes. But for all the preponderating balance of the Malays in the 
national Alliance it is not said that the Chinese are now reduced to a pos­
ition of subordination in a hierarchy. For the rural, out-numbered Kelantan 
Thais Independence has brought a different fate. The elevation of one for­
merly equal group to inherit the crown of the retreating metropolitan power, 
in a way not paralleled in the Peninsular political system as a whole, has 
destroyed the conceived equality of status with the Malay 'category' which 
the Thais had enjoyed for 48 years. And the sensation of equality for the 
Thais, a group without representation higher up the economic scale, did 
depend more heavily on the notion of a shared relationship to power than on 
the less abstract realities of shared economic statuses with other groups
in society, or even the reality of friendly interaction with Malay neighbours 
during the British era*
Methodologically, our analysis here must entail a concept of 'model': 
the sort of model of society that a Thai constructs when he perceives the 
status of his race in society as equal or unequal to others (it is not socio­
logists alone who construct models). In terms of Barbara S. Ward's much
30cited trio of models the Thai model of colonial society, being retrospective 
and coloured somewhat by nostalgia, would count basically as an 'ideological 
model1, and behaviour and legitimisation are ordered by reference to it. But 
it purports to be a description, too, of remembered experience and is partly 
a 'home-made' or 'immediate* model with objective elements which we cannot 
ignore in reconstructing colonial history in Kelantan. So far as the model 
is an objective and not purely subjective reconstruction, it will thus over­
lap with our own 'observer's model*. But its true power lies in the more 
subjective, simplifying, and ideological facets of its account of British 
rule. This account reveals - and in a sense summarises - some of the learning 
processes which are at the back of current responses. We consider that it is 
not in last resort the ideological model that has determined behaviour but 
the formative experience behind the model - just as values prescriptive of 
behaviour also reflect experience.
This is the basis of the periodieisation adopted in this study between 
events before and events after Independence. The changing historical exper­
ience of the group is conceived as a varied conditioning process which will 
be betrayed in its responses to contemporary further changes. This is not 
an original proposition. Yet it gives a larger role to historical change
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and the changing values of a group than Deutsch, with his sense that assim­
ilation is an uninterrupted process once begun (regardless of the forms new 
experience takes) and gives rise to a constant, integrative response (even • 
to new stimuli). It is only necessary to bear in mind the cognitive factor 
in learning - the adoption of values and expectations as well as mere 'assim­
ilation* with its involuntary connotations. And it is precisely in a situ­
ation where a group is only partially assimilated that its residual identity 
will enable it to experience change and acquire values in ways unique to it­
self and not in common with the majority culture. This is the inner dynamic 
of the group's relations to its environment. The assimilation of the 
Kelantan Thais before British rule was of a negative (but not insignificant) 
kind, relating to an acceptance of belonging to a Malay Kelantan (rather 
than to Thailand) and being subjects of a Sultan (see Chapter III); but it 
left Thai cultural identity untouched. More positive social assimilation 
in the British period is indisputable and is an important constituent element 
in today's integration, but that period again left untouched - when not 
actually enhancing - Thai cultural identity. Indeed, given inherited Thai 
identity, social assimilation could scarcely proceed in an era of incipient 
mobilisation except on the basis of a realisation of socio-political values 
which make stricter demands of society than in earlier times. These expect­
ations (notably of equal ethnic status) were simultaneously satisfied by 
the colonial society but as conditions change in a new direction they become 
a potential obstacle to continuing integration. (Where alienation has not, 
.in fact, immediately transpired, it is still apposite to examine historical 
experience, but for learning relating to specific modes and structures of
the political system, diluting the alienated response in the post-Independence 
period; while recording new patterns of conditioning in the present which 
could in due course lead to an estrangement*)
By ’cultural identity’ is understood, in this dissertation, linguistic 
and religious distinctiveness. Such distinctiveness is not a necessary bar 
to political integration, By contrast, the nature of political culture has 
a more direct bearing on political integration. The shared mental models or 
perceptions of the socio-political structure - in combination with learned 
values - affect legitimisation of that structure as a whole. The community’s 
understanding of an appropriate political role in that structure - or what we 
shall refer to (Chapter V) as the ’mode1 of their politics, with the concom­
itant strength or relative weakness of the assertion of right to equality - 
may in effect modify the legitimisation process in one direction or the other. 
But both models of ethnic ranking and conceptions of an appropriate political 
role among the Kelantan Thai rest, characteristically, on the assumption of 
cultural identity and the underlying need for bridging structures and defined 
relationships between a bounded Thai community and its environment. This is 
likely to prove in the long run the most significant politico-cultural 
reality in the Thais' situation, and a constant where other facets of culture 
are in a state of movement, conditioned by change in the environment.
Finally, it follows from the attempt here to be undertaken to adjudicate, 
as it were, between conflicting evidence of integration and alienation, that 
the study will appear at times vacillatory between alternative analyses. In 
a situation of both environmental change and cultural transition, this is in­
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evitable. Indeed to express an exclusive preference for one analysis 
would be untrue to the natural diversity of the phenomena and imply an in­
eluctability of cultural trends which we have already been at pains to deny. 
Such a study as this is made no easier, either, by the fact that when one 
has adjudicated and declared that certain behavioural indicators are for 
the time being more weighty than others and that therefore integration* is 
occurring, objections can be brought against the proposed indicators in 
favour of an alternative definition. But this is no.doubt a hazard common 
to much research in the social sciences. ¥e turn now as courageously as may 
be to our 1 dialogue* or 'dialectic*, hopeful that it will both adequately 
inform within its limited area, and, through its emerging analysis, con­
tribute a little to an understanding of the conditions for national inte­
gration on a wider stage.
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CHAPTER II; THE SOCIAL SETTING 
This chapter will attempt to place the Kelantan Thai in their social 
context* The analysis of integration cannot begin before some basic in- 
formation has been set down about the community. But already in the course 
of this narrative one assimilative current of the British period will be 
indicated! that which flowed from increasing communications between Thai and 
Malay society,andihechanging posture of Malay individuals towards Thais, The 
latter, as much as the new subordination of all races to British power, was 
a development which helped to structure the Thais’ perception of colonial 
society as an equitable one, and assisted their acceptance of it in this 
century, (However, we conceive that a favourable overall structure was in 
turn an essential environment for the more involunta^ processes of social 
assimilation to go forward.) Elements of integration at the present time, 
where related to changes in Malay society, are sketched in without attempting 
to make a hard division between colonial and post-colonial Kelantan. There 
is a continuity which evokes the same responses, or, in normative terms, 
certain expectations acquired during the assimilative interaction of the 
colonial period can still find satisfaction at the level of personal contact 
with Malay fellow-Kelantanese. There is thus some assimilation, both ways, 
to certain common values of mutual'acceptance and shared identity as Kelant- , 
anese country people. At the same time, ’cultural’ assimilation to the Malay 
community is obstructed by Muslim exclusiveness, so Thai identity is upheld, 
as it were by an outside volition, while increasing communications from the 
wider Kelantan world enhance awareness of its social structure and the Thais’ 
position in it. This can only be a factor for acceptance so long as the per­
ceived system of ranking corresponds to received or simultaneously generated
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values and expectations,
The Thai of Kelantan are overwhelmingly a rural community. The last 
1official census in 1957 disclosed that out of 6,7'27 Kelantan Thais, only 
99 were resident in Kota Bharu tom. However, other Thais are found in the 
smaller townships of the state, such as Pasir Puteh, or Machang: very often
they are the wives of Chinese•shopkeepers, but sometimes Thai couples set 
up a shop independently. For instance in Machang district where there is no 
rural Thai settlement, 38 Thais are recorded, and these may be counted as 
urban or semi-urban population.
The Kelantan Thai are only slightly more numerous than the Indians in 
the state, as the following figures from the last census show. As the cate­
gory 'Indian* comprises a number of distinct, small communities, the Thais 
are certainly not the smallest community in the state, but if we overlook 
the various jungle aborigine groups, they are clearly the smallest rural 
community. (The only other proviso would be that the state does have its 
complement of country Chinese and country Thai-Chinese, and their numbers 
are probably not in excess of the Thai,)
All Malaysians 463>118
Malays 458,717
Chinese 28,861
Indians (excluding Ceylonis
& Pakistanis) 5>665
Thai 6,727
Other 1,151
All Races 505,522 2
The 1957 distribution of the Thais by district is as follows. For each
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district the principal centre or centres of Thai settlement - defined as 
villages or hamlet groups having a monastery or monasteries - are indicated, 
(c.p. map p.49)
Kota Bharu tom 
Kota Bharu rest 
Pasir Mas 
Ulu Kelantan 
Pasir Puteh 
Bachok 
Machang 
Tumpat
99 —
225 Baan Sadang (l wat)
928 Baan Bangs&! (l wat); Baan Khoog IC99 (l wat)
58 — *
514 Baan SamBBrag (l wat)
569 Baan Maalaj (2 wat)
38--------
4,216 Baan B^psamed (2 wat); Baan Kaj (l wat);
Baan Khaw Din (l wat); Baan Khoog Sijaa (l wat) 
Baan Jang (l wat); Baan Jaamuu (l wat); Baan 
Jung Kaw (5 wat); Baan Tuuwaa (l wat).
Tanah Merah 280 Baan Thaasong (l wat)
Total of population Total of wat: 18
Besides these 18 Thai wat, located in the midst of Thai settlement, there 
is one further Theravada Buddhist wat, with Thai monies, but situated in a Thai 
Chinese village: at Tanoong in Pasir Mas district, At Wakaf Bharu, in Tumpat
district just across river from Kota Bharu, a site has been found for still 
another to serve the local Thai-Chinese population. Wakaf Bharu wat will be, 
like Tanoong, an integral part of the Kelantan Sangha, indistinguishable, 
except for its ethnic support, from any other wat in Kelantan*
Further to the population concentrated round Thai wat there are other 
hamlets in the midst of Malay settlement which have only a monks1 pavilion.
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Figure 1.
Kelantan Wats, with waterways, and five settlements in the Pasir Puteh and upper Trengganu Districts.
1 Baan Tuwaa 9 Baan llaj 15 Baan Bang sd1 20 Ligii
2 - 4 Baan Jung Kaw 10 Baan Khaw Din 16 Baan Sadang 21 Bukit T o 1 Chit
5 Baan Jang 11 Baan Jaamuu 17 Baan Thaasong 22 Khaw Ooon
6 - 7 Baan Bggsamed 12 - 13 Baan Haalaj 18 Baan Samfldrag 23 Png Kiang
8 Baan Khoogsijaa 14 Baan Khoog Kqg 19 Baan Tanoong 24 Batu Balai
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The author is familiar with all three such hamlets in the Pasir Puteh district 
and these are indicated on the map given? at page 49 J likewise the two 
hamlets in Trengganu, Most of the remainder are not known to the author and 
none are indicated on the map for the other districts of Kelantan.
The typical Thai village is a cluster of thatched or tiled houses - 
sometimes closely grouped, elsewhere less so - standing amidst fruit and 
coconut trees on an elevation bordering its rice fields. Some villages con- 
sist of more than one such cluster, and these constituent hamlets are then 
separated from each other and from the parent hamlet and wat by tracts of 
rice field or meadow (e.g. Sambb^ag, with three hamlets). Or more than one 
hamlet may have its own wat (e.g. Maalaj). The closeness of Malay settlement 
will depend on the terrain. If the.plateau or knoll (khoog) on which the 
village stands is truly marooned in the low-lying rice swamp, or stands on a 
river bank, the nearest Malay village will never be able to extend to the 
bounds of the Thai settlement. The older villages are generally characterised 
by such immunity. The earliest settlements seem generally to have been early 
enough on the ground to choose the sort of location which allowed seclusion. 
Once a Thai village is established, no Malay would ever move into it. But a 
Malay village may reach to the very boundary of the Thai land, as a result of 
Malay population growth and village extension. All Thai village communities
have the sensation of being more or less 'surrounded1 by the Malay peasantry.
5
A Thai village in Kelantan is not, as in central Thailand, the area 
defined by a wat, but a distinct and circumscribed ethnic community, whose 
identity defines the wat rather than the opposite. However, the wat rein­
forces in turn the sense of community, and by drawing the people constantly
to itself in religious activity strongly inhibits the rise of centrifugal 
orientations. The exception which rather confirms the rule is the people's 
orientation through the wat towards fellow Thai Buddhists throughout 
Kelantan.
The wat involves the whole village, by a system, of daily rotation, in 
the task of preparing food for the monks. It is the scene of most of the 
Thais' many rituals during the year, including some of animistic ambience.^ 
Certain special ceremonies held at a wat attract villagers from other parts 
of Kelantan. The chief among such ceremonies is Khaw Phra' (entering monk­
hood) which unites the whole Kelantan community in merit-making as one 
village after another takes its turn as host to hundreds of guests from 
outside. The sponsor of a candidate will invite as many acquaintances as he 
can from other villages to increase income and his changes of paying for the 
sponsorship without incurring debt - but the social function overrides the 
economic. This is apparent even in the smallest village ceremony where no 
outsiders are invited.
The permanent institutional structure uniting the Kelantan Thai community
is the Sangha; the chief wat is at Baan BangsM,'. The monkhood offers the
opportunity to young men to visit other villages in the state or in Narathiwat
7
without invitation or special pretext; monks carry news of developments in 
other parts of the state more than laymen do. As to the structure of the 
individual village'community, the abbot's office commands deep respect, which 
is only intensified if the abbot is a man of great personal energy and in­
telligence. The abbot's leadership can extend well beyond the communal main­
tenance of the wat to the repair of village roads and bridges, and even to
putting a man's case to the District Officer in some matter requiring the 
Administration's sympathy. A good abbot therefore usurps nationally some 
civil functions from would-be lay leadership. The abbots are almost in­
variably natives of the village where they hold the office.
While the abbot derives his authority from the office itself rather than 
from external institutional sources, the headman's authority derives far more 
from the government which created the post than from any traditional status 
in the community. (And there is no statewide lay leadership). When the 
government was British the fact of being the government' s nominee gave the 
headman very special authority and some Naajs became known and respected 
throughout the whole Thai community. Under a Malay government the advantage 
is negative. The period of British rule was too short, apparently, for the 
office to become a village institution rivalling the abbot's office for
leadership. The rise of such an institution, may be inhibited too by the in-
8curable individualism of the Thai farmers. But it is obvious that such a
development is, also hamstrung by the fact that the community's natural leaders
are reluctant to fill an office that is subject to Malay nomination and 
g
direction. The Haaj Baan's status is made further ambiguous by the fact 
that a ' Naaj' in Kelantan today is not always a government Penghulu (with an 
allowance, today, of $240 p.a.). He may be simply what the Malays call ketua 
kampong - an unpaid, yet still hard worked, nominee of the Penghulu in a nearby 
Malay village. The sort of man who will accept this indignity is inevitably 
one without a strong personality, who lacks reserves of respect in the com­
munity. The Naaj at Sambbrag, for example, is a mere 'ketua' - but at least 
he has his appointment direct from the Penggawa, whose house is nearer than
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the Penghulu1 s, Government business can, therefore, he transacted one stage 
higher up the hierarchy.
The administrative structure of Kelantan to which the Thais are subject 
is distinct from that pertaining to other states of Malaya, A village headman 
is called 'ketua kampong1 as elsewhere, but the Penghulu is responsible for 
a special, intermediate group of villages or a large village, called a Mukim, 
and has a correspondingly lower status than the Penghulu elsewhere - however 
as the equivalent of a high-grade village headship the office has the effect 
of creating a higher village status where conferred. The next highest unit 
in Kelantan is the. Daerah, under a 'Penggawa' - this corresponds to the 
'Mukim* of other states under its Penghulu. Daerah Semerak has six small, 
Kelantan-type mukims. The highest district below the State (Hegeri) is the 
Jajahan, corresponding to the 'Daerah* elsewhere. The Kelantan District 
Officer (D.O.) is thus called in Malay 'Ketua Jajahan', not 'Ketua Daerah'.
The Penggawa, in theory,is an important government servant, the D.O.*s 
delegate in the countryside. He must give his approval for the annual renew­
al of a lease of government land, and should report illegal squatting. He 
has the power of arrest of wrong-doers. However, this power has now fallen 
into disuse, being taken over by the police. This is a welcome protection 
to many Penggawas at a time when any vigorous law-enforcement can be given a 
political colour and result in political reprisals - from above in the form 
of a punitive transfer, or from below in the form of intimidation. The 
Penggawa*s word is no longer decisive in deciding the extension of a lease, 
for the D.O. himself must defer to a political committee of the local state- 
assemblymen. He can do nothing about illegal squatting if the squatters are
members of the ruling party, General order in the countryside - which is, 
in fact, very good hy any standards - is guaranteed by the Federal Police.
The district office is the hub of the administration and this is where 
the politicians go to exercise their power in the day-to-day life of the 
community. A citizen who does not vote for the present governing party may 
not expect special favours from the district office, but he will often find 
an Alliance district secretary or state-assembly candidate there to help him 
assert his basic rights. Kelantan has the distinction, of course, of being 
the only state of Malaya still governed by the Pan-Malayan Islamic Party.
(in Trengganu power returned to the Alliance after two years of the P.M.I,P., 
in 196l). Although state governments have comparatively few powers by any 
federal standards, one of their preserves is land, which is scarcely an un­
important matter for rice farmers. The P.M.I.P. and its land policy are the 
institutional expression of that Malay encirclement and menace which Kelantan 
Thais traditionally, almost instinctively, dwell in fear of.
Thais must go to the district office to pay their land tax and land rent 
and to distribute land among heirs. Today, the district office handles 
applications for citizenship on behalf of the Federal Registrar. The D.O. 
chairs the local language committee which tests applicants. The need to 
visit the district office arises for most Thais once or twice a year at the 
least.
The economic system of the Thai village brings about further multiple 
contacts with the world outside it. This interaction is facilitated by the 
improved transport system of Kelantan in the present century. Only two 
villages stand beside a metalled road, and the whole of West Tumpat district
- 55 -
is served only by a network of bumpy laterite roads; but for Banged' and 
Khoog K99 villages in Pasir Mas district laterite roads are supplemented 
with a train service to Thailand or Kota Bharu. All villages are access­
ible to motor vehicles, most even in the inonsoon. Diesel taxis and regular 
buses to the district centre or the state capital Kota Bharu ply the laterite 
as well as the metalled road system, and these services can be reached in a 
Malay trishaw if the village is a little isolated from them* The author has 
not heard of any Thai peasant owning a car, but all men own bicycles, which 
may be used for quite long trips*
It is problematic how far improving transport has actually been instru­
mental in bringing about the changes which define the present economic system 
of the Thai village, and the changes in its social patterns. Before there 
was road transport, Thais of Sambbrag used to walk across country six miles 
to the district office at Pasir Puteli. They used to walk or canoe up-coast 
18 miles to festivals at Maalaj. Migration across Kelantan in search of new 
land early in the present century was all on foot, as those who took part 
in it as children still recall.
The following sequence of development can,however, be inferred. The 
founding of estates and the building of roads early in this century by British 
enterprise gave the first chance of employment outside the villages. A small 
influx of cash brought the possibility of - and a taste for - acquiring the 
new manufactured or processed articles now appearing in the local markets, 
from batik sarongs and baju kebaya to china plates, coffee and sugar. Dep­
endence on outside sources of supply (for Sambbrag this meant the small Malay
market and the few Chinese stores at Cherang Ruku) became established before 
long, as village weaving and other skills - including the preparation of 
various specialities in the way of food-stuffs - ceased to be practised.
The building of roads, besides offering work to Thais, later allowed the 
search for more work (which increasing involvement in a cash economy, and 
changing tastes, necessitated) to extend further afield, but it did not 
initiate that search (in the sense of providing easier access to the first 
outside employment that ever became available). The rise of a Chinese urban 
community created a demand for pork, and pig-rearing became a leading economic 
activity, providing an important source of income other than employment out­
side. However, the departure of a steady stream of women to Chinese house­
holds as wives, over the years, continued the slow but progressive involvement 
of the T&ais in the process that we call 'social mobilisation's i.e. exposure 
to new structures and communications of the wider world. Chinese enterprise - 
as in motorised fishing - today offers steady employment to many Thai men, 
and since the Second World War many teenage girls have taken work in Chinese 
households as cooks and baby-minders. The men's employment invariably in­
volves association with Malays too.
Within the village many attest to the more or less willing relaxation of 
authority by parents ™ due, perhaps, both to the easing of the struggle to 
subsist which had once involved every member of the family full-time, and to 
the increasingly independent outlook of young people having experience of the 
world outside the village. Religion has been trimmed of some inessentials; 
there is a rejection of the old blind faith by some men; but spirit ceremonies
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are the most prone to decay. The death of the lippraa drama at SamBBrag in 
the last 15 years is due to the unwillingness of young men to become the sub­
missive disciples of the Nppraa master for many years, especially when pre­
ference and necessity indicate frequent or extended absence from the village 
in pursuit of cash income. Parents claim to be careful to ascertain the 
wishes of their children these days before arranging their marriage, In fact 
many young people choose their partners without their parents' assistance, 
and seek their parents' intervention only to make the formal approaches and 
arrangements. Parents say that thdy are more lenient to young children, who 
are less respectful than in the past.
In all this, change in the world outside has had a fundamental impact 
on the economy and various social patterns of the village, Economic change 
in the village consists, in turn, of ever increasing dependence on the world 
outside as a supplying and receiving market and as employer. Ever improving 
transport facilitates and furthers this dependence and multiplies the contacts 
to which it must give rise, (it must be noted that these contacts include 
contacts with the other Thai villages of Kelantan, not with the Chinese or 
Malay communities alone. On his way to some employment far afield a Thai 
will seek shelter at another village on the way* This is apart from the 
greater ease of attending festivals at other wat in recent times.)
Yet amidst change, the major economic activity of the Thai remains the 
cultivation of wet rice. At. SamBBrag in good years some families can sell 
rice outside the village (to local consumers, not to wider markets) but 
essentially it is grown for personal consumption. Selling rice for cash is
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freely attributed to the increased yield under government fertiliser - 
supplied by the Malay government of Kelantan since Independence. Some 
Thais at SamBBrag still have to buy some rice, even in a good year.^ Other 
villages, judging by the size of their houses - e.g. Bp^samed - may have 
been familiar with rice surplus already in the past. But the richest 
village, BangsS’, owes its wealth to its rubber, at home and across the Thai 
border. Many villages, like SamBBrag, diversified their economy by fairly 
intensive pig-rearing. There are no Thai fishing villages: Thais of
SamBBrag net riverine fish for personal consumption; three others work as 
van drivers for a Chinese motorised fishing company at Cherang Ruku and Besut, 
and four more carry boxes at the landing stages; only one Thai in 1967 was 
a regular member of a fishing crew.
In the years since the war the outside environment has begun to add 
various services to the manufactured and processed goods and the employment 
opportunities already offered. There is a money-spinning Indian private 
doctor at Pasir Puteh who gives injections to SamBBrag Thais for most maladies, 
at a time. (When these are ineffective, as they often are, resort is had
to one of the medical m.99 of the village - ifhose skill has not demised like so 
many other village skills.) Village cures or injections are preferred to the 
hospital service at Kota Bharu or at Kampong Raja (Trengganu). Hospital treat­
ment Is either too drastic - involving an amputation or a long stay away from 
home; or too little convincing, consisting of a few pills without explanation.
Wor are the hospital doctors unwilling to send hopeless cases home without
11treatment, which does their name little good in the countryside. However,
the hospital's services continue to he sought in severe cases. There is no 
objection in principle to operation or transfusion. The hospital takes no 
fees but a trip entails taxi fares ($2.80 return to Kota Bharu),
There is a government midwife and a weekly maternity clinic at Cherang 
Ruku, run by the Federal Ministry of Health. The clinic is attended occasion­
ally by expectant mothers of Baan SamBBrag and in emergency the government 
midwife is called to a birth. But for normal births - which are never 
properly anticipated, and happen too quickly for the government midwife to be 
called anyway - the Thai midwife is not only adequate (because very competent) 
but also preferred for her knowledge of the right protective incantations 
against the evil spirits which attend the event. The government midwife, 
moreover, is a Malay, and her presence may complicate or endanger the situ­
ation by the admission of Malay spirits. This is the sort of reaction which 
constantly reminds the observer of the resilience of culture and the Thai 
identity in the midst of modernisation and a Malay society.
The government's agricultural fertiliser at $7.7$. a bag is used as a 
matter of course. The amount purchased varies from holding to holding.
The average at SamBBrag seems to be about 3 or 4, where the average holding 
is 2.025 acres, per each of 72 economic families. The exhausting labour of 
pounding rice in a huge wooden mortar to remove the husk has yielded without 
a struggle to machine milling at a Malay cooperative mill in the last 10 
years. One Thai at SamBBrag now has a small clandestine mill at his house.
At Jung Kaw a Thai joined a government-sponsored Coop in the early *50s and 
has had a fully licensed mill in operation ever since.
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Primary Malay education has become accessible to all Thais at some 
time since the war; even English education is offered up to 5th form 
(secondary) level at Bachok, Tumpat and Pasir Mas. Adults too old to 
have been to a primary school may acquire basic Malay literacy in evening 
courses brought to the village. (Almost all Thai men are basically literate 
in Thai by the time they leave the monkhood.)
In the last five years a further link with the outside has arisen in 
the shape of transistor radios. SamBBrag is certainly backward in having no 
more than five working sets. But a large number of radios would not mean a 
large accession of new communications, for country Thais rarely understand 
the Standard Malay or the Standard Thai of radio bulletins and other programmes. 
Radios when bought, or received from friends or kin in town, tend to fall 
into disuse and disrepair because they offer too little entertainment or 
meaningful instruction. This is not to say, however, that an intelligent 
monk or layman may not pass on information which he has picked up and under­
stood. Most knowledge - and misunderstanding - of world events is in fact 
traceable to the Malay radio via the coffee shop. Newspapers in Thai villages, j
I
if seen at all, are out-of-date copies of Thai papers brought in by travellers. !
A traditional link with the outside which has been maintained is meeting 
the demand of many Malays for Thai medicines and charms. This is one service ; 
that the Thais provide rather than receive or buy. Malays will travel a 
long way to seek the help of a particular 11199 or renowned monk. Malays, 
like Thais, believe in the power of a monk’s words to dispel even and deter 
spirits - although a monk is prohibited to believe in spirits himself, Where
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Malay respect differs from the Thai is in being based on a belief in the 
monfe^  equal power to do harm. (Whatever its basis, the respect of the 
Malays may be one factor to explain the Thais* general immunity from inter­
ference and intimidation by Malay peasants adhering to the Pan-Malayan 
Islamic Party, cp. Appendix XII, p.286.)
The modern era has been a time of constantly increasing contacts out­
side the village, entailing dependence on the outside and a sense of belonging 
to a Kelantan community* But new relationships have involved Chinese and 
other Thais - and the British (see Chapter III) - as much as the Malays, 
even though the rural environment Is totally Malay and as such a matter for 
obsessive concern to some Thais, The general growth of contacts with the 
outside has brought with it, for SamBBrag, an increase of friendly, daily 
contact with the surrounding Malays. But cultural assimilation is almost 
nil. Perhaps the surest test of a community's ability to assimilate is its 
attitude to inter-marriage and religious conversion. Marriage patterns at 
SamBBrag, for one, hardly suggest an imminent Islamicization (but they offer 
ample evidence of the de-isolation of the village in the present century).
To' Thid, a learned and much beloved elder layman of SamBBrag, discussing 
the parental role in contemporaiy marriage-making as he conceives it, 
observed:
"I will give my daughter to any man of any race who asks for her, 
provided that:
1. My daughter wants him;
2. He is a good man;
3. He eats pork.”
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12The data given later, make the point in some detail. There is no ob­
jection to a non-Buddhist as such but the peculiar and fanatical beliefs of 
the Malays and the total break which they demand from anyone crossing the 
line, rule out the arrangement of such unions. The worst part of such a 
fate would be the inability to continue to do merit, (Bating pork has become 
symbolic only because the Malays have made a major issue out of it,) Only 
the socially isolated can make the conclusive, and usually, final break by 
their own decision and act. Only one woman and six men, to the author's 
knowledge, were 'lost' to Islam from Samdbrag during the last 50 years, and
the woman returned to the village to die. (The present population of the 
\13village is 353*) The Thais are not proud of those who cross over to the 
Malay community, but on the other hand they are less likely to suppress such 
information about their brothers and children than a much-married woman is to 
understate the number of her husbands. Perhaps the.fact that a Thai who 
crosses over is invariably a person without high moral standing in the 
community in the first place, makes it easier to mention his departure. The 
strongest pressure to become a ^ alay has lain in the relative shortage of 
Thai women in a village such as Sambbrag owing to the popularity of marriage 
to Chinese at a time when life was still much harder than it is now, and when 
the sex ratio among the Chinese was out of balance: a popularity clearly
evidenced in the statistics. The more feckless sort of Thai would be hard 
put to it to find a wife and his only resort would be to a Malay village, 
where even the feckless convert is received with a joyful indulgence. The 
Thais note with irony that these 'converts' continue to eat pork.
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In saying all this we do not wish to shatter the incipient image of a 
community that is integrating with its environment. In the course of the 
dissertation it will become clear that ethnic identity is no bar to political 
integration. On the other hand, a too rapid assimilation to Malay culture, 
if sensed to be the policy of the Malays, would be sure to put integration 
into reverse. Religious identity, freedom and security are precisely the 
preconditions of successful integration.
The marriage data at Appendix III reveal, in striking contrast to the 
avoidance of a Malay 'fusion1, the rise of the Chinese connexion at Samttdrag. 
Before pursuing further the theme of Thai identity in a Malay world it will 
be in place to elaborate on this other trend, in the context of a short 
historical sketch of the Chinese in Kelantan.
The history and sociology of the Chinese of Kelantan, when they come to
be written, must give prior attention to the distinction - and interaction -
14between the 'old' and the 'new* Chinese. In Graham's time the monopoly 
of the old Hokkien was just beginning to be challenged by an influx of Hailam 
and others from Singapore, and at Kota Bharu, Kampong China under its Captain 
ceased to be the only centre of Chinese residence, as the newcomers set up 
shops in the town proper. Today the 'new Chinese1, mostly Hokkien in fact, 
but speaking their language in an uncorrupt form and far less assimilated to 
any local cultures, are the majority. The old Hokkien still people Kampong 
China and a few settlements in the countryside, such asOhnomg on the road to 
Pasir Mas, and the Ghinese half of Maalaj (85 houses). They speak Kelantan 
Malay without an accent (this is noted with surprise by outsiders and is
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occasionally held up as a model by politicians) and are very brown-skinned. 
New Chinese often attribute this to their long residence in Malaya, under 
a hot sun (»), but the real reason is a strong Thai admixture. If conditions 
permit it, as at Maalaj, the Chinese are tri-lingual in Hokkien, Malay and 
Thai. At Tanoong, although they have a Thai abbot, Thai has been lost among 
the younger people. At Kampong China, Kota Bharu, too, Thai is preferred 
by the very old ladies but not otherwise.
An 'old Chinese' whose family, by reason of living in a settlement far 
from a Thai village, or opening land in a completely isolated place, has 
ceased to use the Thai language, will usually be referred to as 'ciin bog* 
by the Thais, that is, just 'country Chinese'. (Ethnic Chinese with no 
Thai blood who have lived in the kampongs for a generation or two, are also 
'ciin bog'.) An urban 'old Chinese' who has severed his Thai bonds will at 
least be called 'ciin ICalantan*. If strong Thai connexions are maintained 
then he is invariably 'ciin thai’ - a fhai-Chinese. (Thai-Chinese are always 
Theravada Buddhist.)
The Thai-Chinese population came into being in the Bachok, Kota Bharu 
and Pasir Mas districts some time well before 1900 and was the not unnatural 
consequence of the absence of women among the very early Chinese immigrants, 
and the religious bar to Malay women taking Chinese husbands. In the first 
two or three generations double identity was maintained easily, although to 
the uninitiated they counted simply as Chinese; the category 'Thai-Chinese' 
is still today perfectly distinct from 'Thai' and from 'Chinese'.
Of course, a Thai-Chinese woman or man could lose this identity
by settling in a Thai village. The monolingual offspring of suoh a man 
might still be referred to as 'luug ciin' (best translated as 'a person 
with a Chinese ancestor1) but the grand-children would be completely re­
assimilated to the country Thai community. Conversely the Thai part of the 
identity would be dropped by prolonged settlement far from a Thai village, 
especially round Kota Bharu. Today the far stronger trend is for country 
Chinese and Thai-Chinese to become urbanised and merge by marriage and 
assimilation with the 'new Chinese'.
In contrast to the rural semi-Thai Chinese of the 19th century, the 
immigrants of the 20th century are urban or semi-urban. This community 
like the earlier wave, suffered at first from a severe sex-imbalance. Nives 
were again sought among the Thais and this time among the Thai-Chinese.
The search reached into further corners of the state and Samttbrag village 
was affected. A village such as Bppsamed was too prosperous, at least by 
the 20th century, to respond to any but a few of the latest Chinese requests 
for wives. Sambttrag by contrast responded eagerly to the novel opportunity, 
as the figuresifofar witness.
It is impossible to fathom what combination of poverty, vanity, auto­
cratic crassness or sheer simplicity, moved those Thai fathers to sell their 
daughters into the new immigrant society for $100 or so. B99samed Thais 
still hold the Semerak Thais in contempt for it and frown at the admixture
which results when a Thai widow or divorcee brings her children back to the
15village to be brought up as Thais, Generally, though, the children of the 
20th century marriages grew up in urban Chinese communities cut off from Thai
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culture, and no Thai would ever call them ' ciin tha j.' • The wives continue to 
do merit at their native wat during their lifetime and their husbands are as 
a rule generous to Thai parents-in-law. Chinese New Year is celebrated at 
SamBBrag with the making of Chinese cakes, which are offered to the Chinese 
sons-in-law and grand-children when they come visiting on the second day. 
There is little communication between the two sides because of language 
difficulties. It is a happy occasion, though. Cash gifts are left for the 
parents and needy brothers and sisters of the wife. Recently Chinese New 
Year has brought all the teenage boys and girls back to the village from 
their employment in Chinese shops and households. The employers of these 
young people, even if unrelated by marriage, often pay their parents a court­
esy visit at this time.
There is no doubt that the many Thai girls who now experience urban life 
before marriage would like to be the object of a marriage petition from town, 
to save them from a life of back-breaking agricultural labour. They would 
make more willing brides than the simple, fearful maidens of the 1920s, 
making their very first journey outside the village. But the demand for Thai 
wives seems to have slackened since the war. 20 known marriages of SamBBrag 
women with ethnic Chinese ('ciin trong*, or 'ciin myang1) were in the 51-60 
age-group, approximately; 20 were in the 41-50 age-group; but there were 
only 11 among the 31-40s and 10 among the 21-30 group. The under-20 group 
has 7 marriages to Semerak Thais and one to a Thai-Chinese, but none so far 
to an ethnic Chinese to its account. As the sex-ratio in the Chinese comm­
unity becomes balanced this development is only to be expected.
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Nevertheless, new links with this modern, Malayan, urban elite are 
always being created through employment. The Chinese like to employ Thais, 
and, if they marry one, recognise clear obligations in the wife's village. 
Descendants of the 19th century fusion who are noxsr assimilating to 'new 
Chinese' society may yet recognise an affinity and certain moral responsib­
ilities attendant upon wealth and political weight. One of the most generous 
patrons of the Buddhist Order in Kelantan is a Chinese estate owner who is a 
keen convert to Theravada Buddhism through the proselytizing of the Malayan 
Buddhist Association and of his wife, an 'old Chinese' native of Kelantan.
The ceremonies of Th99d Phaa Paa at SamBBrag and Th99d Khathin at Sadang in 
1966 were both sponsored by a successful Thai-Chinese business woman and her 
sister. The direct political significance of Chinese patronage is discussed 
in Chapters V and VIII. But the chief social role of the Chinese in this 
century has been to introduce Thais to urban life and employment, which in­
creases substantially the Thais' exposure to outside communications and new 
values, and their identification with Kelantan1s Sino-Malay society, through 
involvement on favourable terms: economically, through the opportunity to
share in some degree in urban prosperity (perhaps more than the Malays); 
socially, through association with the Malayan urban elite as clients and 
kinsmen. Village culture too is being constantly modernised^ - yet not 
Sinified. Language, to give one example, strikes the observer initially 
both by the strength of its Malay content and the absolutely minimal influence 
of Chinese - even at Maalaj, with a Thai-Chinese village next door.
But the Malay influence is no more than skin-deep. The language of 
SamBBrag and all the other villages is the Thai of the far south. The author
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counted some 151 loan words from Malay (or from English via Malay) at
SamBBrag. Many of these clearly date from the present century and the growth
of contacts with a rapidly changing outside world, and describe objects and
activities emanating from outside. But there are some important verbs wnich
have completely replaced Thai equivalents, even for everyday actions which
17have no connection with the modern administration and economy . This trend 
has certainly gone further in SamBBrog than in any other Thai village 0 Gn 
the other hand, with only one exception Malay words are assimilated completely 
to Thai phonemes o This has the curious effect with a word such as 'hairan', 
'to be surprised', of producing a more 'standard' Malay pronunciation than 
the Kelantan Malays achieve. The Thais include the final 'n'y thus5 hajran. 
(in Kelantan Malay the final 'n' can only be guessed ats haire.) A Malay 
final 's' becomes stopped *df and the accent is put on the second syllable - 
which is invariably lengthened - so that a word like 'pengeras* - 'doctor's 
fee' ~ becomes almost unrecognizable as k(a)raad. The only phoneme adopted 
from Malay is the aspirate final in a word such as 'memerentah', 'to have the 
running of (a piece of land), which Semerak Thais as well as local Malays 
pronounce as r&thp^. This is probably a recent borrowing, made possible by 
incipient bi-lingualism.
The tonal characteristics of the unique SamBBrag and Maalaj dialect were 
18described earlier. It is natural to speculate that the drastic simplifi­
cation of the tones and the apparent elements of syntactical intonation may 
be a product of a centuries-long contact situation. Such contact certainly 
never occurred at SamBBrag, where nearby Malay settlement dates largely from
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the British period. But Maalaj, upcoast, from whence the SamBBrag Thai 
on linguistic evidence surely migrated, is much less isolated from the Malays 
and could have a long history of contact with that community. Yet why 
should vocabulary remain overwhelmingly southern Thai (complete with tell­
tale Chiengmai words), and phonemes yield scarcely a point? Whatever the 
validity of the author's analysis of the tonal situation, there is no ques­
tion but that the language of the most remote and probably oldest Kelantan 
Thai group is Thai.
Near bi-lingualism has become common amongst the men of SamBBrag but is 
rare amongst the women, who are more likely to know some Hokkien as a second 
language. However, young girls who now attend Malay school are becoming 
fluent Malay speakers. Malay is never spoken by Thai to Thai.
The reasons why SamBBrag women speak little Malay, even though the 
village is cut off from other areas of Thai settlement, are to be sought in 
the following facts. SamBBrag is encircled on two sides by its river and is 
separated from the market and village of Cherang Ruku by sandy scrub land 
a mile across which in the past no woman dared to cross for fear of tigers 
and thieves j only on the western side (Baan Tog) has the recent extension of 
Kampong Lembah brought Malay houses almost into the Thais' back gardens - 
see map, page 70 - with fairly regular opportunities for conversation with
Malays who pass the time of day on their way to and from market. The only 
Malays who stop regularly in the other two sections, Baan Klaang and Tham 
Phaj, are two women who hawk calces and the men who fetch 'down coconuts with 
the help of a monkey. Recent building by PMIP members on the scrub-land
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Baan SamfltJrag and Environs.
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south of the wat does not bring about contact since, apart from mutual 
distaste, these Malays have no business in the Thai village and to reach 
the market have to walk in the opposite direction. In general, to meet Malays, 
a Thai woman at Sambbrag must walk to the market a mile away - but her husband 
is more likely to buy necessities on his bicycle, and there is a village shop 
anyway for most things. If she does go to Cherang Ruku she won’t have any 
taste for idle chatter with Malay women whomishe may, inwardly distrust and fear. 
Indeed she will probably do her shopping with a Chinese grocer. Almost the 
whole of social life for a woman centres on the wat - except that once or 
twice a year she may attend a festival at another Thai village. Only the 
men-folk receive and accept invitations to Malay feasts on the osSc^ sion of 
weddings and rites of adolescence (masok Jawi) - at j&L a seat! The few 
women of Sambbrag who speak Malay fluently have learnt it while married to 
Chinese shopkeepers in other parts of Kelantan. The teenagers who now find 
domestic work in the towns do not experience contact with the Malays and 
their language - they overleap, as it were, the rural environment. It is 
only the under-lps who meet their Malay contemporaries by attending school 
at Cherang Ruku,
In summary, the physical situation of Baan thaj Sambbrag makes it a 
more sequestered place than any other Thai village in Kelantan, and thus it 
is not excessively more prone to Malay contacts than the great Thai concen­
trations of Tumpat district. The Malays are closer here than they are to 
the Thais of Baan Naj or Jung Kaw, but there is scarcely more mixing for 
Sambbrag Thais who stay at home. This contradicts the author's original
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19surmise that Sambbrag would he more subject to contact with the Malay world 
than other villages. Culturally, Sambbrag feels itself to be distinct from 
its surrounding environment but integral to the scattered Thai community of 
the state, notwithstanding considerable social interaction between Thai men 
and Malays on a footing of economic and social equality and a growing ease of 
association through bi~lingualism.
Intelligent Malays who know the Thais as work-partners and are even aware 
of some of their festivals, will say generously but sincerely, '’They are like 
usM. Seen from within a Thai village, however, there is a world of difference 
between the purposeful serenity of a community doing merit at the wat and in 
many small ways, confident of the ultimate goal of successive birth and death; 
and the warring, factional, irrational Malay mass outside, stealing to do 
merit (there jls more theft during Ramadan and the Thais equate this month, 
and the Hari Raya which concludes it, with their own great occasions of merit- 
making), murdering their rivals, divorcin g their wives at whim, declaring 
belief in a God whom none can describe and few obey. The Thai wat and its 
village are an oasis of calm to the Thais and to anyone who is accepted into 
the community. Buddhism it is above all that identifies the Thais, and the 
wat ensures the perpetuation of that identity. Buddhism, if not immune to 
change, is generally not subject to decay in the way that animistic practices 
and beliefs are. Eiven the sparsely populated wats of the present time are 
sometimes welcomed on the ground that the monks of today are never parasites, 
but do merit because they really want to.
Change in many things, chiefly reflecting change and modernisation in the
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outside world, has been familiar long enough to be accepted without protest. 
But the Thais would not admit that the changes have been in essentials. The 
Buddhist religion flourishes uncorrupted - if not always perfectly understood; 
and the doing of merit and belief and participation in the progression through 
death to rebirth are what define a Thai above all. In answer to the question 
(which was meant rather in a political sense): "How do you see the situation
in 10 years' time? Bo you think there will still be Thais here?" the author 
time and again received the answer: "As long as the wat are here there will 
be Thais,"
If the wat disappear there can no longer be Thais in Kelantan. As long 
as the wat survive, the villages in which they stand will be Thai. This is 
a matter of simple fact and logic. At present the primary condition for the 
existence and continuance of a Thai community in Kelantan is fulfilled: a 
spontaneously flourishing Buddhism.
Nevertheless it is possible to conclude with an account of a significant 
level of integration with an environment traditionally considered so hostile. 
In this chapter we are interested in general social identification rather than 
integration with particular political structures and 'modes', (These latter 
aspects of integration certainly have a bearing on the wider identification; 
but, constituting a sufficient theme of their own, they will be discussed 
later, notably in Chapter V.) How general social identification is expressed 
and can be identified in more than one way. A strong sense of natural
political equality stems both from immemorial residence and from the 
experience of equal status under British administration (see Chapter III).
A sense of natural equality, if not frustrated, assists a sense of identity 
with the state and society of Kelantan. Another factor for identification 
in recent times has been economic mobilisation through the Chinese relation­
ship, bringing' both awareness of the wider Kelantan community and an accept­
able socio-economic status within it. This we have related, but what of 
assimilation to the local Malay community? This is a case where ’charity1 
must begin ’at home’. Ho amount of identification with the ’wider’ Kelantan 
community can be taken to constitute a ICelantan identity without the strong 
foundation of a positive relationship with the immediate environment, the 
local Malay neighbourhood.
Most striking is the welcome given to Malay education as a means to a 
greater viability in relations with the administration and the market. The 
welcome to primary schooling for Thai children is stronger among those with 
outside experience than those who stay at home - and this means, in effect 
that the women are the less enthusiastic, being the more superstitious group 
and the main carriers of anti-Malay beliefs (as in the matter of child-birth). 
It is the mother who will readily believe her son’s complaint that Malay boys 
at school bully him; and the father who will exert considerable pressure, not 
excluding physical violence, to make the boy continue at school till he is 
basically literate. The sensation of being closed in by Malay society is 
still basic to the community's universe and is inculcated in small children 
but it is associated at maturity with values for self-respect through a prag­
matic, out-going adaptation, not values for a fearful withdrawal or defensive
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20isolation, Thai boys of 17 or so at SamBBrag seemed to like to demonstrate
their independence of parental and cultural restraints by cultivating Malay
friends of their own age in the district. Some of them develop a convincing
Malay personality for the purpose and duration of these contacts: cocky,
21self-assured, irreverent. In the smaller Thai settlements where there is 
no government-appointed Naaj and no monk, one finds a de facto lay leadership 
in the persons of. intelligent, bi-lingual men who have cultivated the asser­
tive, even domineering personality of the Malay rustic boors - when they speak
22to Malays but not otherwise. These men by their adaptation fill an inter­
mediary role between the community and the Malay world (including the District 
Office).^ They are the agents of the Thais' capacity to prosper happily even 
as an out-numbered minority in a Malay society.
Adults of both sexes have taken advantage of the three-year adult liter­
acy classes brought into the villages by the Ministry of Rural Development, 
and twelve men of SamBBrag are now entitled to hang the certificate of com­
pletion and satisfactory achievement on their walls. The young Malay teacher 
who had taken the course at SamBBrag wat in the evenings told the author that 
the Thais were his best pupils - their previous literacy in Thai helps them 
to pick up the new Roman alphabet of Malay faster than the average Malay 
beginner. This teacher also appreciated his Thai pupils for their consider­
ation in bringing melons and rice to his house.
This is the sort of courtesy and mutual regard which become familiar 
after one has stayed for some time in a Kelantan Thai community. The Thais 
complain loud and frequently about the land and citizenship laws. At SamBBrag 
they resented the snooping and malice which they experienced from certain
quarters when the Europeans arrived in the village, Malay curiosity at any
time they regard as a tiresome and disconcerting trait of that race. Ancient
racial antipathy and fear sometimes break surface, particularly among the Thai
women. But with this ancient antipathy goes a stoical acceptance born of long
familiarity; and a man who condemns the Malays in one breath is capable of
doing them credit with the next, for having 'improved* in the last generation.
As a small boy he might have been tormented by Malay bullies when he left
the village, even under the eyes of his mother. As a young man he saw Malays
spit on the ground in disgust as he went by on his way to hunt wild boar.
The attitude of the Malays in Semeralc district has generally become more
tolerant. It is also certain that the Thais themselves have become more
tolerant. Primitive fear of the Malay peasant as a vicious and unpredictable
alien began to give way among the men to a certain acceptance, turning to
friendliness, towards Malays who took work alongside Thais or took their turn
at the District Office, and were seen to be just poor, ordinary peasants like
24the Thais themselves.
When one considers all the signs of the mellowing of Malay society in 
the course of its modernisation, the intolerance of P.M.I.P. rule seems an 
unreality or an aberration. The truth is that the Semeralc Thais seem to 
locate favourable Malay attitudes in the Cherang Ruku area, among Malays 
who became more modernised in the middle and later British period and came 
into contact with the Thais through the motorised fishing industry. These 
Malays today support U.M.N.O. More traditionally-minded Malays still despise 
the Thais for keeping pigs, but it is also possible that traditional respect
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for Thai medicine and charms modifies the sort of hard attitude to the 
1fakir* which Islam and P.M.I.P. tenets dictate. In any case, political 
mobilisation by the P.M.I.P. was initially in response to the alien Chinese 
menace, not to the familiar and long-established Kelantan Thai.
A telling incident, reflecting the growth of tolerant attitudes, was 
witnessed by the author's wife at the Cherang Ruku weekly maternity clinic. 
Two Thai ladies attending for pre-natal advice surprised all the Malay women 
present when they produced, red (alien) identity cards for the nurse to copy 
down their names. "Why have you got red cards? You have always lived here 
like us! Just think, if they had given us red cards!" exclaimed two of the 
Malay patients. At Baan Maalaj Malays fill vacant places in the Thai Wppraa 
orchestra. In all districts Malays invite numbers of Thai men to their 
wedding feasts and were it not certain that Malays would be deterred by fear 
of pork, a few Malay friends would certainly be invited to Thai weddings, 
and without the economic motive which characterises the Malay wedding 
invitations! the Thai wedding is not structured for large-scale catering 
and profit. But many Malays are invited to the Khaw Phra' (monk-entering). 
Although the economic motive in this case in strong (a Malay makes a good 
guest, Thais will say wryly, because he pays a dollar and only touches the 
biscuits and bananas) it is just as much a courtesy symbolising for both 
sides a common identity and interdependence as Kelantan country folk. The 
Thais recognise Malay friendship when they see it, and are ever willing to 
reciprocate. We will conclude with a touching example. In March 1967# 
SamBbrag landowners gave generous cuts of well over the standard 8 :40 har­
vested sheaves to their poor Malay harvesters. This was done out of genuine
gratitude and pity in view of the exceptionally scorching harvest weather of 
that year.
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FOOTNOTES
1. Federation of Malaya* Department of Statistics, Population Census 1957. 
Kuala Lumpur, 1959? Report No. 10, State of Kelantan; Table 5?. p.9*
2, Ibid,, p.9*
5, The author's count for this district in January 1967 was 624. He 
excludes from this figure 15 ’lung ciinf; people with a Chinese 
father or of Thai-Chinese descent (for definition see infra p. 65) 
who, living as members of a Thai community, are already by upbringing, 
or are becoming by adoption, indubitabljr Thai; but who carry a Chinese 
name on their birth-certificate and identity-card, Such persons are 
fairly certainly counted as Chinese by government census-takers.
4. Population Census 1957» op.cit., pp.9-10.
5. Particularly the village of Bang Chan immortalised in the writings of 
the Cornell Modern Thailand Project, The villages in Kelantan are thus 
more like their counterparts in the north; c.p. Michael Moerman, "Ban 
Ping's Temple; the Centre of a 1Loosely Structured* Society", in;
Manning Nash, ed., Anthropological Studies in Theravada Buddhism, Tale 
Cultural Report Series, No.13, 1966; p.138.
6. See Appendix II, p. 256 , for a list of these rituals at the village of 
Sambbrag. N.B. rituals vary from one village to another. Maalaj rituals 
are nearly identical with Sambbrag (and as such are part of the evidence 
of a historical connexion) but this is exceptional.
7° Out of 79 living men of Sambbrag eligible to be or have been monks, only 
5 have not been. But there is a trend to shorter sojourns in the Order, 
so that while the 38 living laymen of the village who were in the monk­
hood before the war were so for an average of 4-71 years, the 34 who 
entered since the war stayed for an average of 2.64 years each. Until 
the war there was a second wat at Sambbrag. The wat inmates by then had 
become too few to merit maintaining two establishments. The modern trend, 
so far as it is established, to a shorter monkhood, may be due to the 
relatively greater freedoms and pleasures of the life of the young layman 
compared to former times.
8 . Few groups were ever observed among the men of Sambbrag unless based on 
close kinship, although women are brought together in more stable
association by the rotation of temple duty among groups of houses. It 
is noticeable in a Thai village how elderly parents are often accommodated 
by their own choice in a separate house rather than in the houses of the 
adult children even if those children have to carry food to the parent 
each day because he or she is no longer strong enough to prepare it alone. 
The old folk prefer the freedom of eating at times of their own choosing,
and being master ±n their own house, however small. As members of an
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extended household they would he too conscious of their children fs 
hospitality. Extended households are not exceptional, hut not the only 
rule where elderly parents survive. Young married couples try as a rule to 
establish a separate household and by the same token unmarried uncles 
and brothers live independently and fend for themselves. At Sambbrag,
out of 84 houses 11 were the houses of elderly people living separately
from the extended household to which they could have attached themselves 
if they had so wished - a step which they are constantly urged by their 
children to take. For purposes of the rice economy, hot?ever, these old 
folk do belong to extended families and are indeed normally the titular 
owners of the family's land. From this point of view there are 72 
families (rice-producing units) large and small in a village of 353 
souls, sharing rice land totalling 145 acres 779 ddpa according to the 
author's calculation.
9. The question of leadership is discussed and analysed in full in Chapter VI,
10. But even a Sambbrag family which is almost landless will have no diffi­
culty in obtaining a lease of neighbours' rice land, ho one seems to 
regard the rent of l/3  of the harvest, or l/2  if the owner supplies 
fertiliser, buffalo, etc., as onerous. The Thais call this kind of 
lease 'phuwaag' (from Malay pawah).
11. c.p. Rosemary Firth's similar findings among the Malays, published in 
Housekeeping among Malay Peasants. London, 1966; p.198,
12. Appendix III, p. 260 . A note on divorce in the community is appended, 
as well as an explanation of the method of collecting the data.
13. This figure includes 7 with Chinese names on their identity cards,
14. W. A. Qraham, o.cit. p.20.
15. There are however one or two cases of returned widows continuing to send
their children to the local Chinese (Mandarin) school if there is one,
16. One obvious effect of urban employment is that Thai girls of Sambbrag
always wear modern frocks and dresses when they go to town, a habit 
which has only just begun to appear among Malay girls - and then only 
the most daring and ostentatious of them - in Semerak district. (At Kota 
Bharu, incidentally, short skirts are now (1967) quite a common sight 
among Malay girls, but the author never saw such a thing in 1963 while 
he was resident in Kota Bharu. Rosemary Firth's comment on urban dress 
in 1963t if it refers to short skirts, is difficult to account for - 
see Rosemary Firth, op.cit,, p.202). Within the Thai village, habits
of dress are also distinct from Malay patterns in certain ways. See 
Appendix IV, p,264.
17. See Appendix V for a list of loan words, (p.266)
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18. See Preface, pp. 10-11.
19. See Preface, p. 13.
20. A few years ago Khy Muag, a Sambbrag lady of about 50, was suddenly 
stricken with a terrible swelling of the cheek and jaw. Characteris­
tically, it was blamed on a spell exercised by a Malay whose house she 
had recently passed on the way to market. With equally characteristic 
aplomb, however, the Thai 11199 prescribed a poultice of pig's, dung to 
drive the Malay spirits from Khy Muag’s face. The author may also be 
permitted to mention how his own daughter, aged 3 , learned two con­
trary roles in relation to the Malays. With her playmates in the 
village she would scatter and hide trembling behind trees when Malays 
approached; but she liked to accept the invitation of the author's 
'landlord' and general assistant E K99 to ride on the back of his
bicycle to market and '•look at the Malays" (pai 1EE khEEg) in the
coffee shop or "see the Malays playing ball". (The self-assurance 
which this requires comes, of course, much later for Thai children.)
21. Specifically, Batu Balai, Pog ICiang, IChaw Joon, of those known to the 
author.
22. They truly dominate even an exchange of courtesies on the road, by 
mastering the trick of asking the first question about destination 
when a Malay approaches and continuing the interrogation till he has 
passed and is out of earshot again. Thereby you prevent the Malay from
getting in a question edgeways and finding out where you are going. If
he does manage to ask, you anyway tell him a lie - another Malay art 
which stands this sort of Thai in good stead. (NB. This may seem defensive 
but it is a normal form of social interaction between Malays.)
23. Behaviour relating to political and governmental structures is described 
at Chapter V.
24. An odd feature of Thai statements about Malay intimidation is that they 
so often refer to other villages than the informant's own. When one 
enquires at the other village in question one finds that the Malays 
there behave themselves acceptably. This distorted impression of the 
circumstances of other villages may arise from the fact that Thais 
often visit them only on the occasion of a monk-entering, when large 
numbers of Malays converge on the monastery for the entertainments or 
just to wonder at the heathen spectacle. These Malays are not by any 
means all from the neighbourhood of the wat holding the ceremony. 
Occasionally there are trouble-makers among them and clashes can arise 
between these elements and drunken Thais.
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CHAPTER III - HISTORICAL
The curious outsider is not alone in wondering how and when the Thais 
came to Kelantan. The question is often posed by the people themselves, and 
has many times been posed in the past. It is not a new fashion, brought to 
life by Thai nationalism or stimulated by the pretensions of the modern Malay 
state. It is therefore significant that no Thai has, or claims to have, any 
knowledge of the epoch in which the Thais first entered Kelantan, and the 
manner of their coming. These matters are beyond tribal memory. There is at 
Sambbrag a tradition that their ancestors were sent "from Bangkok", or from 
Sukhothai, to catch a white elephant which had escaped. They were not to 
return without the elephant, on pain of death. This story is treated quite 
frankly by the Sambbrag folk as a legend which one can believe or reject 
according to taste. But they do support the idea of a Bangkok origin by 
saying that Bangkok and Sambbrag Thais understand each other remarkably well,’*' 
whereas with Nakhorn there is unintelligibility.
Of all the Kelantan Thai villages, Sambbrag and Maalaj, speaking an 
identical, partly intoned (rather than tonal) dialect, and isolated in iden­
tical positions 3/4 mile up the Sungai Semerak and Sungai Kemasin respectively, 
are the most likely candidates for a martial origin. Sambbrag guards the 
approaches from Trengganu admirably. Maalaj, likewise accessible to ships, 
threatens and dominates the Bachok district. If their unique dialect is not 
the product of long isolation, or contact with the Malay language at Maalaj 
following a move fromlcwerPatani (Sambbrag being in this case a later colon­
isation from Maalaj) then the twin settlement might have involved settlers 
originally from another frontier region where a linguistic contact situation
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had arisen; or from a subjugated ethnic group whose assimilation to Thai
was incomplete at the moment of the migration. An isolated migration across
great distances such as this, would suggest government initiative and a
military or imperial purpose (although soldiers could also be recruited in
the 'Narathiwat*area and despatched by sea southwards to their new location).
The legend of the elephant hunt would appear to strengthen the supposition
of official inspiration.
Whatever the case, there is no tradition here of a martial or empire-
building role. On the contrary, the pride of the Sambbrag Thais is in their
ancestors' lonely pioneering and many generations of survival unprotected and
unsponsored by Thai power. They remember no rule but Malay rule.
All Thais of Kelantan who have given the matter thought agree, however,
in regarding the Maalaj-Sambbrag group as the most ancient settlement. It is
also agreed that Tumpat was the earliest and nuclear settlement among the
northern villages, with Baan Naj remaining the chief wat till about 1920.
Again, no one can set a date to the northern settlement (with the exception of
BangsE', probably early 19th Century, and Sadang, late 19th Century), and there
is no imperial tradition. In this case, however, although the nuclear migration
can hardly have been later than 150 years ago (given the lack of any knowledge
of its epoch) the lack of any imperial tradition is more likely to be due to
2a genuine lack of any such original purpose, than to a loss of memory with
the passage of many generations (which might apply to Maalaj and Sambbrag).
For language leaves little doubt that the Thai villages of Tumpat district
■z
represent two main, gradual extensions of settlement fromlower Patani. Piece­
meal extension is also invited by the terrain, and the uniform type of (Malay)
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political system on either side of the Golok river. Piecemeal extension from 
one territory to another virtually identical with it is, incidentally, not 
conducive to the establishment of any tradition at all of the era of settle™ 
ment,
An inspection of the physical map of Kelantan shows that the line of the
4
Golok River chosen for a boundary by the negotiators of 1908-9, while no 
doubt correct in broad principle as the line dividing the kingdom of Patani 
from Kelantan, does not constitute a sharp point of geographical discontinuity.
The Kelantan plain is made up of two distinct river systems, that of the left 
bank and that of the right, separated by an independent river, the Sungai 
Kelantan, which is unrelated to either. The left bank area is roughly defined 
by the districts of Tumpat, Pasir Mas and Tanah Merah, the right bank by the 
districts of Kota Bharu, Bachok and Pasir Puteh. Nearly the whole of the sur­
plus waters produced by the left-bank plain flow not into the Kelantan River, 
which owes its size and force to the Ulu, but north and westwards to the 
Golok. The waters of Kota Bharu, Bachok, and Pasir Puteh meander indecisively 
and tend to stagnation, but their ultimate destination is the sea at Sabak, at 
Maalaj (Sungai Kemasin) and Semerak (Sungai Semerak). The existence of two 
distinct segments of the Kelantan plain can be invoked, incidentally, to 
justify the epithet 'isolated' for Semerak and Maalaj. But here it was intended ; 
rather to show that the left bank, the chief area of Thai settlement, is not 
geographically integral to Kelantan and is easily accessible by foot or up 
the various tributaries of the Golok. (c.p. map p.49).
A third group of villages is: Baan B a n g s , Baan Khoog K99 and Baan Thaa
Song, all three situated on the banks of the Sungai Lemal. Their dialect has
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the eccentric 'wobbliness1 of Taag Baj in the most pronounced form of all the 
Kelantan villages, and were this not enough, the map only allows one assumption 
about their origin: this was a slow migration inland from Taag Baj. There is
agreement among the Thai that Bangs&* is comparatively new (this still might 
mean at least 150 years old) and at BangsS1 itself some people believe that 
Thaa Song is older, although further upstream, and was the source of the 
Bangs&' ancestors. That such a hypothesis would involve a 'retreat' is not 
incongruous. The settlement of the Kelantan Thais should not be imagined as 
a planned advance into new territory, ever onward with ne'er a look back.
The search for land can lead in any direction, to whatever land is discovered
for the purpose the searcher has in mind. The BangsK' Thais early in this
century themselves branched out in two contrary directions, attracted by the 
prospect of rubber planting. One group struck south-east to Khaw Joon on the 
Trengganu border (today a village of 25 houses); another went 'back' to 
Tanjong Balek near Sungai Golok town, on the Thai side of the frontier. (The 
wealth of BangsE' today is attributed to the rubber holdings across the border). 
Men of Baan Jang,^ probably in the latter half of the 19th century, used to 
cross the Kelantan River to hunt wild pig in the jungles of Gunong, and were 
attracted to some cultivable rice land where they established a new village, 
Baan Sadang. Early this century, a new generation from Baan Sadang set up a 
hamlet in the hills behind Seligi and planted rubber (Thai: Ligii; 10 houses).
Shortly before the Second World War groups from Sambbrag and Khaw Joon set up 
a hamlet at a place further south still called Bakat. When this became unten­
able in some way as a result of the Japanese occupation, a further move was
made to Batu Balai on the main Trengganu road, some 12 miles south of Jerteh,
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in 1947 T and rubber was planted. In the intervening period the original 20
houses have diminished to 10, and the rest having migrated to Narathiwat.
Batu Balai vail be the last and the southernmost Thai settlement on the
Malayan east coast, barring the success of a petition for land in Ulu 
7
Kelantan.
Perhaps the most interesting settlement of all in the 20th century is 
Pog Kiang near ICampong Raja, Besut. This was neither a case of further 
penetration' nor of 'retreat' by Kelantan Thais but of original pioneering 
from Thailand. Pour 11199 from the village of Pron (now in Narathiwat) came into 
Kelantan about the year 1900 to practice their arts, and, crossing over to 
Trengganu, found some land going for the asking. In the course of a few years 
seven more men of Pron were attracted to the place and it slowly and painfully 
became productive of coconuts and rice. In the end, only the son of one of 
the pioneers stuck it out - Caw DU&ng, now aged 86; his father and all the 
original older generation of Pron men returned to Thailand, and D&&ng only 
remained in order to defy the ridicule of his kinsmen. Meanwhile the settle­
ment survived with new blood from Sambbrag, at least three later migrants from 
Pron (a man and two women, still alive) and three ethnic Chinese. There are 
now 18 houses. The dialect is as at Sambbrag. Caw DMng and the three other 
Pron migrants have lost their original accent.
The manner of Pog Kiang's founding and survival illustrates as well as 
any other example the haphazard and uncertain nature of colonisation. It may 
also be symbolic of the way Kelantan as a whole was originally colonized by 
Thais (if we can rely upon the evidence of language, geography, and these
recent historical movements): by isolated and unconcerted acts of enterprise
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on the part of f Patani fanners* Only Sambbrag and Maalaj by their strategic
location, and the missing regimental elements mentioned by Graham suggest that
8strategic settlement was pursued for Kelantan at any time at all. Colonisation 
from J Patani. was probably mostly complete by the early 19th Century but 
there was one example as late as 1900* The earliest date and the main period 
of entry cannot even be guessed at* The earliest possible date would depend
Q
on the date of settlement of the first nucleus of Thais in the Mara area.
Although there may have been occasional settlements of soldiers at times
*?
across the centuries and Maalaj and Sambbrag, if any, are candidates for 
10such a role ~ the memory of it has been lost* This puts all the Kelantan 
Thai settlements on an equal footing in relation to the state of Kelantan*
They have no imperial tradition,no trait of arrogance in their political cul­
ture* This is at once a possible form of evidence for, and is explained by, 
the circumstances of settlement in the state 5 the very late assertion of Thai
susexmnty? and the fact that even when jm the late 19th century suzerainty
11began to change into a form of control at Kota Bharu, the Kelantan Thais 
were neither agents nor beneficiaries of thisxf^- suzerainty* Today'it is not 
as conquerors that they claim their rights in Kelantan but as pioneers who by 
their own courage and labour opened up land* The Malays wore always the 
majority, and the Thais depended on their good graces for survival, not on 
the power of Thailand. The Malay nature of rule at Semerak, fox'* instance, 
comes out clearly from the accounts of old people, even on the eve of the • 
British take-over, i.e. at the ■ height of Siam*s pretensions in the state*
That ,rule* was characterised by insecurity for all peasants, of whatever 
race. There was no security or redress against raiding parties who crossed
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over from Trengganu and stole women, so said an old Thai-Chinese of Cherang 
Rulcu, Tom Booi. The penggawas and penghulus were Malay, although there was 
once a Thai who was promoted Penggawa by the Sultan for his remarkable 
ability to snap a board in two with a single blow. Thais were in Malay ser­
vice and not vice-versa. At Cherang Ruku at century1 s end there was a Thai 
moo (a native of Bopsamed) who kept the elephants of the local raja. In the 
old days, before the British introduced land rent, the Malay officials used 
to come and count the harvest and take a proportion in tithe. Mo Thai 
officials or Thai soldiers figure in the recollections of that time. Maalaj 
offers an exception which proves the rule. It was the son of the old Thai- 
Chinese Tom Booi of Cherang Ruku who told the following story.
Tom Booi's grand-father was a famous Thai of Maalaj, Datok Misai Merah 
(to the Thais nuad'dMng), who became hulubalang to the Raja Muda of ICemasin, 
There was war between Raja Bukit of Bukit Marak and the Raja Muda of Kemasin. 
ICemasin was the prize Raja Bukit hoped to win and annex. As the two sides 
closed in combat 12 horsemen in black sent by the King of Thailand suddenly 
intervened and shouted, "Don't fight, we are on your side!" There was con­
fusion, as neither side was sure which side the horsemen referred to, and the 
fighting stopped. After this the Thai authority relieved the Rajas of their
authority and appointed Malay 'Longs' (luang) in their place.
12Incidents like this brought a rare demonstration of the power of the 
Thai king, but let us note that a local Thai figure was here in the service 
the Malay royalty and that the reported result of the war was a reorgan­
isation of authority using Malays, not Thais. Malay rule was in the order of 
things. Indeed at the end of the century not all English observers could agree
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that Siam's authority over the state, even then, was everything that the
protagonists of a British forward policy claimed. Mr. Beckett, the acting
Consul in Bangkok, sent to investigate an allegation that Siam was using
the hunt for the Pahang rebels as an opportunity to strengthen her influence,
"recorded ^ jwrites Eunice Thicy^ the 'feebleness’ amounting 
practically to 1non-existence1 of Siamese authority in 
Kelantan and Trengganu. Siam, he said, was reluctant to take 
strong measures against the Malay chiefs to compel their 
cooperation in the capture of the Pahang men, because she was 
afraid of alienating an obedience which was purely nominal."
This feebleness is attested further by the inability of the Siamese Commissioner
to prevent the Raja from signing away vast tracts of the state to an adventurer 
14like Duff. The Agreement of 1902 was therefore a British attempt to make
Siam's authority felt where it had been lacking before, besides being, in the
15not very long run, the wedge to open the way to a British advance.
The relevance that is here claimed for the Kelantan Thais * long exper­
ience of Malay political dominance is two-fold (further dimensions will be
16discussed later). The Thais' political relationship to the Thai kingdom 
was indirect and tenuous, mediated by the vassal systems such absence of a 
tradition of Thai rule is a negative, but in no way insignificant, factor for 
later integration with a modern Malay sovereign state. The long establishment 
of Thai culture in Kelantan, on the other hand (predating Malay settlement in 
some districts), gives a sense today of the rightfulness of their presence in 
the state. This too is potentially integrative, albeit long settlement in 
the proximity of Malays, prior to modern times, seems to have bred attitudes 
largely of fear and distrust towards the latter community. The integrative
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potential appears from statements such as: "There will always be Thais in
ICelantan". This is not an expression of blind political confidence, but 
rqther a normative, ideological statement, meaning: "There ought to be Thais
here because it is our right". The sense of being people of Kelantan is one 
reason for the keenness to get Malayan citizenship when it was offered, first 
between 1950 and 1952, and later, between 1957 and 1958: Thais in several
villages took out citisenship, as they informed the author, "To be considered 
natives of here." It can be argued that there is an economic motive, in that 
citizenship confers the right to inherit land. But the ancestral land in 
turn symbolizes the validity and dignity of the claim to recognition and 
membership in ICelantan.
This claim to membership of Kelantan, and to the rights which are due 
to loyal subjects, was eloquently expressed on the Sambbrag Thais' behalf by
t
a Malay petition-writer in July 1966, The occasion was a petition to the
Mentri Besar not to withdraw the Thais' Temporary Occupation Licences to
17certain rice land. The preamble read as follows:
"Ada-lah kami2 yang bertanda tangan di-bawah ini memaalomkan 
kepada Datok, sunggoh kami2 di-sebut se-bagai bangsa Siam 
tetapi bagi-mana-kah keadaan di Negri Siam itu, kema kami 
telah beberapa tapis lama nya dari datolc-nenek-moyang kami 
bertaat stia di Negri ICelantan ini dan pun perkataan BANGSA 
SIAM ITU, hanya tinggal sebagai perkataan sebutan sahaja 
lagi, dengan kema itu-lah kami2 ini sebenar2 nya Warga 
Negara Tanah Melayu yang menumpukan taat stia nya di Negri 
Kelantan ini dari sejak datok nenek moyang kami lagi, maka 
dengan kerna itu se-imbang lah kami dengan orang2 Melayu 
yang taat stia kepada Negri nya." 18
It is a paradox, perhaps, of the Thais' historical experience, that a 
certain potential for national integration has been passed down from a period 
in which contact and integration were minimal. The British period that we
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we shall describe belox-f was one of rapidly growing contact and political
integration, yet the legacy is more often in the form of cultural obstacles
to further integration.
To complete the picture of the Malay historical environment of the
Kelantan Thai, let us briefly consider the conditions in 'Narathiwat* (the
modern equivalent of the petty Malay states of Saiburi, Raman and Rangae),
If this area was Malay when the Thais first pushed across the Golok into
Kelantan, it was scarcely less so in the late 19th Century. There is no
case for suggesting that, for all its uncertainty in Kelantan, Thai power was
in some sense poised at the border and therefore an implicit reality in the
situation of the Kelantan Thai. This is very important indeed, because it
might be objected that villages nearer the border than Sami36rag would be far
less isolated from Thai government than the author's generalisation has claimed.
For all Siam's closer control over the Seven States, they lived like Kelantan
19under their own rulers and customs and the whole of Patani was an area of
20endemic revolt. Indeed the division of Patani into seven segments was the
Siamese reaction to a serious revolt of 1790. By the time of the tours of 
21Chulalongkorn, administrative reorganisation had brought the Monthon and the 
Changwat as far as Songkhla but no further south. The Phra'jaa N99ngcig
22might receive funds to build a temple wherein to drink the water of allegiance, 
on home ground, but there was no sense that the new assertion of Thai control - 
it was experienced as a new trend in Patani as in Kelantan, albeit talcing off 
from a slightly more advanced stage of existing supervision - was unanswerable, 
or in the proper order of things, Eunice Thio states:
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’'As Siamese officers took over the collection of revenue 
and the exercise of jurisdiction, the Raja of Patani com­
plained to the authorities in Singapore and asked for 
British protection. In February 1899 the Raja of Sai 
similarly protested against the action of Siamese officers 
in his state and expressed a desire to settle in Perak," 23
A communication from the British Minister at Bangkok, Beclcet, to Foreign
24 /Secretary Grey, dated 8th October 1908, (in connection with the Anglo- 
Siamese negotiations for the Malay states) forwards a report from the British 
Vice-Consul at Songkhla, W, A, R. Wood, that this gentleman was being be­
sieged by petitioners for British protection. Wood claimed to have been asked 
to become Raja himself!
As to its population Patani was still - and is still today - like Kelantan,
part of the Malay world, Pallegoix's opinion that by the middle of the 19th
25century Siamese had become a majority in the area, should be compared crit-
26ically with the figures in the I960 Census, which still shows for Changwat 
Narathiwat an Islamic population of 208, 098, as against 55,122 Buddhists, 
(However, the latter figures should not be allowed to obscure the extent to 
which Narathiwat has been incorporated into the modern Thai state since 1909.
If the Kelantan Thai identify in a limited way politically with Thailand, it 
may be due - see Chapter VII - to change across the border: but change sub­
sequent, not prior, to 1909).
A small irritation attending the transfer of Kelantan suzerainty to 
Britain in 1909 was the alleged attempts of the Siamese government to prevent 
emigration from areas like Legeh and Kuala Tabal which had newly come under
Siamese control as part of the rationalisation of the boundary, and to attract
27ICelantanese into Siamese territory under false pretences. Peel, British
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Minister at Bangkok, noted that such; allegations, if true, would represent
an infraction of the provisions whereby "no man should be made to suffer in
28person or property for preferring his old allegiance*" The allegations 
could not be substantiated by enquiries from the Thailand side. What is cer­
tainly clear is that any attempts to restrain Malays from migrating met with 
almost uniform failure, and Kelantan was positively embarrassed by the flood. 
Phya Sakdi Seni, the H$gh Commissioner for Patani, on arriving at Kuala Tabal 
to take over the district for Thailand, found that "by far the greater number 
of the young and able inhabitants of the district had fled across the Golok
29river, on it becoming known that they were about to fall under Siamese rule." 
From the Kelantan side Mason reported that; "Thousands of Malays have left
Tabal district and are now being settled in the upper reaches of the Golok
30 31in Kelantan territory,.," "I am settling them as well as I can".
The principle that "no man should be made to suffer..for preferring his 
old allegiance" was incorporated into the treaty with specific regard to sub­
jects of his Siamese Majesty who might wish to remove themselves from Malay
32rule or British protection in the ceded territories. It was certainly not
anticipated on the British side that there would be a mass exodus nor that any
British Adviser would ever contemplate restraining such voluntary migration if 
it occurred. The clause was included in the treaty for a reason extraneous 
to Kelantan;
"The provision regulating the rights of persons in the ceded 
territories appears at first sight somewhat unnecessary but X 
learn that some question in this connection arose on the cession
of Krat to France in 1904. Apparently the Siamese population
in the Province of Krat commenced to migrate in large numbers
into Siamese territory. ThiBs led to an accusation, by the French
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authorities that this migration was due to Siamese 
machinations and attempts were made to arrest the exodus.
Under the circumstances the King of Siam has desired that 
this subject shall be specially referred to in the present 
Treaty." 33
Did the Thai of Kelantan perceive Malay rule as a disaster in the way 
the Malays of Legeh and Tabal (Taag Baj) perceived the approach of Siamese
rule? The evidence of Graham would suggest that they did, for he claims a
34 35Thai population of ’about 15,000’ in 1907, and the 1911 census found a
meagre 5,355. Of course we can reject Graham's estimate as one unsupported
36by a count, just as we reject Pallegoix’s fantastic claim for Patani and
shall reject the Thai Consul’s claim of ’about 12,000’ Thai in Kelantan 
37today.
In fact, if the Thais did stay put in Kelantan this would not amount un­
ambiguously to a choice of Malay rule. The state of Kelantan had become in 
the course of the last seven years something different from either a Malay 
state or a Siamese state, namely an outpost of wholesome European influence, 
felt in the form of improved security and an increasing economic activity 
(if Graham is to be believed). The choice was not, by now, one between Malay 
rule and Thai protection, but between British-protected rule of which the 
residents of Kelantan had some experience and Thai rule of which they still 
had none. To say this is not to deny what was argued above; that before 1902 
the government of Kelantan was Malay government. The point is that if the 
Kelantan Thais were aware of the withdrawal of Siamese suzerainty (probably 
they were not aware) the alternative was not any longer, by 1909, Malay rule 
pure and simple.
In this light is incredible that over half the Thai population could
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have fled. It is certain that none left Samttttrag» if they had, the village
would have far more links with Thailand than it now does. If villages nearer
the border had packed up and deserted the state, one might have expected to
read about it in the official correspondence. But as of 2nd April 1910, as 
38we have seen, the situation was that "no ICelantan men have entered Legeh."
A little deduction from simple principles may help us. The Thais had their 
land in Kelantan and were comparatively prosperous. Today, as security is 
threatened, there is no inclination to desert the land their forefathers 
first cleared and occupied. Why should there by mass desertion at a time when 
security was palpably improving? It is, also, questionable whether awareness 
of the change of rule would have been comiuunicated to the mass of the peasantry 
anyway. (The Thais of Semerak are in a state of extreme vagueness as to what 
month and in what year Malaya became independent. Momentous events make their 
impact slowly in the countryside even under modern conditions.) Additionally, 
it is not demonstrated that the Kelantan Thai were conscious of being in a 
Siamese state at all before 19G9. At least the Kelantan Malays of ICuala 
Tabal had no such idea about their territory before 1909.
Thus British influence cane to Kelantan quietly and in two stages, and 
Siam's influence, which had been nominal, slipped unlamented away. The lack 
of political upheaval however did not mean that the new presence did not make 
itself steadily felt thereafter in the lives of the people. The real ICelantan- 
ese revolution, a revolution of modernisation and economic development, was 
now to begin.
We have surmised that the seven years of Graham's advisership brought
minimal security and the first small upsurge of economic activity. The ripples
from these changes at the capital, round Tumpat port and in Duff territory,
may hardly have reached Semerak by 1909» but it was no later than that year -
it might have been a year or two earlier - that European planters entered the
Semerak district with Ceyloni clerks and overseers to plant coconuts. For the
first time the Thais of Semerak could go out and earn cash which was a
terribly hard come-by commodity before that time. Men and women now in their
sixties and seventies invariably recount how they went out to open the heaths
along the shore and south of Cherang Ruku for the copra plantations. To' Thid
Nppn never tires of telling how he became Tuan Owen's 'boy'* There is a
feeling that these plantations, which have now reverted to the state, are in
some way 'Thai* too because the Thais did all the work. There were too few
Malays in the immediate vicinity at the time.
But word spread among the Malay community at large that the European
planters were weak and vulnerable because they walked around unarmed and didn't
lock their houses. This led the Malays to march on Pasir Puteh in 1915 led
by the fanatical To' Janggut, and the planters at Semerak packed up in a 
39hurry. The next development was the arrival of a gunboat off Semerak which 
fired shells on Pasir Puteh. So began the 'first war* for the Thais of Semerak 
more frightening by far than the second, which largeljr passed them by. The 
shells whined high over the village and the women and children fled to Pog 
Kiang. In the wake of the barrage a detachment of Sikhs, packed shoulder to 
shoulder, passed in motor boats on the river, advancing on Pasir Puteh. After
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the death of Janggut’his photograph was taken by the British and displayed
around the countryside. Then the Europeans returned to their estates and
stayed until the second war. ■
The Jahggut affair - or the 'Pasir Pueh riot' as Mr, K, J. Farrer nicely 
40called it - turned out ignominiously for the Malays, and the Seme rale Thais 
were suitably impressed. The Europeans gave employment and patronised the 
h9raa on their estates. They had squashed Malay revivalism with military tech­
nology. And they administered efficiently and fairly from the new District 
Office at Pasir Puteh. One of the first fruits of the new administration was 
the land survey and issue of title, followed by the new and equitable cash rent
in place of tithe. In 1922 the metalled road reached Cherang Ruku and Besut
41from Pasir Puteh, and a customs post was set up at the Trengganu border.
The building of the road provided more work for young Thais.
The European presence was felt directly, and personified by Europeans 
directly. The epithet 'unfederated Malay State* is a misleading one, as much 
so as the earlier label, 'under Siamese control* , The British were as ubi­
quitous after 1909 as the Thai officials were distinguished by their absence 
before. That there was a strong and very important thread of continuity in 
the role played by Malays at all levels, from Penggawa up to Mentri Besar, is 
an important fact, but the popular conception of the U.F.M.S. as an area of 
Malaya which development and the British presence somehow passed by, is 
erroneous. This conception betrays itself in the judgement of Tregonning that:
"The Unfederated States enjoyed the services of British specialists, 
but the district administration was Malay.n 42
In contrast to this, the history reveals Mr. W.E.Pepys taking over the 
District Office at Pasir Puteh in May 1915 to restore confidence and order
after the riot. He occupied the post till 1920, when his departure "was much
43felt by the population of the district." Mr. L. H. Gorsuch was visiting
L.0» in charge of Pasir Puteh and Bachok from 1929 to 1932. Mr. L. Forbes
who later became Commissioner of Lands, had his first Kelantan posting as D.O.
44in the Ulu in the early ’20s. The business of survey and inspection brought
other Englishmen frequently into the kampongs, and if it was not business then
it was the pursuit of diversions like shooting or an interest in culture.
Noel Ross was a familiar figure to the Semerak Thai before the war, as the
officer in charge of drainage, and a frequent visitor to the wat where he was a
connaisseur of their entertainments. Luring the war he disappeared and the
Thais feared for his safety; but he returned, equipped with the Thai language,
learnt in Thailand during captivity. As Commissioner of Lands and Mines,
1946-49 and British Adviser 1952-3 he continued his friendly association with
the Thais. He above all and in spite of himself personifies the benign British
presence, and solicitude for the community (although he denies ever showing 
45any favouritism or having spent more time with the Thais than with the 
Malays.) However small the proportion of Europeans in the Kelantan service 
compared to the Federated Malay States - statistically one can no doubt demon­
strate a striking difference - the fact is that this was British-sty1e admin­
istration by Englishmen who were known personally and held in respect and 
affection by country Thai and country Malay alike.
To hear the Thai speak, one would sometimes imagine that they were a breed 
set apart or above all the rest of their English patrons. You hear the same 
thing in Malay kampongs, with a little more reason; Kelantan was administered 
as a Malay state and the Mala3r Reservation Enactment was passed in 1930. But
the Thais in practice experienced no difficulty in buying land from each 
other or from non-Siamese: permission was sought and given as a pure form­
ality. Above all the Europeans were accessible without regard to race. The 
importance of those appearances in the villages cannot be over-emphasised. 
Countless personal bonds were forged, here where Tuan So-and-So drank coconut 
milk from someone's tree or took shelter from the rain in his house, there 
where a boy rowed Tuan Somebody Else across a stream or held his guns. The 
great authority of one of the first Naaj Baan of Sambbrag in the British period 
was attributable in an important degree to the fact that an Englishman had 
come to the village personally to sound out the community for a suitable can­
didate. (The British made a point of giving the Thais their own penghulus if 
they could, which acknowledged and enhanced the Thais’ identity and self-res­
pect. )
To put it in ’socio-structural’ terms - i.e. in terms not of the formal 
administrative structure nor of ’social structure1 in one of the usual senses 
of that phrase, but in terms of the scheme of conceived overall ethnic ranking 
and power in the society - the Malay race had been demoted from its dominant 
position in the countryside to one of conceptual equality with the Thais under 
British patronage. The erstwhile law-givers now received law and their access 
to the power-holders was not more complete than that of the Thais, (even if 
more developed, for the mass of the Malay peasantry, than previous access to 
their own aristocracy.) It does not create complete understanding to demon­
strate that the Penggawa was always a Malay and the D.O. quite often too. To 
say that the formal administrative structure, up to the State Council and the
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Sultan, was predominantly Malay, is accurate, and it is true and axiomatic 
that the Malay ruling class, now incorporated into the administrative structure, 
had more access to power - and indeed more share in administration - than any 
peasant of any race. Yet the whole of this structure was run on European 
principles, not for the Malays' exclusive benefit, and was in any case circum­
vented by the Europeans' appearances in the lcampongs so far as the Thais per­
ceived the power relationships (and what we have to stress here is their per­
ception of those relationships, not the formal set-up). Even at the District 
Office with no European in sight, the European presence was implicit. Caw 
DM&ng of Samttttrag tells with glee how he was called to see the Malay D.O. some 
time about 1952 on some minor business. The D.O* was busy and told him to 
come back next day. Sambbrag lies nine miles from Pasir Puteh and Caw DM&ng 
was not minded - and who would blame him? - to come all the way back again, 
so he said that Tuan Ross had called him to the beach next day to help with 
water-sports. The business was transacted immediately. (The story of Tuan 
Ross's summons was fabricated).
Direct, personal and equal access to authority.... this above all (but 
together with the changing posture of individual Malays described in the 
previous chapter) determined the Thais' conception of the structural situation, 
a situation no less real to them for lacking formal institutional expression. 
Their model of colonial society becomes apparent from all the Thais' statements 
about British rule, just as its antithesis emerges from statements about Malay 
rule today: e.g. "khon khaaw pogkhr99ng myankan: lchfiHg khaw bid" (literally:
The white men administered equally, the Malays, they oppress*"); or again,
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"khSHg man haj chaad eng k99n: khon angkrid maj khid chaad araj phasaa araj1
("The Malays, they give to their own race first; the English didn't reckon 
what race or kind you were.")
One may ask, sceptically, what tangible advantages such direct and equal 
access brought the Thais, i.e. what was its function? Was the European pre­
sence in the kampongs any more than a skilful public relations exercise? But 
the willingness to listen is, after all, part of the function of successful 
government. To articulate popular feelings to the government is already to 
achieve a partial satisfaction, without the government talcing any specific 
action. In fact the government did satisfy several desires of the Thai com­
munity, these desires being very basic and born of centuries of insecurity 
and minimal access to governments the desire for security, for fair treatment 
by government and dignity vis-a-vis the Malays, for access to land and for 
marginal increments in the standard of living. Needless to say, there was 110 
desire (there is no desire today) to participate in decision-making, and the 
Europeans did not seek to encourage it. There was no question of a democratic 
'mode* of rule. The Thais are highly sensitive and resentful towards any sign 
of arrogance in any person, but they appear to have accepted the ineffable 
lordliness of the European officers as a style fitting a patron. The conditions 
of life under British rule marked such a radical transformation that all Euro­
peans were ascribed the virtues of concern and understanding for the peasant's
46
condition, where more critical and 'universalistic' criteria might have led 
to a different appraisal in some cases.
Far more epoch-making than the material fruits of good administration -
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or the sheer efficiency of administration, which also internalised new values 
in those who experienced it - was its seemingly undiscriminating, impartial 
treatment of all races. In conversation one is repeatedly told that the 
government clerks were not as arrogant (kong) as they are now. They even went 
out of their way to help the Thais, knowing of the Thais' good relations with 
the British. (Caw D&Ung of Sambbrag believes that some of the hostility of 
the clerks today is a form of retribution for the favoured status enjoyed by 
the Thais before Independence.) "KhMg klua khon khaaw." ("The Malays stood 
in awe of the British.") Experience of a societal structure in which the Thais 
enjoyed equal status with the other races has left indelible values in the 
Thais' political culture prescribing this kind of structure as a necessary con­
dition of - and possible obstacle to - further integration. It is also plain 
that the affection which some Europeans had for the Thais, and the equal (not 
to say subjectively favoured) status enjoyed as subjects, enhanced Thai identity. 
For the time being, however, their identification and integration with the 
state and society were rewarded and reinforced. The colonial plural society 
was, of itself, an integrated society, (lor has this integrated society yet 
wholly passed from the scene.)
A further and more extreme attribution to the British experience would be 
that only British rule is now acceptable. The nostalgia for those years is 
at times overwhelming.* Perhaps the author's appearance on the scene unstopped 
a flood of memories and wishful thoughts which are otherwise easily repressed. 
But the nostalgia is kept alive by other stimuli than the sight of young Euro­
peans in the state and locality. Local Malay friends often confide their own
nostalgia because of the bitter divisions that have rent Malay society since 
Independence. (IMO men in Kelantan have a further, specific, grouse about 
discrimination in favour of PMIP members in the alienation of new land; while 
the PMXP think of the British period as one when the Ghinese were less 
assertive than now.)
Chapter V will show that the Thais’ condemnation of Malay rule as such is 
partly a comment on the form that Malay rule has taken in Kelantan, not pre­
cluding integration with any Malay system. In mitigation of rejection, there 
are the positive neighbourhood relationships narrated in Chapter II (giving a
sense that equal ranking among the races is partially preserved), and a dimen^ -
sion of the same phenomenon at the level of party conflict (see Chapter V).
The tradition of Malay rule before 1909? and the continuance in office of a
Malay elite thereafter - not to mention the mode of British rule itself - are 
also highly significant formative factors, in that part at least of the spec­
trum of Thai political values offer a basis for acceptance of the contemporary 
political envirohment. But in the long run the pre-conditions for integration 
may prove, as a whole, too demanding, and the formative experience of British 
rule, under incipient social mobilisation, will have played a leading role in 
creating such a dissonance between expectations and the realities of independ­
ent Malay rule - whatever the extent of assimilation to such rule before the 
mobilisation era, and whatever the extent of assimilation to membership of a 
Kelantan political system during the era of early mobilisation itself (the 
colonial era).
We conclude this chapter with a reiteration of the same thought, hut 
with reference to a comment of Lucian Pye. In his study of South East Asia
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47in The Politics of the Developing Areas, having characterised the Malay 
states generally as subject, in the British period, to "the principles of 
indirect rule” (albeit experiencing "greater bureaucratization and a greater
J\ O
reliance upon British concepts of law"), Pye later suggests that (in spite
of Western impact), in South East Asia generally!
"...the formal structures of government were not the leading 
innovators or examples of modern practices, but rather, social 
changes tended to take place at a faster pace. Often under 
indirect rule changes in the authoritative structures of govern­
ment occurred only in order to keep up with changes in the 
social or economic patterns of life. In most cases where in­
direct rule was practised the formal structures of government 
have been inadequate to the task of guiding or controlling the 
pattern of change during the post-colonial period." 49
This characterisation does not help us to an understanding of the 
Kelantan Thai case. With Pye, the emphasis is very much on the backwardness 
of government. But in Kelantan, as we have sought to illustrate, goverbment 
did advance tangibly in its style and achievements, being under manifest Euro­
pean auspices, in spite of genuine principles of indirect rule. As far as a 
minority like the Thais is concerned, colonial rule was far in advance of what 
indigenous society could be expected to throw up. Alienation after Independence 
is attributable not to the colonial era institutions having been outpaced by 
social change, but to the institutions of independent government suddenly 
being viewed as a retrogression from the high standard of their predecessors, 
in the light of values for legitimation of these. It is difficult to assess 
the compatibility of a level of social development and a given level of 
development in the authoritative structures, as Pye would have us do. It is 
easier, and perhaps more to the point in studying political integration, to 
look to the political values of a group as moulded by historical experience,
and to consider whether these values legitimate the political structure at the 
present time.
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FOOTNOTES
1. If we view the Maalaj-SamBbrag dialect as tonal, its tonal patterns show 
far more correspondences with northern and central dialects than those 
of Taag Baj do. The coalescence of MO and LO is found in ten dialects 
of the northern and central families, including Bangkok (according to 
the charts in J. Marvin Brown, op,cit., pp.75-155) and only one of the 
southern family: viz., (Northern or Central Thai:) 11. Phuan; 14*
Bangkok; 19. 1750 Luang Prabahg; 20. Luang Prabang; 21. Kaen Thao;
22. Dan Sai; 23. Loei; 48. Si Saket; 49. Tha Turn; 52. IChorat; 
(Southern Thai:) 56 Chumpon. The only one of these which shows a shallow 
falling tone, like SamBBrag, is Bangkok. The rare coalescence of LI,
L3, H2 and M2, is a characteristic of only four of the dialects described 
by Marvin Brown: 4. Shan (Chiang Rai); 12. I65O Ayuthaya; 13. U Thong;
and 14. Bangkok,
2. The author did not manage or chance to turn up any traces of the "several 
villages near the coast, the forebears of the inhabitants of which came 
from Siam proper, accompanying the Siamese general Phaya Pitsnulok on a 
military expedition some sixty years ago and afterwards being left behind 
to keep the peace between Kelantan and the neighbouring state of Sai..." 
(W.A,Graham op. cit. p.20). The case against Maalaj or SamBBrag being 
the villages referred to is that the author would surely have heard of 
such a martial origin as recent as the 1840s, and also that they are 
wrongly placed to keep the peace between Kelantan and Sai, It is possible 
and likely that the troups in question merged with the existing population 
somewhere in the Tumpat district.
3. Viz., a group comprising Baan Bppsamed, Baan Naj, Baan IChoog Sijaa, Baan 
Khaw Din; and another comprising Baan Jung Kajf and Baan Tuwaa. These 
groups have distinct and recognisable accents of their own but are basic­
ally, in the author’s impression, very close to Taag Baj (see J.Marvin 
Brown op.cit., p. 135). Baan Jamuu and Baan Jang the author has not been 
able to place. They may be separate extensions from ' Patani: Baan
Jamuu has direct river access across the border. But Baan Jang is said
by some to have historical links with Baan Naj.
4 . See the Boundary Protocol attached to the Treaty signed at Bangkok on
March 10 1909 (given in Sir William Mqxwell and W.S.Gibson, ed., Treaties 
and Engagements Affecting the Malay States and Borneo; London 1924; p.218) 
The boundary follows watersheds across most of the Peninsula but on 
reaching "the hill called Bukit Jeli or the source of the main stream of 
the Sungai Golok...the frontier follows the thalweg of the main stream of 
the Sungai Golok to the sea at a place called Kuala Tabar."
5. Beliefs about the age or source of a village sometimes reflect the fact
that the informant himself had an ancestor who came from a certain place.. 
Such facts are remembered extremely well - and a man of over 60 who knows 
that his great-grand-father came from outside the village but admits that 
there were already Thais there, pushes back the founding of the village
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beyond 1850. This applied to two informants of Bangs&' whose great-grand­
fathers but not great-grand-mothers stemmed from Phatalung. On the assump- 
. tion that 1850 would be remembered, the author felt confident in dismissing 
the idea that SambtSrag and Maalaj were established in 1840: see note 2.
6. Some say it was men of Baan Naj. The author did not have the chance to 
check this at Baan Sadang itself. One abbot stated that the Buddhist 
traditions relate it to Baan Jang.
7. See Chapter VIXI, note 6 , p. 249 . The Trengganu Goverhment in collusion 
with the Kelantan Alliance Party is also now receiving applications from 
individual Kelantan Thais for new land, Trengganu is, of course, under­
populated and underdeveloped by comparison with Kelantan.
8. Although the dialect of the Tumpat coastal group (Bppsamed, etc.) is 
closely akin to Taag Baj, it is of course conceivable that this location 
could have commended itself strategically at any time, accessible from the 
sea and providing a base from which to intercept northward movements 
against the dependency of Patani. It is conceivable that the original 
nucleus could, have been established by policy, just as in the 19th century 
a military force was sent down there (it is unlikely to have been located 
anywhere else to "keep the peace between Kelantan and Sai", and with the 
lapge numbers of Thais already there, it could all the more quickly have
\ merged with the environment.) But the main migration can easily be 
imaged to have been in the nature of a slow infiltration from upcoast. 
Actually, Graham*s idea of the purpose of the (Tumpat?) settlement - see 
note 2 a  is in conflict with the original mission of the force, which was, 
of course, to uphold the authority of the Sultan of Kelantan against his 
internal rivals: see Walter Vella, Siam under Rama III, New York, 1957;
p.70. A more likely purpose of settlement would have been to forestall 
further collusion between Kelantan and the Seven States such as occurred 
in 1851 against Siam,
9. While the colonisation of Worth Kelantan by Taag Baj speakers was surely 
in the nature of a slow and unplanned extension, this is far less easy to 
believe of the original Patani ' 'Taag Baj' nucleus itself. On the basis 
of J. Marvin Brown*s reconstruction - see especially: • J.Marvin Brown,
"The Language of Sukhothai: Where did it come from and where did it go?",
The Social Science Review of Thailand, June 1966: 59-42 - *79. Tak Bai*
is a colateral dialect of *54. 1450 Wakhon*, i.e. a development not from
1450 Nakhon but from *55* 1250 Sukhothai1. In other words, the first
colonisation of lowerPatanl must have occurred simultaneously with the 
colonisation of Wakhorn. Such a phenomenal double leap of pioneering 
population is difficult to conceive without Ramkamhaeng's own sponsorship. 
If one wishes to assume slow penetration, one must also reject the 
assumption that Taag Baj (No. 79 in Marvin Brown's charts) is descended 
from Sukhothai. In fact, on Marvin Brown's own evidence, No,79 would seem 
to share more in common with the later Ayuthaya dialects. The character­
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istic merging of the tones HI, H3, Ml and M3 into one block is found no­
where else in the South, but occurs in: 3* 1150 Chiang Saen; 4. Shan 
(Chiengrai); 5* 1650 Ghiangmai; 7* Phrae; 8. Nan; 9. Lampang; 10. 
Chiangmai; 11. Phuan; 12. 1650 Ayuthaya; 13. N Thong; 14. Bangkok.
This coincidence is by no means as complete as between SamBBrag-Maalaj Thai 
viewed as a to&al dialect, and Central-Northern dialects: c.p. note 1
above. Yet the idea of a 13th Century migration perhaps merits a critical 
reconsideration, balancing the historical possibilities realistically 
against laryngeal theory.
10, But even their 'strategic' position could just be due to the natural fact 
that would-be settlers will use rivers for preference to gain access to
a jungled landscape. If a suitable spot for a settlement is found 3/4 mile 
up river, why go further? It anyway allows of a rapid retreat if the worst 
comes to the worst. Before giving equal weight to the strategic theory we 
should really consider the strategic or tactical ends which might have been 
served by such a policy. In the 19th century it was not to dominate an 
area, but (a) to protect one Malay vassal from the machinations of his 
rivals; of (b) to punish or forestall alliances against Siamese power.
The putative garrisons of Maalaj and SamBBrag could have kept a watchful 
eye on the Rajas of Bachok and Semerak respectively, in the interests of 
the Sultan of Kelantan, and have stood ready to prevent attacks from the 
South against Kelantan - or against Siamese power itself. But if the au­
thor is correGt to assume that Maalaj and SamBBrag are older by a few 
centuries than 1840, we need to identify a period when Thai power was,as 
immediately felt in Kelantan as in the 19th century. This is not easy.
The conventional view is expressed by Thamsook Numnonda in her Ph.D. dis­
sertation, The Anglo-Siamese Negotiations, 1900-1909. London University, 
1966, p.48: "The Malay states of KedahJ>erlis, Pattani and Setul became
dependencies of Sukhot}tsL in the 13th century when Siam first made con­
quests in the Malay Peninsula, /Thamsook Numnonda's source is: Prince 
Damrong: Phraratchaphongsawadan Krung Rattanakosin, Rachakan thi 2, Bangkok 
1916, pp.311-2; and Prinpe Damrong: Prachum Phongsawadan Fhak thi 5.
Bangkok 1914, pp.2-3^7 But it was only in 1769 that Kelantan and Trengg­
anu came under Siamese suzerainty /Phongsawadan Ghabab Phraratchahatleka, 
Bangkok 1952; Vol. II, Pt.II, p.28/...." The aim of protecting the new 
vassal Patani from its rivals might, incidentally, provide the context for 
a Thai migration to Taag Ba;j under Ramkamhaeng which we sought above - 
see note 9.
11. The Rajas of Kelantan, having come voluntarily under Siam's suzerainty in 
1769, were dependent .upon Bangkok for the confirmation of their succession, 
and sent tribute, but the intervention in a dispute over succession in 
1835 (described by Walter Vella, op.cit., p.70) and political interven­
tions in the growing anarchy of Kelantan politics in the final decades of 
the 19th century, were always a far less stringent form of surveillance or 
control than was exercised in Patani at equivalent periods. The seven sub­
states of Patani had many characteristics of 'Outer States' - hua myang
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n99g ~ as described recently by Charles Keyes for North-east Thailand 
(in ISANs Regionalism in North-east Thailand; Cornell Interim Report 
Series, 65; Ithaca, 19677P•15 j - "Tliei r chiefs /i.e. of Patani/ were 
chosen by Bangkok and retained their powers only as long as they pleased 
Bangkok." (W. Vella, op.cit., p.62.) "These seven states....were 
probably the most closely controlled of any of the Malay vassals."
(W. Vella, op.cit., p.62). But as we argue on p. 90 infra, even this 
did not amount to a great deal, and if tenuity of control applied to 
Patani it was even more the case in Kelantan, a genuine vassal, where 
nothing.like control appeared until the very end of the era. When it 
appeared it was, paradoxically, partly the product of a British design 
to forestall French and German designs in South Thailand, by asserting 
unequivocally Siam’s superior status in the Peninsula, especially in 
the Secret Convention of 1897 and the Boundary Agreement of 1899* This 
development is admirably clarified by Eunice Thio (see her British Policy 
in the Malay Peninsula. I88Q-X909; Ph.D. dissertation, London University, 
T956). This British design accorded, it is true, with Siamese aspir­
ations for some little time past, and the growing instability of the state 
made intervention almost imperative by some party. But promotion of Siam 
was not to be British policy for long. The Agreement of 1902, which 
brought Mr. Graham, and Mr. Thomson (of the Straits Service) to Kelantan, 
marked both the high water mark and the turn of the tide for Siamese con­
trol, for it represented the principle that only Englishmen could effect­
ively keep order and preserve Kelantan from the depredations of foreign - 
and English! - concession seekers,
12. Of course the Thais must have known something about the pretensions of 
Thailand in the late 19th century. Naa Can, a&ed 74, who recalled the 
story of the Thai elephant 11199 at Cherang Ruku, (p. 87 above), followed 
a monk up to Baan Naj as a joom - in about 1905? - and saw the bunga mas 
ship moored in the Kelantan River. The accounts of the royal tours of 
the Malay Peninsula published in 1924 and 1925 tell of visits to Kelantan 
in 1888 and 1890 (see; Codmaa.i heed Phra'baad somded Phra'cun coom klaw 
caw yuu hua Saded praphaad iMm malaa.iuu khraaw r.s,107. pp.5-8? and r.s. 
109, p.55, respectively; published at Bangkok, 1924* On the second 
occasion high seas prevented His Majesty from entering the river, but in 
1888 he Came to Kota Bharu.) In 1898 there was a further visit, the 
occasion when the Raja was promoted to the dignity of Deechaanuchid, i.e. 
Sultan (see Codmaa.i heed ra.ia* thaang Saded praphaad na.i rachakaan thii 
5 Saded praphaad hua mvang naj iMm malaa.iuu. radtanakoosin sog 117; 
published Bangkok 1925; ppV5-8.) In 1900 the King again visited Kota 
Bharu (see Codmaa.i heed.... etc.. as 1898 but dated Sog 119; pp.33-34) and
once more, finally, in 1905 (see Codmaa.i heed etc, as 1898 but dated
Sog 124; pp.98-99*) In 1898 ten abbots of Kelantan came to attend the 
arrival of the King at Kota Bharu, and in 1905 an unspecified number of 
monks was chanting the montra between the landing stage and the pavilion 
set up for the reception. The summoning of monies on such occasions would 
have brought the royal visits to the knowledge of the whole community. 
However, the author never heard mention of these progresses during his 
historical enquiries at Semerak or elsewhere.
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13. Eunice Thio, op.cit., p.335.
14. See The Malay Peninsula, hy Arnold Wright and Thomas H. Reid, London,
1912, p.157. Duff negotiated 3,000 square miles of territory in the 
Ulu and comprehensive administrative powers over it for the sum of 
£2,000 plus 200 shares (to the Sultan) in his syndicate.
15. O.p. note 11, above,
16. These other dimensions, discussed in Chapter V, are acceptance of the 
rule of Malay Sultans in a positive sense (there is a forecast of this 
already in the passage translated at note 18 below); and assimilation 
to the role of clients in general.
17. The incident which gave rise to the fear of the loss of these licences
is related at Chapter IV, p. 122. The Thai reaction is further discussed
at Chapter V, p. 143.
18. The author offers the following translation: "We the undersigned do
(humbly) declare to Your Honour that although we are (traditionally)
called 'the Siamese', we know little of what goes on in Siam, For we have
been loyally resident in Kelantan for many generations reaching back be­
yond our great-grandfathers' time. The expression 'the Siamese' survives 
only as a form of speech, and thus we are true citizens of Malaya, 
showing our loyalty to this state of Kelantan since the time of our an­
cestors. In fact we are of one kind with the Malays whose natural loyalty 
is to their state."
19. Walter Vella, op.cit., p.61.
20. Viz.: Pataanii, Jiring, R&ngMIL, Npng Cig, Jaalaa, Sajburii; see Walter 
Vella, ibid., p.61.
21. See note 12, above; and Codmaa.i heed...»etc. opera cit.,
especially that for Sog 117 (1898")' p. 4. " ™
22. Codmaa.i heed... .etc. op.cit., khraaw r.s.108 (1888-9) p.38.
23. Eunice Thio, op.cit., p.394. She in turn quotes W.W.Skeat and Dr.F.F, 
Laidlaw in 3I.M.B.R.A.S. Vol. XKVI, 4, December 1953J "The Cambridge 
University Expedition to parts of the Malay Peninsula, 1899-1900."
24. Foreign Office 422-62 (Affairs of Siam, Further Correspondence XX).
25. Pallegoix, Description du Royaume Thai ou Siam. 1854; Vol. I, 25; and 
quoted by Walter Vella, op.cit., p.77.
26. Thailand, Central Statistical Office, National Economic Development Board: 
Population Census, I960 (Qhangwat Narathiwat).
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27. See J.S.Mason, British Adviser, to Federal Secretary, F.M.S., dated 
2nd April 1910; F.0. 22983 in P.O. 37l/984: (Para-4)
"I was informed on March. 31st by the ex-Kamnan of Jeli (now a Kelantan 
Government official, as Jeli is in the land ceded to Kelantan) that Nai 
Ban Samat, of Kampong Kuchi in Ampur Legeh, threatens all Legeh men that 
their property and padi will be confiscated if they migrate to Kelantan.
Nai Ban Samat states that he has received authority on this point from
the Ampur of Legeh, Che Draman. Nai Ban Smat has promised Kelantan peo­
ple that if they will migrate into Legeh they will never be "krah'ed" 
and that the poll tax will be remitted until the time of their grand 
children. (No Kelantan men have entered Legeh: several Le&eh men have
migrated into Kelantan.)"
28. Peel to Grey, 16.5.1910; P.O. 22983, in P.O. 371/984.
29. W.A.R.Wood to Beckett, 2.8.1909, in P.O. 422-64, (Affairs of Siam.
Further Correspondence XXI.)
30. Mason to Federal Secretary, 2.4.1910; F.0. 22983 in F.0. 371/984, para.6.
31* Ibid., para. 9.
32. Anglo-Siamese Treaty, signed at Bangkok, March 10th 1909; Clause three:
"....subjects of His Majesty the King of Siam residing within the terri­
tory described in Article X who desire to preserve their Siamese nation­
ality will during the period of six months after the ratification of the
present Treaty be allowed to do so if they become domiciled in the
Siamese dominions. His Britannic Majesty's Government undertakes that 
they shall be at liberty to retain their immoveable property within the 
territory described in Article X." (Given in Sir W.Maxwell and W.S.
Gibson, op.cit.)
33. Enclosure 14 in: Paget to Grey, 27.2.1908, in F,0.422-62, (Affairs of 
Siam, Further Correspondence XK.)
34. W.A.Graham, op.cit., p.20.
35. See J.E.Nathan, op.cit., para. 341, p.92. The 1921 total is 6,255.
36. See note 25, above.
37. Reported in The Straits Times. November 15 1966.
38. See note 27, above.
39* This is the view of the affair from SamBBrag. The Thais understood it 
as a peasant rising and knew nothing of promotion by higher interests. 
They had a keen sense that it was a movement to drive out the foreigner 
and restore Kelantan to the Malays. G.f. the suggestive analysis along 
the same lines by James de V.Allen: "The Kelantan Rising of 1915 s Some
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Thoughts on the Concept of Resistance in British Malayan History",
Journal of South East Asian History, September 1968: 241-257. We 
quote from this article again in Chapter V, p. 149.
40. Adviser's Report Kelantan. 1915.
41. Personal communication of Mr. Nagaratnam of Kota Bharu who was in charge 
of the pest when it opened.
42. K. G. Tregonning, A History of Modern Malaya, Singapore, 1964; p.225.
43* Adviser's Report Kelantan, 1920.
44. These are just three examples brought to the author’s notice by the 
personal communications of the three retired officers. (The author is 
warmly appreciative of their help and interest; also of the service of 
the British Association of Malaysia in putting him in touch with them.) 
Valuable communications were also received from Mr.D.Headley (B.A., 
1953-57)* Mr. N.Ross (B.A., 1952-53), Mr.J.Innes Miller (Legal Adviser, 
194l), Mr.T.W.Clayton (Assistant Adviser 1913 and High Court Judge), and 
Mr.C.C.Brown (Kelantan High Court Judge in the 1920s and author of 
Kelantan Malay, Singapore, 1927). That the extent of the European staff 
establishment was not fortuitous is suggested by George Maxwell's re­
commendation after the Pasir Puteh rebellion that more European officials 
be sent as a matter of urgency (in Young to C.O.Conf, of 2 June 1915, C.Q. 
273/426: quoted by James de V.Allen, op.cit., p.250.) Maxwell was a
keen federalist and thought Kelantan eligible for federation as soon as 
the railway was built from the West Coast,
45. The only act which he remembers as being of benefit to the Thais was his
rescinding of a tax on their entertainments while he was B.A. However,
it is not any single policy, but the sum of European policies and above 
all the quality of government which the Thais remember - its accessibility 
and its concern,
46.......the criteria, let it be confessed, of the present author, who stands
a good two generations in time behind the colonial servants in question 
and not very close to them in social origin. But the Thais do usually 
judge behaviour in terms of a normative continuum from humble to arrogant, 
and the author could never have become accepted in SamBBrag village as
an honorary member on the basis of the master-servant relationship. On
the other hand, the old respect for Europeans eased his initial welcome.
47. The Politics of the Developing Areas, ed. by G,A.Almond and J.S.Goleman;
New Jersey, I960.
48. Ibid., p.91.
49. Ibid., p.99.
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. CHAPTER IV; THE RISE OF MALAY POLITICS,AND THAI ALIENATION
It is appropriate to describe the hostile factors in the Thais' environ­
ment before its more tolerable aspects, because they strike the student of
minority problems irresistably in his first exposure to the situation. They 
are also what the Thais always talk and complain about. On the first evening 
in his new house the four men most closely concerned with the arrangements 
for the author's installation'*' were not slow to express their discomfort and 
apprehensions under Malay rule. The motives for giving Independence are so 
remote from the Thais' understanding that it is a common belief that the 
British have not withdrawn at all but are simply giving the Malays a pro­
bationary trial in harness, and are watching from the side-lines ready to 
intervene and retrieve the situation if it gets out of hand. The reappear­
ance of young Europeans on the Kelantan scene in the last few years (the 
Peace Corps) and the author's arrival in the village were taken as auguries 
.of the British 'second coming* which is expected by some as earnestly as it 
is desired. Nostalgia for British rule is sometimes expressed very strongly 
indeed and Malay rule in any form tends to be denied legitimacy; for in 
Kelantan not only has popular British patronage been withdrawn, but the patent 
equality of status of the races in the coloniaJ. plural structure has been very 
drastically called in question. The British "let the Malays rule" (haj khd&g 
pogkhrppng) and the result is a revolution in the relative ranking of the com­
munities. The popular Thai 'immediate* model of Independent Kelantan inevit­
ably places the Malays at the top of the new hierarchy, suppressing (bid) the 
rest. Although sweeping rejection of Malay rule as such is misleading, it is 
impossible to find a Thai who will say expressly that he can accept independent
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rule, and indeed Malay rule was rejected at SamBBrag long before its peculiar
abuses in Kelantan had a chance to be experienced - viz. in 1955? at the first
General Election, two years before Independence and four.years before P.M.I,P.
swept to power in the Kelantan state government. This was done by voting
exclusively Parti Negara. The same vote was cast overwhelmingly by Thais in
other villages visited by the author, if in constituencies where Negara had
2
fielded a candidate. At Bppsamed hnd Jung Kaw the author heard of a few
votes for the Alliance at this time but there the differences between the two
parties were not, apparently, clear to all the Thai voters. The first reason
3
for voting Negara there was often that its symbol, a sheaf of rice, seemed
more fitting for rice farmers than the rya'baj - the sailing boat - of the
Alliance with its apparent appeal to fishermen. If the symbol was all that
guided some voters, it is understandable that some would support the Alliance.
But the informants usually remembered - as an afterthought, without special
prompting - that Parti Negara was the British party and that some people had
this in mind too when they supported it. At Sam^rag this is the only reason
given. (At Baan BangsB* the Alliance was supported from the beginning because
there has never been a Negara candidate in the various national and state con-
\4stituencies in which the village has found itself from 1955 up till 1964.j
The reason why Baan SamBBrag was so well informed about the stakes in the
first election may lie in the regular contacts between Semerak Thai men and
Malays, at the Gherang Rulcu coffee shop and on the fishing boats. Also in
the fact that the Penggawa at that time was a Negara supporter, who would
have appealed to the Thais1 reason and feeling -- by telling them what was at
5stake - as well as to their loyalty to himself. But the Penggawa was neither
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the prime factor swaying the Semerak Thais' decision nor the prime source of 
information on Negara's policy. Nho then said it was the British party? "The 
Malays said so."
Indeed they did. Two great issues differentiated Parti Negara from 
U.M.N.O. in the 1955 election campaign. One was Independence from Britain, 
the other was alliance with the Chinese, There was a superficial contradiction 
in the stand of each party on these issues. Parti Negara's stand on Independ­
ence was on the face of it anti-nationalist, but it was justified as a stand 
in defence of the Sultans and of Malay integrity, and of course since its 
formation as the Malayan National Conference in 1953? Parti Negara had repre­
sented Dato Onn bin Jaafar's new-found communalism.^
"Any Malay who demands independence from the British is a traitor 
to his ruler, said Dato Sir Onn bin Ja'afar, Secretary General of 
Parti Negara, speaking at a rally here last night /Kota Bharu, on 
25th April 1955/ attended by nearly 1,000 Malays. He referred 
specifically to UMNO leaders who, he said, were malting this demand.
He said that Malays in Penang and Malacca owed loyalty to the Queen 
but those in the Malay States owed it to their rulers.,,.Malays 
should not be misled by the ignorance of UMNO leaders, who had 
allowed UMNO's policy to be dictated by the Malayan Chinese Assoc­
iation. .. "7
The emphasis on the sovereignty of the Sultans and the illegality, there­
fore, of asking the British for Independence was a mere quibble. The fear of 
the consequences for Malaya - and for the Malays - of the double loyalty 
and the dominance of the Chinese, though, was surely a genuine fear for Dato 
Onn, even if party interest, following the rout in the first three state 
elections (in Johore and Trengganu, 1954, and in Penang, February 1955), also
indicated the postponement of Independence till such time as the party might
8have a prospect of forming the first independent government.
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In contrast to Parti Negara, the United Malays National Organisation 
was committed to an inter-communal policy, hut was thinking in terms of 
Merdeka within the life of the forthcoming partly-elected Legislative Council, 
about 1959o Naturally, the whole rationale of the Chinese alliance (and 
subsequent events and indeed the whole success of independent Malaya have 
vindicated it) was that inter-communalism is the only possible foundation of 
nationalist pox^ er. The Chinese alliance was a means to a certain ends 
Independence. UMNO too was pursuing' a nationalist end, but the higher of the 
two cptions, involving a risk proportionate to the stakes.
Yet it is slightly ironical that the party which was openly communal at 
that time should have won the Thais’ support, while the party of all the races 
was rejected. The paradox stems from the fact that the communal conservatism 
of Negara had made them shrink from the means necessary to achieve the supreme 
end of Independence, and this turned them Into the party of the status quo.
UMNO, just as much a Malay party, accepted the political imperatives and em­
braced inter-communal ism only in order to come forward unambiguously as the 
party of national independence. Negara was smeared as the "Parti orang puteh" - 
the Englishmen's party. But as far as the Thai vote was concerned nothing 
could be better propaganda for Negara, coming, as it did, 'from the Horse's 
mouth’s "The Malays said so."
Thus it came about that the Thais' first chance of participation in the 
new political process was used to register whole-hearted rejection of it. How 
sound their instinct was! Independence in Kelantan could only mean Malay rule. 
It was no unkind distortion that made UMNO appear in the guise of a Malay 
nationalist party, for Independence was a Malay nationalist policy and UMNO
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made much of it. The rejection of Independence evinces strong values 
favouring British rule and rejecting Malay rule as such, when the choice is 
offered. It is only since Independence that the Thais have reconciled them­
selves to association with the Alliance and have come to appreciate and praise 
its inter™communal qualities. But these have become more easily apparent with 
the rise of an extreme conmiunalistic party on its 'right*. The evidence of 
1955 is that Malay rule as such was unwanted. The evidence must be accepted - 
without, however, subscribing to the non-sequitur that no integration is 
possible outside the framework of British rule.
The total defeat of the Thais1 party in Kelantan (as in the rest of the 
Federation) in 1955 must have given them some premonition of &reat and inaus­
picious changes to come, but Independence itself passed uneventfully and many 
Thais take refuge from the realities of political change even now by refusing 
to believe that the British have really betrayed their trust. Whatever the 
Reservations and fears following 1955 there was nothing to warn the Thais of 
the magnitude of the approaching revolution. How many Malays of UMNO dreamed 
that the fruits of- Independence would slip so soon and so completely from 
their grasp?
In the first state council elections to all seats, held in Kelantan on
24th June 1959, the party of the kampongs, the party of Islam, swept to power 
9in all but two of the 30 constituencies.
For the Semerak Thais the utter defeat of their chosen party for the 
second time in four years was a poor invitation to identify with the new pro­
cess. (The Negara having disappeared from the scene in Pasir Puteh Tenggara
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constituency, and the old Penggawa being imprisoned for embezzlement - his 
successor is pro-Alliance - the Semerak Thais had inevitably transferred their 
allegiance to the. Alliance.) But the peculiar character of the party which 
took power was far more demoralising than defeat as such. PMIP speakers had 
campaigned at Gherang Ruku on a programme which included the prohibition of 
pig-rearing and the ’nationalisation1, in a theociatic sense, of fakir temples.
In other Thai villages the 1959 election is remembered as the election 
when the Alliance was generally supported for the first time. The fact that 
it was the party in power when the second state elections were held would have 
given it a built-in advantage even in constituencies where Negara put up a 
candidate, provided the Penggawa was an Alliance supporter himself and could 
add his personal pressure to the attraction of the party of power to a loyal ■ 
minority. In any case Negara could no longer fight on a pro-British ticket 
and the Alliance could validly pose as the Thais' best guarantee against PMIP 
fanaticism (without, presumably, fearing that their worst fears would actually 
be realised in the election.)
However, Negara was still in the running and must have taken some Thai
votes in the four state constituencies where Negara candidates faced a partly
Thai electorate.***^  In Rantau Panjang the Negara candidate even appears to
have been a Thai, from his unmistakable (Malay) nickname, Gelap Pak Wei, His
poor showing - 66, lost deposit - may reflect the absence of any major Thai
settlement in that constituency. In Tumpat Tengah the Negara was actually
opposed by a Socialist Front candidate of mixed Thai and Indian parentage, who
11attracted 341 votes, a large proportion of them Thai. In the parliamentary
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elections Negara put up only one candidate, for Ulu Kelantan, which in the
event was won by the Alliance.
In the 1964 General Election Negara fielded no candidates in Kelantan;
likewise in the state elections. The PMIP won again, this time with 21:30
12seats in the state assembly and 8:10 parliamentary seats. Subsequent by-
elections have shown distinct Alliance improvement and a growing PMIP problem
13would seem to be the defection of leaders at various levels-to UMNO. An 
Alliance victory in 1969 is by no means impossible, if not yet predictable 
with certainty.
Meanwhile, it would be a distortion to pretend that in the Thai mind 
there is not a deep sense of outrage at the fundamental reverse of their for­
tunes and status brought about by the restoration of Malay rule in Kelantan. 
This sense of outraJtge is patently a response conditioned primarily by the 
learning experiences of British rule. Malay peasant power in Kelantan has cast 
the ethnic relationships from a mould of equality into the hierarchical scheme 
of the •classical' plural society. PMXP practice has not gone to the lengths 
of banning pigs, but it has unpleasant features enough. Firstly, land.
Pressure on the Thais in this field is on two fronts: legal and illegal.
Legally, the PMIP government has a strong enough weapon against non-Malays in 
the land-laws of the British era, if operated strictly. The irony of the 
situation is that entrepreneurs of the major immigrant race - from whose in­
roads Malay land was supposed to be protected by the Malay Reservation Enact­
ment of 1930 and subsequent consolidations - can today use their wealth to 
oil the machinery which processes applications for exemption. (The PMIP
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leadership on all evidence is excessively corrupt - hut the Alliance clique 
who preceded them in office set no better example.) The rural and indigenous 
Thais, who represent no threat whatsoever to the Malays' inheritance, suffer 
under the strict application of the law.
It is a rare Thai who realizes that the law was written by the British.
But this is understandable, because in the British period permissions to buy
land, even Malay land, appears to have been given to Thais without delay. It
is necessary to understand here that the most common Thai requirement from the
State Executive Council (the body which advises the Sultan on land matters) was
and is simply the facility of buying Thai land from Thais, rarely land owned
by Malays. This was something that could scarcely be interpreted by the
British as a breach of the spirit of Malay Reservation. Yet permission always
had to be formally sought, for Thai land, like the whole of cultivated Kelantan,
14is 'Malay Reservation1. It is this fact which now enables the PMIP govern­
ment to erode Thai land by holding up transactions between Thai and Thai for 
six months or more, thus forcing the needy vendor to sell to a Malay. The 
Thai who needs and can afford the lot goes without and the total of land 
available to the community shrinks. Sometimes the amount of land available is 
increased for a while by a purchase from a Malay - but this cannot be registered 
and the Malay could walk in any time and reoccupy the land without compensation. 
The author came to know of only one case of alienation of a piece of government 
land to a Thai for freehold occupation, even though alienation is proceeding 
slowly but quite steadily under present policy.
Another perfectly legal way in which Malay land could be increased at the
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expense of Thais is to refuse to renew the lease of state land taken under a 
'T.O.L.1 (Temporary Occupation Licence). At Samddrag 18*77 of the 145.779 
acres under rice cultivation are in the category 'state land' and subject to 
sudden withdrawal by the government. Fortunately, it is not the government's 
policy to withdraw Temporary Occupation Licences from their present holders. 
The largest group which would be affected by such a policy would presumably 
be Malay supporters of UMNO, who are the first object of PMIP hatred. The re­
sult would be immediate internecine conflict. An UMNO Malay in Pasir Puteh 
district even threatened armed resistance to a pending move to evict him from 
land where he had squatted for some time without any rights whatsoever; no 
one doubts that the consequences of suspension of T.O.Ls would be tlie same, 
but on a scale commensurate with the numbers affected - and the licences are 
often of long standing. The PMIP is not afraid of conflict as such, nor 
would the reaction against them be organised or supported by Kelantan UMNO.
But the fighting would be very likely to lead to Federal intervention and 
perhaps a suspension of the State Constitution. This is the last thing the 
PMIP wants.
The easiest way the PMIP can satisfy its supporters, if not bjf granting 
a proper alienation in the jungle or at its fringes (all of which takes a long 
time to set on foot) is to give them 'permission' at the district-party level 
to squat illegally on government heath or coconut land or in jungle, and build 
a house. There is a good chance that no future government will want to take 
on itself the trouble of throwing them out and eventually deeds will be issued 
and the land alienated. The present Penggawa of Semerak and the D.O, of
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Pasir Puteh are naturally powerless to do anything about the illegal squatting 
by PMIP members at Semerak since 1964 without the support of their superiors, 
and by July 1967 the only action taken against the assemblyman who had given 
the wink to his supporters was a police enquiry into an allegation of corrup­
tion and/or fraud, (The allegation was certainly the work of UMNO, but it 
was based on the locally well-known and acknowledged fact - not a fantasy con­
cocted for propaganda - that the assemblyman had taken $60 'fees' per acre of 
land occupied by his own supporters, ad well as making out false receipts
and chits relating to their 'rights' on the land.)
(
All this does not affect the Thais directly, but a variation of the above 
theme is to 'permit' a party member to occupy coconut land which is already 
subject to a T.O.L, but in the name of someone less dangerous than an UMNO 
Malay. Such a person was the mild-mannered Naaj Phlab, the headman of 
Samtibrag in 1966. The Malay who dispossessed him in 1966 claimed to have paid 
for temporary occupation himself. Naaj Phlab*s plight was not serious enough 
for the Penggawa to exert himself hard to disprove the Malay's claim to have 
a licence. It took nine months to persuade the Malay to move. And three 
months later he was back anyway.
The pretensions of PMIP assemblymen in their districts would be laughable
did they not reflect a large measure of real power. Indeed the power flows
from the pretension: the party faithful take the assemblyman at his word when
hd says he has the authority to let them occupy state land; and by occupying 
the land contrary to law they become the tangible manifestatioh of his power.
In the 1964 General Election the assemblyman for Pasir Puteh Tenggara
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even 'reserved1 an area of sandy heath, id*thin the confines of the Semerak 
Thais' area of settlement and cultivation, to the Thais themselves if they 
would vote for him. No doubt he would have been true to his word in the 
event of getting Thai support, for the area was not attractive to any Malay.
But the Thais did not support the PMIP and it is inconceivable that they ever 
will, because illegal occupation has become the party's characteristic weapon 
against the Thais, not a credible or desired advantage (the Thais are too 
law-abiding) of Thais supporting the party.
The audacity of the local party reached its newest limits at Semerak in 
July 1966 when a party man masquerading as a Survey Officer acting on the 
P.O.'s orders went to the Thais' richest T.O.L. rice land at midday, when no 
one was about, to 'survey' it prior to 'reallocating' it to Malay applicants. 
This was a very different matter from the threat to one man's coconut plot. 
Several Thais were affected. The matter was taken to the Penggawa at once.
One exceptionally tough - and very un-Thai - character, Nuj Kong ('Big-headed 
Nuj') threatened violence. The Penggawa knew that this for once was an ex­
plosive situation; the P.O. in the name of his dignity and such authority as 
he still enjoys could not allow this flagrant abuse of his name to go un­
checked. The Officer Commanding the Police Pistrict was apprised of the threat 
to individual rights and more especially of the danger of violence. Apart from 
the repercussions of violence, the PMIP government was not prepared to go so 
far towards denying its own writ (here represented by the Temporary Occupation 
Licence) in the countryside. On this occasion, therefore, the local party's 
initiative fell flat. But the incident remains in the 'landscape' of Malay-
ruled Kelantan as perceived by the Sambbrag Thais.
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At the district office today the amenability and accessibility of the D.O.' 
has come to depend rather on his political views. The D.O.'s freedom of action 
and authority within, the district office are greatly circumscribed, whatever 
his views, by the ubiquitous PMIP assemblymen or their agents. Their power 
is felt as strongly at the district office as British power before them, and 
is probably feared more because PMIP favours are bestowed selectively. Petty 
but increasing venality of the clerks is a constant grievance. Even if the 
government does not with-hold renewal of a T.O.L., or if no Malay occupies 
a Thai's leased government land, a clerk can cause untold anxiety by refusing 
to issue a new licence till a bribe is paid - and this even when the D.O. has 
ordered him to issue the licence without delay. The political and venal 
motives are usually difficult to disentangle, but less so, perhaps, where a 
Thai is obstructed in his application for citizenship.
Citizenship is vital for farmers because it enables them to inherit and 
have title to land. It also entitles one to vote.^ Voting is viewed by most 
Thais as primarily a duty, not a right, so disenfranchisement arouses no 
resentment. The PMIP of course attaches great importance to limiting the Thai 
vote as an Alliance vote, and has no intention of preventing Thai inheritance. 
But the Thais believe that the PMIP would with-hold citizenship to deprive 
them of their land.
Another common misunderstanding, which yet has some objective foundation 
in the Thais' experience, is that the state government issues nationality.
The Federal Registrar for Kelantan and Trengganu has his office at Kota Bharu, 
but the issuance of identity cards (compulsorily to all persons of 13 and over)
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is mostly delegated to the district offices, as well as the handling of
applications for citizenship. Thus the Thais will often be dependent on pro-
PMIP clerks to tell them, inter alia, that if they are already citizens they
can apply as of right to register their native-born children as citizens
17before the child is 21. They are never told, and so, when a young person
is taken by the parent at the age of 12 to apply for an identity card, a red
one is issued. If the parent protests he is still not told that nationality
is obtainable immediately, but rather that the juvenile must wait till 18 and
18then apply himself. Although registration on that occasion is also of 
right (regardless of the father’s status), certain conditions have to be sat­
isfied, including the language test, a hurdle which can be used effectively 
by unfriendly interests on the district language boards to limit the number of 
successful candidates. Meanwhile the young person is disqualified, in spite 
of his Malayan birth-certificate, from eligibility for scholarships to see him 
through lower secondary school if he has the brains to get him so far, and 
from employment by estates and companies, which is strictly for citizens only. 
In the early part of 1967 the author found that there were 104 young Thais in 
the whole of Pasir Puteh district aged between 10 and 21, Of these, 97 either 
had red cards or seemed to have no prospect, if they were under 12, of getting 
citizenship in time for a blue card to be made out for them. What is pro­
foundly disheartening and offensive to the Thais Is that all but two of these 
young people (in Pasir Puteh district) have Malayan birth^certificates, being 
bom since the Japanese occupation, and their parents themselves are citizens 
for the most part. However, even the few who are aware of the different loci 
of power in the Malayan state do frequently blame 'PMIP law* for it, not
’Alliance law'* Poor communications, which hinder the Thais so much in their 
encounters with the bureaucracy, can at least conduce to a certain optimism 
about the conditions which would follow the fall of the PiCIP. Behind the 
blanket condemnation of Malay rule there often lurk hopes of better things to 
come, even hopes which are, strictly, misinformed.
To the extent that unfriendly clerks are withholding necessary information, 
the PICEP can be held responsible for obstructed access to citizenship, but 
the PMIP could scarcely obstruct at all were it not for the Federal authorities’ 
bureaucratic - but in east-coast conditions unrealistic and unreasonable - 
insistence on documentary validation for certain statements relating to citizen” 
ship rights. As it stands the present law is more liberal to first and second 
generation non-Malays (i.e. in its naturalisation and registration clauses 
respectively) than the British legislation of 1948 or 1952. For third gener­
ation or older immigrants the British legislation of 1952 still applies under
which 99/s of Kelantan Thais should be admitted to citizenship by operation of 
19law. Indeed the British administration before and after 1952 issued operation-
of-law citizenship to any Thai who needed a passport, accepting the Penggawa's
testimony that the applicant’s family had resided in Kelantan immemorially.
The D.Chs at Bachok and Pasir Mas in particular, between 1949 and 1952, made
it a point to advertise the future advantages of citizenship to all the Maalaj
and Bangsd' Thais, vis. equal rights with other races, specifically rights of 
20inheritance. Many took out citizenship at that time; juveniles as young as 
12 were in some cases made citizens. Nor was the independent Malayan regime ' 
reluctant in its first two years to enrol citizens on prima facie evidence of
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right. In Pasir Puteh district, of 255 Thais aged over 51 in 1967 (i.e.
persons who had reached their majority in 1957, the year of Independence) 190
21were issued with a special form of citizenship in late 1957 or early 1958.
The purpose of this massive enrolment was to recreate an electorate now that 
voting' was to be reserved only to proven citizens, (in 1955 no certificate 
of nationality had been required.) But the certificates of nationality them­
selves were still issued without documentary proof of right.
Now these 1957-8 certificates were sometimes issued by Peng'gawas and 
Penghulus at the D.O.’s direction, but the major initiative in mobilising the 
people to make their thumb print on the declaration of loyalty and accept the 
certificate came from the political parties, interested in acquiring voters.
The government’s generosity was badly abused and many new citizens were created 
(especially in the west-coast states) who had no rights, as immigrants, to the 
status. By I960 the doors were closing against the flood of applications, and 
for the first time Registrars insisted on production of a birth-certificate in 
support of every claim of a Malayan birth-place. Citizenship by operation of 
law is now granted, in principle, only on the production of two birth-certifi- 
cates, ones own and, that of ones father, on whose birth in Malaya ones right 
primarily rests. Since the generations who were over 21 in 1957 were born in 
an era which knew practically no birth-certificates, they cannot substantiate 
their children’s right to citizenship by operation of law, even though they
jrhemselves may have been granted a form of citizenship on precisely that basis 
22in 1957-~8° That is why their children now in the 10-21 age group have to 
use the registration channels, and so fall foul of obstruction.
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That is the major injustice of which the Thais complain. But at least 
the under 22s as of 1967 have birth-certificates and if they didn't attend
primary school they will have the opportunity of adult education to bring
23
their Malay up to the standard required by the local board. From 1969* 
when the children born since Merdeka begin to apply for identity cards, blue 
cards will be issued automatically. This will be received with relief but will 
also add to the Thais' sense that the laws are arbitrary. Indeed it has taken 
this university-educated Westerner some months to penetrate and understand 
all the complexities and anomalies of the citizenship laws.
Parents at Bangs&* and Maalaj have been particularly affected by a certain 
decision taken, it is claimed, at the beginning of this decade, but only in the 
last two years made fully operative in the district offices. A majority of 
Bang-sS* and Maalaj parents have citizenship by operation of law (1948 rules) 
as a result of the generous initiative of the British administration through 
the D.O.s of those two districts. One of the clauses of the (State citizen­
ship) legislation which followed in September 1952 conferred state citizenship
by operation of law on any person holding Federal citizenship under the previous 
24legislation and another clause conferred automatic citizenship on their
25children whenever born. The prestige of operation-of-law citizenship under 
the 1948 and 1952 laws appears to have been such that even when, about I960, 
parents were being generally required to prove their own birth in Malaya, both
the pre- and the post-September 1952 certificates of operation-of-law citizen­
ship were still accepted in practice as proof of birth in Malaya. It was 
accepted and well-known among the Thais that those old documents of citizenship
issued by t^ BrjLtish entitled their children to blue identity cards.
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But since 1966 the children of pre-September 1952 operation-of-law citizens 
horn (a) since 15th September 1952, or (b) before the father was issued a 
citizenship document, have been regrouped in practice as well as in theory 
with the children of other citizens, and the citizen parent now has to produce 
his own birth-certificate. If he has none, the child gets a red card. The 
official position now is that even the blue cards already issued on an 
operation-of-law basis to these children, if they were due for a card at any 
time between I960 and 1966, are invalid and should be withdrawn if discovered. 
A blue identity card is no proof in itself of citizenship under the latest 
interpretation. Children born during the brief months between the father 
acquiring citizenship under the 1948 rules and the superseding of those rules 
by the 1952 rules, are however still entitled to automatic citizenship without 
a paternal birth-certificate. Children born between September 1952 and 
August 1957 of fathers who held at the time of the child’s birth an original 
document of state nationality by operation of law under the 1952 rules are 
also still eligible without a paternal birth-certificate! It was suggested 
to the author that it was easier to devalue a British Federal document than
p r y
one issued (in theory) by the Sultan. But even this facile explanation 
overlooks that the continued validity of the pre-1952 documents after 1952 
was guaranteed by those very state laws of September 13th 1952. Insistence 
on birth-certificates across the board would have made sense but the creation 
of new categories of privileged and under-privileged simply brings the law 
into further discredit.
This change in the ground rules has affected mostly the Thais of Bachok
and Pasir Mas districts, i.e. at Maalaj and BangsSL' of the villages known to
the author. The group of juveniles affected is actually quite small, barring
a mad attempt by the bureaucracy to round up all cards issued In error. Only
the age-group 11-13 in 1967 (10-12 in 1966 when the loophole was closed) stood
to benefit by a continuation of the special status of the operation-of-law
citizenship issued under the 1948 rules. The 0-10 age-group in 1967 will get
blue cards in any case from 1969. But unequal treatment between siblings in
one family causes considerable resentment and distrust towards the administration
A very characteristic group among the Thais is the 21-31 year-olds with
red cards. In Pasir Puteh district, of 60 Thais in the age group, only 10
had blue cards, 3 had red cards but possessed a birth-certificate (one at
Samddrag dated 1941, two more applied for retrospectively by the parent), and
47 had red cards and no birth-certificate. They lack birth-certificates almost
by definition, being born, like their parents, before the British Military
Administration (1946). As an under-31 group they were too young in 1957, 10
28years earlier, to be affected by the mass hand-out. Without their own birth- 
29certificates they are not qualified for consideration under the registration
30rules now in force, but must apply, as aliens, for naturalisation.
Naturalisation involves an ’adequate’ knowledge of Malay, not just the elem­
entary knowledge prescribed for registration. Candidates must prove residence 
in the country for 10 out of the last 12 years. Six out of the seven young 
men entering the monkhood at SamUttrag in 1967 were in this category. They did 
not complain of any specific loss of rights, but are hui't and alienated by 
the suspicion which accrues to them as ’aliens’ when involved in procedures
like a police check at road blocks. Red card holders are questioned closely 
about their background and destination. Perhaps aliens should be subject to 
this inconvenience; but the ultimate irony and insult of the red cards held 
by the Kelantan Thai is that their birth-place on the card is given clearly 
as Kelantan.
In Pasir Puteh district only 37 out of 253 in the 31-plus age-group have
red cards. Most of these are old people who were discouraged from requesting
citizenship in 1957 on the ground that they were already title-holders of their
land and would not need citizenship in order to Inherit it. The politicians
probably doubted whether they could rely on the elderly to make the journey to
the poll at election time. These elderly people accepted the idea and they
still express no resentment. But there are not a few people of middle age,
over 30, who were simply absent from the villages on the day when the hand-out
31occurred, and who want citizenship. This group is largest in Jung Kaw be­
cause the Penghulu there was a Malay supporting the PMIP: on the day when he
brought the certificates for distribution he instructed only pne person from 
each household to come. Often the woman has citizenship but the husband, who 
was in the fields at the time, hasn't.
Not the least of the difficulties in analyzing the citizenship status of 
the Kelantan Thais lies in the great variation in practice from one district
to another across the years. Clearly some villages have less reason for dis-
32content than others.
In closing one should add that Malays too who were not at some time 
handed a certificate of citizenship and who have no birth certificate or who
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have lost it, are treated just as strictly by the administration. However, a
Malay, to claim citizenship by operation of law has only to i^ rove that he was
32born in Malaya, not that his father too was a native. It is not only the 
bureaucratic concern with proof that discriminates against the Thais, The 
Malayan Constitution distinguishes between two types of population for citizen­
ship purposes: the Malays and aboriginal tribes; and the rest. The 'rest1
are assumed to be immigrants and are expected to accept certain conditions for 
citizenship. The indigenous Kelantan Thai are grouped, as non-Malays, with 
the immigrant races and are subject to the same disabilities. However, the 
disabilities only become apparent when bureaucratic pedantry transfers the 
Thais effectively from the 3rd generation category (where rights to citizenship 
are equivalent to Malay rights) into the 2nd (registrable) or even the 1st 
(naturalisable) category of immigrants. Disability is compounded by illiteracy 
and poor communications and the machinations of petition writers, which make 
the rules more of an obstacle than they are to the Chinese for whom they were 
designed.
It is an irony that the Federal.authorities should have made the rules 
regressive in their application even while the formal trend is to a much more 
liberal position (compared to 1948 and 1952) under M.C.A, pressure. Some civil 
servants pride themselves on doing their job better than the British did it, 
but in failing to know the conditions of rural life (as in regard to birth- 
certificates) and of district administration and politics, they apply the laws 
in an extremely formalistic spirit, and deprive them of a vital element of 
popular identification. It was the curious quality of British law never to
seem unintelligible, obscure or remote. Perhaps the much less complex nature
of administrative problems in earlier years helped as much as the readiness of
the British administrators to bring the law - personified by their own physical
presence - into the kampongs. In the popular Thai view everything is of a
pattern. The concept of citizenship was first introduced to them by the
British and its acquisition was facilitated or encouraged. Now "the Malays"
34are taking it away. The Thais are stunned and angered by the developments 
of the last ten years. That they still strongly assert their rights to 
citizenship is one sign of the potential for integration which, as Chapter V 
will show, enjoys a certain realization even now.
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FOOTNOTES
1. The Naaj Baan and Caw DM&ng (the most educated layman), who had been 
called to the district office a fortnight previously to hear the D.O.'s 
earnest wish that the author and his family be accommodated in the 
village; the carpenter who had completed the house ready for occupation; 
and the house’s owner.
2. Viz: (apart from Kelantan Timor), Kelantan Utara and Kelantan Tenga^u 
See Appendix VI, p. 271 for candidates and results of the 1955 election 
to the Legislative Council of the Federation of Malay, held in Kelantan.
3. At each of the villages visited on the author’s tour in August 1967 the 
question of the village's alignment in 1955 was discussed with some half 
dozen intelligent informants, who were asked to say both how they person­
ally voted and how the village as a whole behaved at that time.
4. There have, of course, been six country-wide elections (State and Federal) 
in Malaya since 1955. The Thais of Semerak have only participated in five 
because the state-assembly seat for their district was uncontested in 1955*
In the 1955 election to the Kelantan state assembly all 16 elective seats 
went to the Alliance - 8 unopposed, 8 contested (see The Straits Times
21 September 1955). In Kelantan this success merely echoed the earlier 
victory in the Federal elections. Only three of the state elections, of 
this period can claim the historian’s attention as events which demon­
strated the validity of the Alliance formula and thereby boosted Alliance 
self-confidence for the General Election campaign to come. (These would 
be the Trengganu election, October 1954, the Johore election, November 1954, 
and the Penang election, February 1955). But it is surprising and regret­
table, in any case, that K.J.Ratnam should have seen fit to play down the 
first series of state elections, even to the extent of writing: "Only
municipal and’town council elections were held between 1952 and 1955, the 
first general elections being held in July 1955*'* (K.J.Ratnam, "Political 
Parties and Pressure Groups”, in Wang Gang Wu, ed., Malaysia. A Survey.
London 1964; Chapter 22, note 4, p*438). Ratnam’s collaborator, R,S.Milne, 
has written: "So far there have been three General Elections in Malaya,
in 1955 for 52 out of 98 seats in the Legislative Council, and in 1959 
and 1964 for 104 seats in the Federal Parliament. In 1959 and 1964 there 
were also elections for the state legislatures in Malaya...” (R.S.Milne, 
Government and Politics in Malaysia, Boston 1967, p.95.)
5. The alignment of the Penggawa is itself a factor which must not be dis­
counted, it is true, in the explaining of why the Thais vote as they do.
But at SamBBrag in 1955, as subsequently, there was at least no conflict 
between natural party preference and obedience to the Penggawa. And while 
the Thais of SamBBrag sometimes say they support the Alliance today because 
it is the Penggawa*s party, this is very rarely said of the pro-Negara vote 
in 1955J Negara was the party for British rule and that was the primary 
consideration. Another, subsidiary consideration however was that Negara 
was the party of Bato Nik Kamil, ex-Mentri Besar - see note 4 Chapter V,
P* 156 - and a candidate in Kelantan Selatan constituency.
- 134 -
6. The rise of Parti Negara is described in several works on the period, 
including K.J.Ratnam, Communalism and the Political Process in Malaya. 
Kuala Lumpur 1965; pp. 158-9.
7. The Straits Times. 27 April 1955-
8. This latter analysis is suggested by a Straits Times leading article
entitled "The Promised Land": The Straits Times. 21 June 1955.
9. Viz., Ulu Kelantan Timor, where a Malay won for the Alliance, and Bandar 
Hilir, which fell to an MCA candidate: see The Straits Times. 26 June
1959. In the parliamentary elections held on August 19th 1959, only 1
out of 10 seats - Ulu Kelantan - was retained by the Alliance: see The
Straits Times, August 20 1959* See also Appendix VII for candidates and 
full results of the 1959 State Elections and Appendix VIII for the 
Federal Parliamentary Elections which followed,
10. Viz., Tanah Merah Timor (Baan Thaasong) where Negara polled 980 votes 
of 6,435 cast; Bachok Tengah (Baan Maalaj) where Negara polled 405 
votes of 6,122 cast; Kota Bharu Timor (Baan Sadang) where Negara polled 
229 votes of the 6,865 cast (deposit lost); Tumpat Tengah (Baan Bppsamed, 
Baan Naj,Khoog Sijaa, etc.) where Negara polled 968 votes of 5,762 cast.
11. This is the view of C.W.Sook himself. See Chapter VIII, p. 239, for a 
further consideration of this candidature.
12. See Appendix 2  for results of the 1964 State Elections and Appendix XI 
for the Kelantan elections to federal seats.
13. This occurs mostly at the local level, without fanfare. But the PMIP 
government seemed within the grasp of the fate that befell the PMIP 
government of Trengganu in 1961, when in August 1968 one Independent 
(PMIP prior to 1965) and three PMIP assemblymen joined UMNO, a further 
PMIP assemblyman becoming independent. (Berita Harian 19 August 1968). 
However, within two days PMIP had recovered 2 of its 3 defectors to UMNO 
plus the temporary Independent. UMNO retained only the former Independent 
and one of the PMIP defectors.
14. A native of Kelantan (see Appendix IX for the definition) needs no per­
mission to buy land in Kelantan as such, but if he is not a Malay he 
usually does need permission, most of Kelantan being declared Malay 
Reservation. Much of the current buying of land in and on the outskirts 
of Kota Bharu by Ghinese magnates is in breach both of the Malay Reserv­
ation Enactment (because they are Chinese) and of the laws preferring 
natives of Kelantan. These Chinese and some big Malay investors are from 
the west coast. A Malay from outside the state must seek permission to 
buy land even in Malay Reservation. No state of Malaya is so strict on 
this point as Kelantan. Its special position is preserved in the National 
Land Code 1965.
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15. See Chapter III, p. 89,for the preenblfi of a petition written on this occasion, 
and Chapter V, p. 143, for an analysis in terms of how redress was sought.
16. This has been the case since 1959 but in 1955 all adult Thais were allowed 
to vote. Non-citizens were thus disenfranchised after Independence. Then 
in I960 they received red identity cards. There are four colours of 
identity card: blue for citizens; red for permanently resident aliens; 
green for temporary residents; brown for persons with a criminal record. 
Possession of an ’I-C1 has been genuinely enforced since I960 when the 
new plastic-laminated cards in four colours were introduced to replace the 
British issue. More potent than any fine in impressing the importance of 
a card, however, have been the rights attaching to its possession (it has
. been treated until very recently as the equivalent of a document of citizen­
ship; but see p. 128 infra re. changing interpretations.)
17. Under the (Malaysia) Citizenship Laws 1964, Part III 15 (3)s "...a person 
under the age of,21 years who was born before the beginning of October 
1962 and whose father-is (or was at his death) a citizen but not a 
Singapore citizen, and was also a citizen at the beginning of that month 
if still alive, is entitled upon application made to the Federal Govern­
ment by his parent or guardian to be registered as a citizen if the 
Federal Government Is satisfied that he is ordinarily resident in the 
Federation outside Singapore and is of good character.”
18. Under the (Malaysia) Citizenship Laws 1964, Part III 16s "...any person 
of or over the age of 18 years who was born in the Federation before 
Merdeka Bay is entitled upon making application to the Federal Government 
to be registered as a citizen if he satisfies the Federal Government
(a) that he has resided in the Federation outside Singapore during the 
seven years immediately preceding the date of the application for 
periods amounting in aggregate to not less than five years;
(b) that he intends to do so permanently;
(c) that he is of good character; and
(d) that he has an elementary knowledge of the Malay language."
19. As under Kelantan Enactment No.2 of 1952; 4(c): "any person born before, on<©r'
after the prescribed date /i.e. 13 September 19527 in the state, one of 
whose parents was b.orn in the Federation of Malaya..." /shall be a subject
of the Ruler of the state by operation of law and hence a citizen of the ; 
Federatior^.
20. The 'Templer* laws of 1952 (the State Citizenship Enactments) had as one 
aim the "crystallization of a nation" in face of Communist rebellion - 
F.G.Camell: "Malayan Citizenship Legislation" in International and
Comparative Law Quarterly. October 1952 - even though Federal citizenship 
fas to be acquired chiefly through the medium of State Citizenship, a 
device which one observer characterised as a step "not forward but back­
ward towards the feudal period of Malayan history": Victor Purcell,
The Chinese in Modern Mala.va (Background to Malay Series, 9) Singapore,
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I960, p.51. But the citizenship issued by operation of law at Bachok 
and Pasir Mas to many Thais came under the 1948 Agreement on Federal 
Citizenship and as such would seem to advance the date of British inter­
est in Malayan nation-building. Of course the Alliance legend that only 
the Alliance aspired to creating a nation, while the British merely 
divided to rule, was already belied by the 1946 proposals for Malayan 
Union which the Malay interest, represented in Urnno, boycotted,
21. A "Certificate of Gitizenship issued under Article 30 of the Constitution 
(The Citizenship (Registration Authority) Rules 1957 - Form K1 (Rule 15))". 
This document declares that: "Whereas a doubt has arisen whether the 
person....is a citizen,... and the said person has made application....for
a certificate that he is a citizen,.the registration authority is 
satisfied on the evidence produced to him that such certificate should be 
granted...." At that time application rarely needed to be made by the 
•applicant* and no evidence worth the name was elicited from him.
22. The bureaucracy invokes legal history and points to the fact that regis­
tration of birth became comptilsory in 1926. But without accompanying 
advantages or sanctions, laws like this take time to become operative.
They must also be understood by the Penggawas who were supposed to issue 
the certificates of birth before the war. Furthermore, paper documents 
have a comparatively short life in villages where they are vulnerable to 
damp and termites. 30 years would be an unusual period for a small scrap 
of a birth-certificate to survive. The author only ever saw the remains 
of one pre-war birth certificate at SamtiUrag, dated 1941*
23. The test is in Standard Malay, not dialect, but the level demanded varies 
enormously from district to district, depending often on the political 
views of the chairman. In Tumpat district the latter is the B.O., a PMIP 
supporter, who asks Thai naturalisation candidates to name the Sultan of 
Kelantan and the Yang-di-Pertuan Agong of Malaysia. For registration the 
standard is supposed to be 'elementary1, for naturalisation 'adequate*. 
These categories are obviously open to a wide range of individual dis­
cretion.
24. Kelantan Enactment No.2 of 1952; 4(d): "any person not being a citizen of 
the United Kingdom and Colonies who was born in the state and under the 
provisions of the Federation of Malaj&Agreement 1948 at any time in force 
was immediately before the prescribed date a Federal citizen.,." /shall be 
a subject of the Ruler of the state by operation of law and hence a 
citizen of the Federation/.
25. Kelantan Enactment No.2 of 1952; 4(f): "any person, wherever born, whose 
father....(i) was born in the state and, at the time of the birth of such 
person, was, under the privisions of this Enactment, or would have been 
had the provisions of this Enactment been then in force, a subject of the 
Ruler;•••• "/shall be a subject of the Ruler of the State by operation of 
law and hence a citizen of the Federation/.
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26. Blue cards were issued to children without formality. No certificate of
citizenship was made out. The blue card was sufficient proof until very 
recently of citizenship.
27. Much of the above information was acquired in discussions with two
Federal Registrars at Kota Bharu and their clerks at the Registry, Wakaf
Siku, Kota Bharu.
28 Some at the upper end of the 21-30 group at Maalaj were actually given 
operation-of-law citizenship by the British in the 1949-52 period, when 
they were aged 12. Also many other juveniles now in the 31+ group, who 
in other villages would have been affected by the 1957-8 distribution.
29. If a parent still lives it is possible to make a retrospective report
of the birth. But the procedure is little publicised in the Thai villages, 
and besides involving a small fine for making the report late, involves 
the services of a petition-writer too. Some petition-writers are effi­
cient and honest but minor fortunes (by peasant standards) are sometimes 
lost to persons posing as petition-writers and promising to win favours 
from the administration which are (in realitjr) either unobtainable or 
obtainable without charge. Fear of what is believed to be unavoidable 
heavy expense keeps many peasants away from the District Office.
30. Under the Malaysia Gitizenship Laws 1964: 19 (l), (2) and (3).
31. In Trengganu and some parts of Kelantan this group were given a respite 
in 1962 when some numbers of Registrations were given to bona fide 
applicants without birth-certificates.
32. The situation in Pasir Puteh district as of early 1967 - which is worse 
than Bachok and Pasir Mas but better than Nest Tumpat (the part of Tumpat 
district where Jung Kaw is located) - may be summarised thus:
Under 10 (total 207): 207 without cards but all will be accepted as
citizens after 1969: 
liG-20 (total 104): 95 either have or will soon have red cards but
they have birth-certificates;
7 have blue cards;
2 have red cards and no birth-certificates;
21-30 (total 60): 47 have red cards and no birth-certificates;
10 have blue cards;
3 have red cards but possess birth-certificates;
31+ (total 253): 190 have blue cards as a result of the free dis-
distribution of citizenship, in 1957 and 1958;
21 have blue cards on some other form of citizenship;
37 have red cards and no birth-certificate;
5 not known.
(Total population: 624)
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33* Kelantan Enactment No,2 of 1952} 4(b)s "any Malay born before, on or
after the prescribed date in the State'* £shall be a subject of the
Ruler of the state by operation of law and hence a citizen of the 
Federation/.
34. The Thais cannot locate Independence with any exactitude. There is a
quite general idea that the 1957-9 hand-out of citizenship was done
by the British; the Malay government thus gets less than full credit 
for it. The elections of 1959 and the coming to power of the PUP 
mark the most conspicuous watershed in recent history. Everything 
before that tends to be grouped under the British auspices.
CHAPTER V; DIMENSIONS -OF INTEGRATION
Since we have emphasised the importance, following the colonial exper­
ience, of Thai perceptions of the overall societal structure of Kelantan - 
their model of ethnic ranking - for identification with and legitimation of 
the socio-political system in which they find themselves, it is to the point 
to begin a chapter on elements of integration with a description of mitigating 
factors in the environments factors which are obvious to the Thais, however 
selective and ideological their usual accounts of the world they live in.
We will then proceed to describe Thai behaviour in relation to various govern­
mental structures, behaviour being, we believe, as valuable an indicator
of political integration as any statement by a subject. This same principle 
motivated the description of good relations with Malay neighbours at the end 
of Chapter II.
The Malayan Federalism which has made state power possible for the HMIP 
in Kelantan and has led to a good measure of Thai alienation, is yet strik­
ingly circumscribed by the standards of some federal systems. Federal power 
is most tangibly represented in Kelantan by the police, who protect civil 
rights and maintain order efficiently, contrary to PMIP boasts of omnipotence. 
The police at Cherang Ruku in 1967 were indeed readier to prosecute the minor 
offences of PMIP men than of others because the wife of the assemblyman had 
claimed publicly that the police were 1 in her hand1„ As if to disprove her 
pretensions, an extraordinary incident occurred in that year, when thefts of 
stores from the R.A,F,Holding Company at Gong Kedak airfield were traced to 
a pro-PMIP Penghulu. Suspicion fell from thence on the assemblyman. His os­
tentatious modern house was surrounded one night by R.A,F.Police, while the
house was searched by a high-ranking officer of the Malayan Police, accom­
panied by an Englishman. Even without this rebuke to the party's claims of 
immunity, the Thais have the regular assurance of the policemen's sympathy 
in the latter's taste for good toddy, which only the Thais make. Indian 
policemen have a taste bordering on addiction. It is in fact illegal to sell 
toddy without a licence, and the police are abetting an offence in providing 
custom. The Thais would never try to make capital out of the indiscretion, 
for police good will is too precious to lose. But the illicit rice mill in 
Samdbrag village is known to the Officer Commanding Police District (a Malayan 
Indian) and Nuj Kong may operate it discreetly in the knowledge that no action 
will be taken. In Kelantan the police need all the friendly citizens they 
can find and if the Thais provide toddy for off-duty delectation, so much the 
better. The Thais enjoy a measure of immunity as a matter of course. The 
relationship is one of unwritten reciprocity.
The Chinese, Indian and Malay officers of the Federal Police, as men 
often of West Coast origin, seem to personify the principle of multi-racialism 
on which the national political system of Malaya is built. Nor are they mere 
neutral servants of the Federal Government, but strongly identify with Alliance 
principles of racial parity, modernisation, and national development, of which 
they are the vanguard on the East Coast. The Malay constables (more often 
Kelantan men) are likewise identified with the Alliance and committed proudly 
to ideas of modernisation and rationalised government, against the PMIP's ob­
scurantism and peasant backwardness.
One very important right which federal power guarantees in Kelantan is, 
of course, the freedom of political association itself. Alliance political
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organisation is strong in the state and puts out quantities of propaganda, 
including propaganda for multi-racialism. Little demonstrates better Kelantan*s 
lack of autonomy from outside influences than the presence of this character­
istically West Coast ideology of ethnic parity - an ideology dear to Thai 
hearts but incapable of arising spontaneously in Kelantan circumstances of 
overwhelming Malay dominance. This ideology is brought to Thai ears regularly 
by both Malay neighbours (UMNO supporters) and Chinese kinsmen or employers, 
anxious to keep up Thai spirits and their party loyalty. Although this pro­
paganda may be storing up nothing but disappointment and reaction for the time 
when inflated hopes are frustrated (numerous Thais are unaware of Malay domin­
ance in the Alliance, even in Kelantan), the result of Alliance activity for 
the moment is to lend the Kelantan world a far less formidable aspect than if 
it were totally dominated by the PMIP. At Samdbrag, invitations to rallies 
from UMWO stalwarts in nearby ICampong Lembah add a new opportunity for assoc­
iation on equal terms to the existing pattern of invitations to wedding feasts. 
Some Thais are in almost daily contact, through employment, with Malays who 
have no superior pretensions and no arrogance of religion, and whose friendly 
disposition is verbally enhanced by the repetition of Alliance slogans about 
racial partnership if the individual is a party enthusiast. The bitter div­
ision brought to Kelantan Malay society by the rise of politics is apparent 
to the Thais, and although the most sceptical among them will dismiss it as 
a new variant of old Malay feuding, and put all the good in the Alliance down 
to the Chinese, yet the Malays* ideological division and the chance of a 
change of government in 1969 do qualify Thai pessimism and alienation. Mean­
while the Chinese, some of whom are kinsmen or employers to Thais, continue
to enjoy a privileged economic position and are a prominent element in the 
Kelantan Alliance, both giving local substance to the imported principle of 
ethnic partnership in politics, and lending to the Thais, as their success­
ful urban elite, a sense that a certain parity with the Malay ethnic cate­
gory is preserved, in spite of ’Malay rule'. And indeed, one element in 
Malay peasant society itself - the modernising UMNO partisans - give moral 
support and a limited realisation to such parity through their courteous, 
undomineering relationships with the Thais.
A further point of continuity from the colonial period is the state's 
administrative structure. It is difficult to attribute this directly to 
federal power, except in that the practice of legality in general reflects 
the Gentral Government's guarantee of law at all levels. The PMIP government 
of Kelantan has found its bureaucracy an adaptable enough instrument for its 
purposes to be happy to retain it, anyway (albeit with L.O.s and Penggawas 
whose prestige has declined in proportion to the rise of party influence with­
in this structure). But whatever the case, the structure and the familiar, 
often pro-Alliance personnel are still there, giving their services promptly 
and fairly to any race in matters not challenging PMIP priorities. Land is 
transmitted speedily, ordinary land-rent is accepted without delay, and calls 
to attend the district office are always received. Notwithstanding PMIP infil­
tration of the district office, the D.O.'s personal room generally remains 
accessible and his office comprehensible to a community so many of whose 
habits and expectations vis-a-vis the administration were formed under the 
British. And there is a familiarity with, and acceptance of, procedures, and 
a confidence of redress, that surely cannot be overlooked as indicators of
integration.
Striking evidence of such confidence was provided by the reaction of the 
villagers involved in the 'false survey' incident at Samddrag in July 1966.^ 
Seven men went out to remonstrate with the would-be 'Survey Officer' when 
they heard of his plans - most of them taking their licences with them. Only 
one man, Nuj Kong - a highly and exceptionally self-assured person, nicknamed 
'Kong' because the Thais regard him as arrogant - threatened to fight anyone 
Who came to take his land. But Muj had good reason to discount the effective­
ness of redress, because - equally exceptionally by Thai standards - he had 
no licence. The reaction of his arch-enemy, the law-abiding Caw KMw, was 
more typical. He went straight to the Penggawa thereafter to enlist his help. 
His elder brother, Caw Sug, soon afterwards employed a p e ti t i on-wri ter on 
behalf of all T.O.L.-holders to write to the Chief Minister and the District 
Officer (appealing against what was still thought, certainly, to be a move 
sanctioned by the administration, but under the unwholesome influence of party 
militants). Organising a petition, or paying a visit to the D.O. to lay a 
problem before him, are, in fact, the normal recourse of any Thai with a mod­
icum of self-confidence and a command of the Malay language. In some places 
an active Alliance assemblyman or assembly candidate will be approached for 
a sympathetic hearing, especially if the D.O. is suspected to be a PMIP man; 
but there is nowhere in Kelantan where Thai villagers are without some channel 
for the communication and settlement of grievances. Indeed it is partly in­
dicative of how the Thais have been impressed by the differentiation of Malay
society, that they will label any administrator who shows them a favourable
2
face: 'Alliance': and the less amenable, or taciturn ones: 'PMIP'. re-
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gardless of whatever their objective affiliations might be. This habit also 
indicates the considerable importance for the Thais of the issue of relative 
ethnic ranking: all Malays are seemingly judged by reference to their sup­
posed stand on it. (And there are sufficient representatives of the ’right* 
view in administration and party structure, both to ensure effective Thai 
integration with these structures, and to add to their general social identi­
fication in terms of a sense that, through good treatment by administrators 
and politicians, the Thai race still enjoys a reasonably equitable position 
in society.)
Now an administrator’s support for Alliance principles is assumed,even 
ascribed, so long as he conforms to certain administrative standards of fair­
ness, accessibility, etc. Ethnic equality in practice thus appears to be a 
matter, very largely, of equal treatment at the hands of an administration - 
just as it was, indeed, under British rule. (Good treatment by one group of 
peasants is not the whole foundation of a sense of equality.) In short, the 
Thais' political integration is in terms not of democratic, 'mobilised', par­
ticipation, but of a more traditional 'mode' of politics: that of the patron-
client relationship, institutionalised in relations with the district admin­
istration and the Alliance Party (and no less an integrative relationship than 
democratic participation, provided the system rewards its clients' loyalty 
with whatever degree of attentiveness and security they consider fitting.)^
But it does not mean racial inferiority to take justice from a Malay D.O. or
4Penggawa, or to give support to a political party - Negara, Alliance - partly 
on the basis of standing 'dyadic ties' with Malay notables, school-teachers
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5D.O.s and Penggawas. For all the Thais1 rational adherence to Alliance 
principles today, and equally rational support for Negara in 1955 as the anti- 
Independence party, patron-client relations between Thais and Malays have un­
doubtedly constituted an important bridge to the new political system ever 
since democratic activity began in Kelantan: a bridge no less important than
the similar structure of relationships with wealthy Chinese and one prominent 
Tamil. Also, UMNO candidates and assemblymen are approached for assistance 
and favours in terms of the client or suppliant role familiar from encounters 
with Malay D.O.s. Now it is clear enough that the assimilation of British 
principles of administration, and continuation in office throughout British 
indirect’ rule, have helped to legitimate the Malay administrative elite in 
recent times; while UMNO leaders, often recruited from the ranks of the 
bureaucracy (state or federal) still carry something of the colonial aura by 
speaking English. But Malay administrators and UMNO politicians are perceived 
to be Malay and are referred to as 'khd&g', by the Thais, like any Malay 
peasant. We cannot avoid an attempt to analyse more deeply how it is possible 
for 1Malay rule' to be condemned, even while Malay patronage remains for the 
Thais a significant corner-stone in a legitimate political universe. What is 
the historical origin of these values (for Malay patronage), superficially 
at odds, as they are, with the more universalistic values of the structure of 
colonial society?
The situation to be explained is, in essence, that the Thais quite freely, 
almost ascriptively, award legitimacy to old and new Malay political structures 
and personnel; whereas it has been argued that, since the British experience, 
legitimacy should spring from a model of ethnic ranking in which no race dom­
inates another. Of course it may be pointed out that good Malay administrators
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conform to a certain style and tradition of administration and patronage, 
which treats the Thai public on an equal footing with the Malay public, and 
so preserves the sensation of equal ethnic ranking within the population by 
and large. But ’conformity to a certain style, etc.’ still side-steps the 
question. How can a Malay meet the criteria?
Although today patronage is located both in the party system and the 
administrative structure (while not all members of the latter can be counted 
upon to be well-disposed towards Thais) the Malay bureaucracy and district 
administration was once the only political structure that the Thais knew, and 
it is difficult to escape the supposition that it was in the course of long 
interaction with this structure that the trait of amenability to Malay patron­
age became rooted in the Thai political culture. This structure remains the 
most relied upon even after the rise of an Alliance (party) presence in the 
state, and one senses that many Thais see it as their bulwark against 'the 
Party’ (EMIP), not perceiving that technically 'the Party1 is master of the 
bureaucratic structure, and overlooking conveniently that some members of the 
bureaucracy do support the PMIP. (Conversely, the Alliance is imperfectly dis­
tinguished from the bureaucratic structure, particularly where a respected 
Penggawa or D.O. are identified explicitly with that party.) Dependence upon 
the Penggawa at Samddrag is equalled by loyalty to his command, be it in turn­
ing out in force to vote, or in supplying labour to mend a public footbridge 
or lay turf for a visit of the Sultan to Semerak beach. There was an echo of 
a very ancient attachment in one Thai's justification of his loyalty: raw
pen phraj khp9ng khw&Mng (nwe are the Penggawa's folk”). This is a sentiment 
both older and more deeply-rooted than the colonial principle of the equality
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of all races.
Certainly there is no a priori reason to imagine that, in the absence of 
Thai power in the 19th Century and earlier, the Thai minority lived in a 
political and social vacuum. We referred, in the course of Chapter III, to 
various Thais who took service with Malay rajas or Sultans, The D.O.s of to­
day are recruited from the social class of the erstwhile rajas and petty war­
lords of Kelantan. Why should the declaration of loyalty read to the Sultan
8
at the inauguration of Chief Abbots in Kelantan not be taken as serious evi­
dence that the Sultans - and, no less likely, their hierarchy down to the 
lowest royal servant - were traditionally accepted as the Thais’ patrons?
Such a tradition would partly explain receptivity to Malay patronage today.
From the years 1923 and (approximately) 1934, Mr. Nagaratnam recalls two in­
stances when all the abbots of Kelantan, with a large number of their subord­
inate monks, were summoned to the Balai Besar (the Old Palace at Kota Bharu) 
to chant the montra 40 days and exorcise the evil forces brought to light when 
lightning struck the Sultan's flag-pole. Court circles of Kelantan speak to­
day of their sense of a trust held traditionally for the Thais, and though one 
may doubt whether this trust was always perceived with the altruistic intensity 
that sentimental hindsight would have us believe, there is nothing spurious 
about the present attitude of the Malay elite that the Kelantan Thai are en­
titled to the state's generous hospitality and tolerance as one of its indigenous 
communities. For their part, the Thais not only assert their right, on the 
grounds of immemorial residence, to the status and privileges of citizens, but 
accept in a positive way, for similar reasons of immemorial clientship in a 
Malay system, that the state is a Sultanate.
In seeking further historical bases of the Thais' acceptance of Malay
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authority, one's attention is attracted to the fact that the Sultan was in 
turn the King of Thailand's vassal. This however, seems to this author to 
have only a peripheral utility in explaining the legitimacy of Malay patron­
age, So far as Kelantan had a regular attachment at all to the Thai political
system (the state was a vassal, at best, not a hua myang)^ it arose from the 
assertion of the hegemony of one political system (the Thai) over parts of 
another (the Malay) with which it came into contact through expansion. Although 
Thai expansion as a whole ethnic movement had produced pockets of Thai settle­
ment within the Malay world as well, the hua myang of Patani and the vassals
of Kelantan and Trengganu remained Malay states whose identity could never be
subsumed in an overarching Thai identity in the way that may come about as
Central Thai control is asserted over related groups like the Thao Laaw^ and 
11Thao Lyy, True, the Kelantan Thai themselves never surrendered their ethnic
12identity and religious orientation to Bangkok and this could have political
13consequences in the future. But as soon as a politically legitimating 
function is sought in Bangkok's suzerainty over Kelantan, the danger arises 
of the analytical emphasis shifting froim the Malay nature of rule in Kelantan 
to an analysis in terms of Thai power and an all-embracing Thai political sys­
tem - features manifestly absent from Kelantan Thai memories and traditions 
about their situation before the coming of the British. We prefer to follow 
the peasant style of calculation, casting a pragmatic eye on the close, 
immediate, Malay environment for factors which may have contributed to the 
Thais' willingness to align their loyalties with Malay penggawas and rajas.
What tangible and valued service could the traditional Malay elite tradition­
ally offer?
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The growth of good relations with Malay neighbours we attributed to change
14
in Malay society in the modem era. But in this respect culture is still
in a state of flux. Many women dwell in neurotic suspicion of Malay peasant
intentions, children are still taught to fear kidnapping and circumcision,
the very isolation of most Thai villages in areas of wholly Malay population
moulds a culture of cautious, watchful, alienated quiescence. The rise of
integrative traits is always in competition with this underlying alienation.
The rise of the PMIP has confirmed traditional fears of the overwhelming
Islamic flood. Yet if the fears are traditional, nor are the dangers new.
The PMIP flourishes in a social context.
That context is a deeply Islamic populace long dominated by its religious
officials (imams) and religious teachers (tok guru, ustaz). 'The First War*
15in Pasir Put eh district is remembered as a Malay peasant rising to drive out
the British. Although one Engku Besar was involved in the movement, James de
X6V. Allen notes, in his recent, brilliantly suggestive study, that two hajis 
and a penghulu (To' Janggut alias Haji Mat Hassan; Haji Said; and Penghulu
27
Adam) were also leaders. Quoting Graham, Allen also observes:
"We are told that at the village level in Kelantan leadership 
was generally divided between the To' Kampong (subordinated 
through the To' Kweng to the Royal Family in Kota Bharu) and 
the imam. Supposing, as seems likely, the Royal House's con- 
trol over the Pasir Puteh district was weak on account of the
fact that it had been, until recent, troublous times, independent:
it seems then likely that the imams - the hajis and such seyyids as 
there were - would have been correspondingly stronger there," 18
The comparative weakness, in one district, of the state structure, legitimated
by the Sultan's authority, would not make it any less a refuge, in the eyes of
the non-Muslim Thai minority, if Allen's insight on rural leadership is correct.
Encircled by the threatening Muslim mass, where else should the Thais have 
looked, in earlier times, but to the royal structure, or to some local high- 
class patron, for a counter-balance and protective shield? British rule 
having now proved to have been but an interlude, and peasant Islam having 
reverted to its old, threatening posture, a traditional cultural pattern, 
evolved in identical circumstances, has been found relevant once again. The 
superficially contradictory attitudes that (a) ’The Malays' should not be 
entrusted with rule; and (b) we live in a 'Malay State* whose laws we will­
ingly obeys simply reflect the ancient reality of a dual structure of author­
ity and leadership in Kelantan Malay society. The Malay law that Thais
19willingly obey is the law of the Sultan, the District Officer, the Penggawa.
The Malays who should not be entrusted with rule and whom the British so un­
wisely let into office (haj pogkhrppng) at Independence, are the imams and
gurus and their mass following, today organised politically under the PMIP 
20banner, but no strangers in Thai experience.
All this is not to say that British rule internalised no important new 
values for an equitable ordering of ethnic ranking in society. It is the 
British experience that conditions the peculiar force of rejection and disgust 
towards 'Malay politics' today, even if fear of Malay peasant domination is 
already much older. That the environment also offers Malay patrons, in the 
bureaucracy and UMNO, and that a cultural pattern (of partly pre-colonial 
provenance) survives, through which Thais can use and legitimate these struc­
tures and personnel, are circumstances which mitigate but do not fundamentally 
alter the dissonance between colonial expectations and post-colonial realities.
Thai expectations are stricter, and are becoming stricter still as social 
mobilisation proceeds. Even the administration of benevolent, well-bred 
Malays will lose legitimacy in due course (and this trend is already apparent)' 
if Thais are not trained up to responsible positions in the district adminis­
tration, to personify ethnic parity at the higher level.
Nevertheless, for practical purposes and in the last resort, the emphasis 
must be on contemporary and future development. While the British experience 
did bequeath an ’ideological model* of the perfect social structure, the his­
torical chapter in this study has made it clear that if the resident races 
were equally ranked among themselves in colonial society, all were in a 
position of inferiority in relation to the European power, whose subjects or 
clients they were. The system of political roles, the 'mode' of government, 
as it may be called, abstracted from the overall socio-political scheme, was 
not participatory but authoritarian, a system of patronage at best, not 
democracy. The Thais favoured it because British patrons offered superior 
guarantees against the Malay peasant menace, compared to Malay rulers. But 
if loyalty was offered more freely to the new system, the Thais' political 
role remained that of subjects of power, not that of participants in power.
The British established no independent political structure for the Thais - 
with the potential exception of the direct appointments of Thai Naaj Baan 
(Penghulus), by British officers. But this only enhanced the subjective 
status of the Thais without giving them the institutional means to assert an 
independent political existence as a community after the British withdrawal. 
The authority of individual Naaj Baan was confined to their own villages, and
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even if reputations sometimes spread among the Kelantan Thai community, a 
political role was out of the question for a government servant particularly 
when the whole administrative structure was handed over to the Malays in 1957.
It is only possible to conclude the analysis of the British impact with 
an emphasis on the failure of the British either to establish for the Thais 
an independent political structure; or to implant the ideas of an independent, 
positive, role and of popular sovereignty. Indeed popular sovereignty with its 
inherent advantage to the majority is precisely what the Thais thank colonial 
rule for not introducing (except in its final moment of aberration at Merdeka). 
The British were the true pillars of continuity from the past, more so, in a 
sense, than Malay notables and D.O.s themselves. The Thais’ ideology is dis­
tinctly impoverished. With no independent political structure to boot, the 
Thais were ill-prepared to challenge the rise of Malay peasant hegemony, and 
this provides one more fundamental - although negative - reason why the Thais 
accommodate themselves so well to the new political situation. They have up­
graded expectations of government and society which English-educated Malay 
patrons are still able partly to satisfy; while another precondition of 
national integration is fulfilled: a consonance of political tradition between
rulers (one section of them) and ruled, an 'identific' consensus between the
22two sides about the desirable ’mode* or ’formula* of the political system. 
Structurally, the Thais are integrated as clients ("organised for common pur­
poses" in Weiner's terms) with the long-established district administration 
and the newer Alliance party, whose personnel is often recruited from an 
identical milieu with the former. But the British political system has also
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left the Thais unequipped for anything but a client or subject role, and the 
good government which is 'expected* is bestowed, it does not yet stem from 
popular will. If the Thais felt entitled to choose their rulers, the rejec­
tion of Malay rule, indeed, would be less easily diluted by considerations of 
the quality of administration. Methodologically, it is plain that the analysis 
of a colonial plural society, even with ample attention to assimilated values 
of general identification and legitimation (or their opposites) may be incom­
plete without a consideration of the political dynamics. The subject-client 
relationship (the 'mode' of Thai politics) that has emerged from the pages of 
this chapter is not just one form of integrative response. It is a feature 
of political culture which has drastically limited the possibilities of resist­
ance to changed conditions, even where these conditions are felt to lack 
legitimacy.
Be this all as it may, the Thais now know that Malay rule, high-class or
25
peasant, is not an historic necessity. The ideology of equal ethnic status 
may give no immediate guidance as to a role by which to struggle against loss 
of status, but the aspiration to equality remains and further change can hardly 
be towards a less universalistic ambience: the aspiration is almost bound to 
increase as change in the environment gathers pace and mobilisation goes for­
ward. Acceptance of the patronage of the Alliance or of Malay administrators 
is effected with a skill which comes from long experience - and which colonial 
rule, where not directly fostering, did little to reverse - but it all has a 
certain air of the provisional.
Transition is a dynamic state, like integration itself. There is movement
forward or back. Current experience is adding greater insistence to the 
ideal of equal status. At the same time, Thai cultural identity remains 
strong. The questions for the future are (a) whether a political structure 
can or will come into being to institutionalise a new, and self-assertive, 
democratic-type role for the Thais; and (b) whether such a structure will 
be used to struggle out of the system or into it, i.e. whether its resist­
ance to discrimination will take the form of progressive alienation, or lead 
to progressive integration. If a political structure arises, the identity of 
the interests sponsoring it will have a bearing 011 the function that it 
adopts.
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FOOTNOTES
1, See Chapter III, p.89 , and Chapter IV p. 122, for further details
relating to this incident,
2, The terms for these parties among the Thais are;
Alliance; Parigkhatan (Malay 'perikatan1); Ammanuu. (English and Malay
'UMNO'); rya baj (Thai for 'sailing ship', the Alliance symbol); 
PMIP; Pha*1 (from the Jam anagram, B-A-S, of 'Parti Islam Sa-Tanah 
Melayu' - the Kelantanese final aspirate in place of s is
reproduced by phonemic adoption in the Thai); daw dyan (Thai
for 'star and moon', the PMIP symbol); Phaathii (from English 
and Malay party/parti - only the PMIP is 'the Party' in 
Kelantan, the Alliance is not),
3. The term 'mode', first introduced into the discussion at Chapter I, p23,
seemed a suitable term for what might just as well be called the 'style'
of government. Integration is facilitated where the style of government 
is acceptable to the governed. This rather intangible facet of inte­
gration seemed to need distinguishing from skills relating to the use of 
specific structures (such as a district administration with familiar 
procedures); it concerns a more fundamental, ideological agreement, and 
hence integration, between the two sides about their roles in the poli­
tical system. Weiner is talking about something similar when he refers 
to integration as (by one definition) a process of bridging a communi­
cations gap between elite and governed, and (another definition) the 
achievement of a minimum value consensus about legal norms. (Myron Weiner 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, op.cit., 
pp.53-54) Claude Ace's essay, A Theory of Political Integration, speaks 
of 'identific* political systems, of which one characteristic is accept­
ance by the governed of the 'political formula' of the political class.
The term 'political formula' is taken in turn from Caetano Mosca, and 
corresponds to what the author of this dissertation has meant by 'mode' 
(Claude Ake, A Theory of Political Integration, Illinois, 1967? espec­
ially pp.108-111.) "
4. At Maalaj, the late Naaj, as recounted by his son, recognised an obli­
gation to a certain Malay patron to use his influence in the village to 
win support for Parti Negara in 1955. At Samddrag,apart from the fact 
that the Penggawa at that time supported Negara (c.p. Chapter IV, p.112) 
the Naaj, To' Naaj Kppj, was influenced in the advice he gave his fellow 
Thais by a special meeting which was held at Pasir Puteh by Dato Onn bin 
Ja'afar himself with the Penggawas and Penghulus of the district, and at 
which Onn solicited their support. At Jung Kaw, where the 1955 vote was 
divided between Alliance and Negara, the cooperative rice miller, Caw 
Saw, said that he had voted Alliance because the Chairman of his 
Cooperative was a Malay aristocrat to whom he recognised an elementary 
allegiance and obligation in such matters. The Cooperative Chairman had
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indicated that all his licence-holders would please him by supporting 
Tengku Abdul Rahman. One of Kelantanfs notables who suffers nothing at 
all in Thai eyes from being a Malay, and whose party allegiance was an 
influence on the Thai orientation in 1955, is Rato Nik Abdul Kamil. He 
was in Kelantan service from 1931 till 1952 and was Mentri Besar when 
he left jdie state on transfer to the Federal Government (see biograph­
ical note in The Straits Times 10 March 1955). Noel Ross informed the 
author (personal communication dated 1. 6. 1966) that as Mentri Besar 
"he did much to try to raise the prestige of the Thai abbots of monas­
teries in Kelantan and give them some status." L.H.Gorsuch, Esq.,
O.B.E,, informed the author that Nik Kamil's father was Rato' Perdana 
Mentri before him (personal communication dated 9. 6. 1966). In 1955 
Nik Kamil led Parti Negara in the Federal elections in Kelantan, but 
was defeated. Xn 1964 he returned to fight a Kota Bharu seat for the 
Alliance, and won, but hopes that he would become an active force again 
in Kelantan life were to be disappointed for the time being. In 
Recember 1966 he was replaced by the Reputy Prime Minister as Chairman 
of Kelantan UMNO State Liaison Committee (see The Straits Times, 
28.12,1966). But Caw RMng of Samddrag, unaware of Nik Kamil's multiple 
interests outside the state, still says "If only we could get word to 
Nik Kamil about our problems, he would do something."
5. Malay school-teachers were among those who brought round certificates 
of citizenship in 1957-8, and have canvassed for the Alliance since.
Malay headmasters at Batu Balai and Pog Kiang in Trengganu (see Chapter 
VIII, note 24 , p. 252 ) took the lead in coopting their local Thais as 
members of UMNO in 1965. But a Malay Penghulu or Penggawa nowadays will 
only exert his influence over Thais when he himself is an Alliance sup­
porter, for the Thais are now sufficiently aware of issues to reject any 
party but the Alliance. Thus a pro-PMIP Penghulu or Penggawa neglects 
them at all times, including elections, and makes no attempt to win them 
over. A pro-Alliance Penghulu or Penggawa, on the other hand, is 
preaching to the already converted: all he can do is to aim for a full
election turn-out. Looking back to 1959, though, before the PMIP had 
taken power and become familiar to all the Thais, it was possible for 
one Malay Penghulu - at Jung Kaw - to win over a modest Thai support for 
the party. This (unique) event certainly demonstrates something of the 
importance of traditional ties in deciding the form of the Thais' initial 
entry into politics. Nevertheless, in the Jung Kaw case, a certain shop­
keeper, Caw Nob, a likeable but eccentric worthy, who communicates both 
news and views to the community by the constant walking and 'visiting' 
(thiaw) to which his restless nature drives him, had been won over to 
the PMIP by the promise of a gun licence. Over and above the influence 
transmitted by the Penghulu through Caw Nob, PMIP canvassers had used 
mildly intumidatory tricks such as writing down Thais' identity-card 
numbers as if to seal pledges casually given to the canvasser to support 
his party at the election. These canvassers took advantage of the lack 
of Alliance propaganda in the area to project the PMIP (not too inaccur-
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ately, as it turned out) as a party bound to take power and therefore 
worth supporting as the price of decent treatment after the election.
Here we see the Thais acting out of uncertainty and fear. The nervous 
quiescence that we shall recur to (p. 149 , and note 19 , p. 158 , of 
this chapter) and have referred to before (Chapter II, p. 76 ) is dis­
tinct, at its extreme, from any integrative trait. The proverbial law- 
abiding of the Kelantan Thais, although productive of stability, is 
sometimes difficult to characterise as 'integration*.
6. Namely, Mr* Nagaratnam of Kota Bharu, a civil servant attached to the 
state bureaucracy as early as 1922, subsequently cloth merchant, cinema 
owner, philanthropist, and a leading figure in the Kelantan Alliance*
His first service to the Thais was the court action he fought in 1946 
on behalf of the wat at Baan Naj (see note 19, P-159 , below). He ex­
plains his sympathy towards the Buddhists in terms of the likeness of 
Buddhism to Hinduism. However, his wife is a Kelantan Hokkien, which may 
have provided an initial point of access to the Thai community. There 
were two Ghinese on the Board of Trustees set up on Mr. Nagaratnam's 
instance to have custody of all wat land in Kelantan, following the 1946 
case. The five members were: the late Dato Kaya Budi, of Tumpat; a
Mr. Ang Keng Yew of Kota Bharu; a Madame Ang of ICampong China, Kota 
Bharu. Concerning Chinese political influence over the Thais, the 
Chinese estate-owner and philanthropist mentioned at Chapter II, p.67, 
(Mr. Aung Cui Li by name) disclaims any political interest or influence 
at all. But several taukehs were active in 1957/8 in the great hand­
out of citizenship and registration of Alliance voters. The most sig­
nificant example of Chinese patronage providing a bridge to democratic 
involvement, is Mr. Wee Suu Hung of Kampong China, whose role is fully 
related at Chapter VIII, pp. 239 et seq.
7. Strictly, one should seek independent historical evidence of relation­
ships which could have formed the cultural patterns which we observe in 
the present. But once such evidence is found, it is tempting (and per­
haps not altogether disreputable) to include onefe cultural observations 
as further, retrospective, evidence for the existence of that formative 
historical situation.
8. See Chapter VII, p. 185, for further details of this ceremony.
9. See Chapter III, note 11, p. 106, on this point.
10. C.f. Charles F. Keyes, op.cit,, pp.10-21, p.59.
11. C.f. Michael Moerman, Ethnic Identification in a Complex Civilisation: 
Who Are the hue?, American Anthropologist, 67, October 1965; p.1222; 
and Michael Moerman in Manning Nash, op * cit., p.157•
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12. It is true that a common sight in Kelantan Thai homes is a picture of 
H.M, The King of Thailand. One receives a variety of explanations for 
this. "We put it there to look ajs" (= "It's a pretty picture"); (,A 
visiting monk gave it to us"; "Someone gave it to me when I was in 
Thailand." This group of replies are the commonest and are not in the 
least insincere for being non-committal on the political implications. 
(Political implications may he sought bjr the observer but not be 
apparent to the subject.) One intelligent and politically conscious 
Thai at Samddrag had asked a monk to bring a picture on his next visit - 
but the picture was "no good" because the King was without head-dress.
Caw KMw had only wanted the picture to protect his house from evil, 
and such protection is only guaranteed by the likeness of the King in 
full regalia, including his crown. There is another group of people who 
say they put up the picture "because he's the same race as we are" (man 
chaad diaw kab raw: man khon thaj, raw khon thaj), Only once at
Sambdrag was the answer heard: "He's the King of Thailand and we are
Thais too." But even this seemed no more than an expression of ethnic, 
not political identification. When the informants who had indicated 
some form of identification with the King were then asked: "Bo you re­
gard him as your King?", the reply was always: "Wo, we live here in 
Kelantan, the raja (phijaa) here is a Malay, mid we obey him." There 
are no grounds at all for the patronising assumption of The Straits Times 
that "till a Thai Consulate was established in Kota Bharu which could 
gently tell them otherwise, they had thought themselves Thai nationals." 
(The Straits Times, editorial, 15 Wovember 1966).
15. See Chapter VII, pp. 193-4.
14. See Chapter II, p. 76.
15. See Chapter III, p. 95.
16. James de V. Allen, Journal of South Bast Asian History, op.cit,, p.247.
17. W.A.Graham, op.cit., pp.31 and 113.
18. James de V. Allen, op.cit., p.253. The To' ICweng was the head of the 
Kweng, as the 'Baerah* were called in those days. The term lcweng, of 
Siamese origin, has given way in the course of the years to daerah, in 
the Malay language, while the To' Kweng has become Penggawa. The Thais 
however, still call the Penggawa "KhwMng".
19. Respect for the established law, however, can go to extremes, and merge
with what we termed 'alienated quiescence' itself. For instance, there
is quite pathetic respect accorded to documentary land title. When 
title first became registrable in this century, Malays as well as Thais 
would sometimes distribute their land to all their children on the
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customary basis, but for convenience or cheapness sake only have the 
title registered in the name of the eldest son. The land then descends 
legally in that line, and come a day when the youngest in the line no 
longer feels the old force of obligation towards collaterals but dis­
covers to his delight that he has official title, he may demand that 
•his' land be handed over. At least this is what many fear will happen. 
The village can bring no sanctions to bear against such conduct. In an 
interesting action fought in 1946 by Mr, Nagaratnam of Kota Bharu on 
behalf of the abbot of Baan Naj against the descendant of a Thai who 
had made a customary transmission of his land to the wat in the 19th 
century - without making a legal transmission - the precedent was est­
ablished that custom was to have greater force than documentary title in 
certain circumstances. But the doubt is probably justified whether Malay 
administrators at the District Office level will have the patience and 
empathy to follow the ramifications of a Thai family dispute if one is 
brought to them. And to take it to court is intimidating in several 
ways. Always the Thais' worst enemy will be their own doubts about the 
force of their own custom in official law and 'Malay law'.
20. The PMIP banner consists, significantly, of a yellow star and crescent 
on a green ground. The comparative weakness of the influence of a 
ruling-class type of elite in rural Kelantan may be partly attributable 
to the absence of large agricultural estates. The notables who led 
Parti Negara and the AlLliance in 1955 proved too remote from the kampongs 
once the religious elite became mobilised as the Kelantan PMIP for the 
1959 election. It was left to a few pro-Alliance Penggawas and school­
teachers to salvage a nucleus of UMNO support in the midst of the PMIP 
land-slide.
21. It is often remarked that the Thai Government appoints Malays as D.O.s 
in South Thailand,
22. Refer again to note 3* p.155 » of this chapter, for a discussion of these 
concepts.
23. A postscript on the argument of this chapter is to be found at Appendix 
XII, p.286.
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CHAPTER YI s FURTHER ASPECTS OF CULTURE 
The Thai of Kelantan described in Chapter II are a community of distinct 
culture, prouM of their Buddhist religion. Religion is the area of culture 
least prone of all tbo assimilation - which is equivalent to saying that the 
Thais do not wish to lose their identity, for a Thai is essentially defined 
(among the Kelantan Thai) as a Buddhist, speaking the Thai language. The 
implication of such an attitude for integration is not, certainly, that inte­
gration cannot occur, but that it must occur in a sense 'unawares1. The 
Thais1 religion is extremely tolerant and eclectic, and is far from being at 
the root of the Thais1 (modified) refusal of legitimacy to Malay rule. But 
because it defines the Thai and indeed stipulates his nature rather precisely, 
it excludes from the Thai universe the notion of convergence of the races.
Or if, in view of occasional inter-marriage, it is admitted grudgingly to be 
possible, convergence is certainly not regarded as permissible.
The sort of convergence described in the earlier chapters is not, fort­
unately, understood as convergence, because it does not encroach on what is 
essentially Thai! It does not encroach on the freedom of religion itself, 
or on the related freedom of language, and the community's leadership,1 Malay 
allows complete religious freedom, although the official religion Is Islam, 
and Malays (defined - note the parallel - as Muslims habitually speaicing the 
Malay language) have more rights than other races. Education in the Malay 
language is acceptable to the Thais because of its entirely secular value 
and content; and it does not proscribe the Thai language nor exclude or 
rival the traditional elementary education in Thai which Is necessary in
order to become a monk. (Boys and girls nearing school age but not yet old 
enough to be called, like to attend wat school in the evenings in imitation
of their older siblings; thus Thai education is experienced in advance of 
Malay education but under Malay education! s stimulus.) Malay rule and Malay 
patronage are structures bridging the Malay and the Thai worlds and involving 
the adaptation of one to the other; but the Thai community is not yet 
called upon to identify with Malay leadership by that free conviction which 
informs the relationship of a layman to his abbot (being based on the reci­
procity of giving and receiving merit) or, for that matter, the relationship 
of villagers to a fellow Thai (secular) leader where such a figure arises.
And these relationships within the community are preserved.
Freedom to do merit and to preserve special relationships with fellow 
Thais make a community which, while highly dependent on the Malay world in 
many ways, is spiritually complete and self-sufficient. This core of self- 
sufficiency centring iound merit-making cannot be yielded, logically or 
morally, without the community's identity being forfeited. A Thai is stipu­
lated in the community's universe to be a descendant of Thai ancestors who 
laboured to bring him into the world as a member of a Buddhist community.
This priceless gift of human life (as a Buddhist), with its manifold
opportunities to do merit, may be partly repaid by certain prescribed acts
1of such meidt-making on one's parents' and ancestors' behalf. No Thai 
leaves out these rudimentary acts of gratitude. But the fundamental goal 
of merit-making and of life itself is one's own Enlightenment.
This goal is not of itself chosen or optional, but inherent in any 
man’s existence, being the ultimate end of every series of birth, death end 
rebirth. One is free within the limits of one's present capacity simply to 
acquire more or less merit and so advance along the road at a quicker or
slower pace. However, while all living creatures are involved in this 
eternal progression towards perfection, a Thai is born into a religion which 
has a special insight into man's condition and instructs its members in the 
best use of their present existence. There are very few Thais in Kelantan 
who could contemplate rejecting the opportunities which are their Thai birth­
right, by ceasing to be Buddhists. The other motive ™ of adding gratefully 
to the merit of ones parents and ancestors - is as strong for some as the 
more self-interested’one of acquiring it on one's own account. Four out of 
the seven young candidates for the monkhood at Sambbrag in 1967 gave priority 
to the motive of adding to their parents' merit; one of these added the 
relief of the suffering of his ancestors. One primary basis of such feelings 
of gratitude and obligation seems to be that being born a Thai is a special 
privilege.
The foregoing is a description of some fundamental popular beliefs and 
attitudes in the Thai villages of Kelantan. These beliefs are freely ex­
pressed in moments of reflectiveness, or when praising or justifying the 
ceaseless round of wat ceremonies, or when answering a stranger's question 
about what it means to be a follower of the Buddha (thyy phud). The author 
did not normally consult abbots or long-time monies on the meaning of Buddhism. 
His impression was that these more learned Thais were too sophisticated to be 
representative of all popular religious beliefs, yet not sufficiently eman­
cipated from them, or sufficiently learned, to give expert guidance on doc­
trine. But so far as they were qualified to give proper guidance, their 
instruction might be expected to diverge significantly from the beliefs of the 
village folk at a number of points.^
For one thing, we are given to understand from our readings on Buddhism - 
and even from some writing on popular Buddhism in Thailand - that the aim of 
merit-making is to break out of a potentially endless cycle of death and 
rebirth. The Thai peasant in Kelantan has been encouraged in a more sanguine 
view* A long and virtuous life in which much merit is acquired will not re­
main unrewarded. ' A man will have advanced along the road towards a goal 
which he does not believe to be beyond ultimate reach; and even though no 
one knows how long the journey will last, provisional rewards are already 
assured in the next following life, in the form of an increased intelligence 
and awareness, increased happiness and fortune. The retribution for a bad 
life (baab) is just as certainly torment and a slipping back from the goal.
The underlying concept is one not of cyclical but of linear progression.
It is also noticeable that the Kelantan Thai peasants give an important 
place to conventional virtue and conventional sin. An influential (if, alas, 
not always reliable) monograph strictly distinguished formal merit-making 
from virtuous living, as to their consequences in the future. Virtue was de­
picted as having an immediate, yet ephemeral, importance in a person's life. 
The Kelantan Thai peasant by contrast, while in no way planning or organising 
his virtuous conduct with a view to advantages in future lives, recognises 
rewards and penalties for the sort of life a person leads aside from formal 
religious observance. Karma, the capacity of the individual (not referred 
to as Karma among the Kelantan Thai) is recognised as a limiting factor, biit 
within these limits a man is not further restricted to the temple round as 
the sole source of merit. Much merit (bun) was thought to accrue to the 
author of this study and to the author's wife as a result of their advice
- 164 »
and help to the villagers of Samdbrag,
The Kelantan Thai, then, in accordance with the normal Buddhist analysis,
believe that all creatures are subject to laws of death and rebirth. It is
not necessary to be a Buddhist to be subject to these laws, nor are other
races unable to acquire merit. The Buddha's injunctions simply offer the
better guidance on this point, which is one reason for wanting to remain a
4Buddhist and wanting to show gratitude to parents and ancestors, as already 
stated. But of course, one cannot do merit for the ancestors either without 
remaining a Buddhist; this, too, is an impulse, and a powerful one, to 
regarding oneself as irrevocably a Thai. And the still vital animistic 
tradition provides that an ancestral presence is felt; it is no mere memory 
that the Thais cherish. Also, one came from Thais and to Thais oneself must 
return. A Thai woman does not lose her identity by marrying a Chinese, but 
some people express reservations about the mixed offspring! their spirit 
will be tragically uncertain to which community it must return. As to 
becoming a Malay, the implications are profoundly disturbing. The most con­
temptible - almost the only contemptible - characteristic of the Chinese in 
the Thai view is the readiness of some of their number to sell baby girls to 
Malays.
The Thais seem not to make a distinction in their minds between honouring 
the dead by acts of merit-making and by invocations performed by a 2199 to­
gether with offerings of food. Animistic observances have so penetrated the 
ceremonies of the wat that it is difficult to make a distinction physically, 
let alone conceptually, on occasion. The ceremony of Saj Haan (filling the 
stalls) at the end of the 10th month is held at the wat in association with a 
Saj Baad for the monks, but the prior intention is that food be placed on two
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stalls for the spirits of the departed. Water is poured slowly into a howl 
for them to drink before they leave the scene at the end of their annual 
feast. Water is poured in like manner by the surviving children and other 
close kin during the Suad Mon performed before and after cremations. On the 
other hand the animistic ceremony of Waj Khruu (honouring past teachers), 
performed at Sambbrag on the 4th day of the 5th month each year at the house 
of the N9raa master, includes a chanted Pali 'Nammo tassa'.
Notwithstanding the interpenetration of two traditions, the Thais are 
constantly reminded of their dead. They attend to their wants in the same . 
selfless spirit with which they attend to the material needs of living parents. 
Identification between living and dead is complete. A bad man who didn't 
observe his natural obligations would not cease to count as a Thai after 
death. His spirit, indeed, would have to account for his negligence to his 
ancestors, when he himself was called to join them. The world of Thai spirits 
has its Malay counterpart too, which makes this universe logically complete. 
Unidentified spirits which work mischief on Thais are usually assumed to be 
Malay. 'Spirits of the place', and 'guardian spirits' associated with one 
Thai community are favourable to Thais and not Malays. This by the way has 
one special consequence for attitudes to land: even Temporary Occupation
Licence land, if opened originally and leased from the spirits of the place 
by T£iais, is regarded as irrevocably Thai.
There is an unresolved contradiction between the belief that a spirit 
returns to its own, and the belief that the punishment for an evil life will 
be rebirth not as a Thai, not even necessarily as a human being, perhaps as 
some lower kind of life. People will muse: 'I wonder where we shall meet
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next time - who knows what I shall be in the next life! * Such uncertainty
is in strange contrast to the notion that there is one part of oneself which
is irreducibly Thai, whatever Buddhist doctrine may say. The uncertainty is
made easier to bear by this opposing current of reassurance to the effect that
5the Thai in one, at least, will not perish.
Gmcesming ieligLcn,thQi, the Thai of Kelantan neither wish to cease to be 
Buddhist nor do they believe that it is possible to cease to be so. Buddhism 
is technically an option, but since onete ancestors were also Buddhists, this 
too has become part of the idea of a Thai, and tends to be as strictly pre­
scribed as any other part of a Thai's nature. Indeed, if the Buddhism be 
taken away, there is little distinctive left besides the language. Buddhism 
has been effectively assimilated to the definition of a Thai, and the motives 
for observing Buddhist precepts are inextricable from the ancestral tradition.
Such attitudes may be discernible in rural Thailand too but they act in 
a Malay environment as a mechanism for preserving ethnic identity and bound­
aries. It seems a fair hypothesis that the special strength in ICelantan of the 
awareness of Thai ancestry, the perpetuity of the Thai self, and the two 
opposed communities of spirits, Malay and Thai, is attributable to peculiar 
environmental and historical circumstances. Today, although the Kelantan Thai 
are highly tolerant, as Buddhists, to other religions, the imperatives of the 
animistic and ancestral tradition restore the balance, working against Buddhism's 
inherent eclecticism, to declare that to yield a point here would be to lose 
all. In Thailand it is possible to become a Christian, or a Muslim, and to 
remain a Thai - at least in language and nationality. Not so in a Malay world. 
The survival of the community depends on sharp cultural boundaries, as sharp
as the boundaries which often divide a Thai settlement from the Malay land 
encircling it. The spirit community stands guard over these boundaries.
Politically, the consequences of this Thai identity are varied. On the 
one hand the Thais will react with determination and hostility to any move 
conceived as a threat to their identity. As the religion occupies such a 
large portion of that identity, freedom of religion is a major expectation 
from Government. However, this being allowed, and even fostered, by the 
Malayan Government, the Thais are not difficult to satisfy. Within the frame­
work of religious freedom and cultural identity, political integration can 
proceed.
Nevertheless, integration must be on the basis of 'unity in diversity*. 
The ability to conceive of a society in an ideological scheme of whole racial 
entities, which touch but never mix, is a product as much of the cultural 
tradition as of the historical and political background of the community.
Nor can it be doubted that the increasing communications from the world around 
and the sensation of a new status under British rule themselves added to self- 
awareness, even while the Thai and Malay communities were learning to live 
and work together as members of a common political system. "Ethnic demarcation 
gives the Thais a curiously detached outlook on Malay politics at times, and 
the UMNO-PMIP struggle can be dismissed as a feud having entertainment value 
to the Thais. They accept invitations to Alliance rallies often for enter­
tainment primarily. (But detachment is also fostered by the almost total 
irrelevance of UMNO speeches to Thai interests.5
In contrast yet again, Buddhism's eclecticism and tolerance, conscien­
tiously taught by the monks, make it possible for Thais to judge individual
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Malays on their merits. Thais are quite ungrudging in their praise for 
good Malay officials. This openness to other men's virtues assists the 
Thais* consciousness of the differentiation of the socio-political structure 
in Kelantan - mitigating the effects of conceiving society in terms of mono­
lithic blocs or categories.
The several consequences of the primacy of religion are dwarfed, however, 
by its effects upon the structure of leadership within the community. Village 
life revolves around the wat. The great merit of the abbot and his important 
role in acts of merit-making by the laity, make him the undisputed head of 
each village community. The sanctity and learning of the Chief Abbot of 
Kelantan make him the equally -undisputed head of the Kelantan Thai community 
as a whole.
Unlike in Thailand, the abbots are not approached to legitimate or lead
6government development programmes. There are no such programmes affecting
Thais in Kelantan. But this, if anything is to the advantage of the Sangha's
authority in village life, for the mobilisation of the monkhood in Thailand
in a national secular role has been argued to have weakened the original basis 
7of its prestige. In Kelantan the Sangha is concerned with village life and 
provides de facto village leadership, but from the firm base of the wat, 
without the secular role becoming explicit, diverse, and self-defeating.
Abbots' secular concerns vary with their intelligence and individual 
energy and social conscience* In the author's experience abbots undertake 
to dedicate new houses (suad ryan) and preside over the physical removal of 
houses from one site to another. The abbot of Samddrag initiated communal
work on the repair of a village road after the 1967 flood* (The headman of 
the village lacked the respeot to achieve a response if he had tried to or­
ganise this activity - only a headman who is a strong personality in his own 
right, or an ahbot, or an order from the administration, can mobilise Thais 
for a common purpose outside of religious activities or matters of kinship.) 
An abbot will sometimes approach D.O.s with petitions on behalf of his village 
or individual villagers, and help them fill in forms (if he can write Malay), 
or lead them to an appointment in ICota Bharu if they do not know the way.
But the authority of the abbot in all these things stems from his 
religious role. It is perhaps not so important that he pre-empts certain 
secular functions, as that his authority is there. Leadership in a Thai 
community is almost defined as the religious leadership because of the 
orientation of the people to the wat and the tendency to act communally al­
most exclusively in matters pertaining to religion. Other factors then 
assist the monkly pre-eminence.
It is the author*s impression that the period of monkhood of all the 
male villagers bestows on each an equality of high status with his near con­
temporaries. Only men of advanced years with, preferably, a long spell in 
the monkhood or as Naaj Baan, have higher status than the rest; relative 
wealth is of very little, if any, significance at all. All men who have been 
monks are properly addressed and referred to as 'Caw* - literally, !lordf - 
as5 Caw Bug, Caw Nuj; rather than the more familiar (but also permitted)
ii 11
A* Bug, A* Nuj. Some villages use the *Neenf prefix. It is therefore diffi­
cult for younger men of an intelligent and more assertive nature to adopt a 
leadership role and not be condemned as upstarts or power-lovers. Naturally
- 170 -
Buddhist culture inhibits the development of assertive personality traits; 
but basically the problem for would-be secular leadership is not that the 
community does not believe in higher secular status, but that high status 
has normally to be shared. No one should rise above the rest unless by vir­
tue of age and great experience or wisdom. This attitude is combined with an 
incurable individualism which resists even small-scale cooperative effort -
e.g. to repair a bund when ones own rice field is not immediately threatened 
8by flood waters.
In smaller hamlets without wats and closely encircled by Malays, the 
assertive personality type fills a de facto leadership role because of his 
ability to handle Malays and get. things done. The prospects for this leader-
9
ship structure look better than in the larger villages, with their formal 
channels of access to Malay authority through an appointed Naaj, and their 
abbots. The swagger and bravado of big Nuj (aged 45 )f at Sambbrag,wom him 
a ready following of the 17-19 year olds, and during the great flood he was a 
useful mobiliser of youthful manpower for felling dangerous coconut trees.
But his contemporaries look askance at his pretensions, His nick-name 
'Kong1 means 'big-head'. This is really a great loss to the community pol­
itically, because Nuj alone among the Sambbrag Thais has calculated the power
11of the Thai vote if with-held from the Alliance in marginal constituencies.
He also has exceptional mobility across the state and into Thailand as agent 
to a Chinese pig-dealer.
It may be asked what could not be made of the institution of Naaj Baan, 
But this seems on balance less a source of actual or potential leadership
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than an obstruction to it. It pre-empts leadership just as the Sangha does,
Even at the height of its prestige, when it was a direct British appointment,
the office of Naaj Baan (Penghulu) was part of the administrative structure
and had scant powers of initiative. As part of a Malay structure today - and
12especially if reduced to simple 'ketua kampong' - its prestige is immeas­
urably less and the people willing to take the job increasingly the village 
dogs-bodies. Yet there it stands, and Thais will always reply if asked who 
is the chief person in the villages "Naaj IS'" ("the Naaj of course!"). 
Retired Naajs of the British period command in fact the greater respect; 
they exert influence on individuals who are susceptible and amenable to it; 
but as elderly men in retirement they have less motive to walk around and 
their magnificent presence is only experienced by those who visit them in 
their houses. And always the current Naaj remains the only man in frequent 
authoritative contact with all the people, albeit on petty matters and 
always at the Penggawa1s hest.
It is not inconceivable that the Thais could have had an institution of
13secular village-level leadership before the modern period and that its 
indigenous roots only began to be undermined after its integration ihto the 
authoritative structure outside the village (probably before the 20th 
century). That a leadership should serve as a link with authority outside 
the village is of itself not derogatory. In the smaller settlements without 
wats, as we have seen, leadership begins on the basis of an intermediary role. 
And the Thais need leadership more in their 'external* relations than intern­
ally, given the internal pre-eminence of the abbot. Under the British the
Naaj's authority was enhanced by his direct access to British patrons, and 
some Naajs won a state-wide reputation in the Thai community. But by the 
time of Independence the Naaj's office had become excessively dependent on 
outside inspiration, like so much else in village life in the modern era.
If there was once an indigenous tradition and institution of secular village 
leadership it is difficult to see how this could be re-established even in the 
strange event of the government Naaj-ship being abolished. Meanwhile, the 
government office stands in the way of alternative structures emerging. Of 
itself it cannot, of course, adopt a 'political* role, independently of the 
administration.
When one considers the Thais* problems in the context of Malayan demo­
cracy, and the question of leadership, it is a leadership with external pol­
itical functions that one sees to be particularly lacking; for democracy 
not only permits the assertion of group interests but indeed compels it so 
far as any group is unwilling to let other groups contest and monopolise 
power and the resources of the political system. If Thai civil leadership has 
always functioned as a bridging factor between Thais and the political system 
of the Malays, such a role today is imperative. Now the leadership of the 
Sangha, dominating everything, and the much weaker institution of Naaj Baan, 
are both active forces in village life. But the Naaj Baan is prevented by 
his government appointment from using the office for new political purposes. 
The true and unrivalled heads of the village communities, the abbots - and 
the head of the Kelantan Thai community, the Chief Abbot - are forbidden, 
ironically, by the rules of the Sangha of Thailand to take up any political
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role. Laymen are astonished at the suggestion that the abbot should be con-
14oerned with politics: it is unthinkable. But the retired Naaj, and other
senior secular figures - in the hypothetical case of the existing Naaj-ship 
dropping out - would prove to have been too long schooled in the client 
role and poorly equipped to initiate a completely new type of political re­
lationship with the Malay world. It must be emphasised however that so long 
as the environment was or is structured for a reciprocal (and in terms of 
other groups' status, equitable) client-patron relationship to authority, 
the lack of an independent political structure is integrative.
If secular communications are needed to assist the rise of a new leader- 
15ship in the village the need would be even more pressing if such a leadership 
were to represent the village in external political relationships, for this 
would imply a disciplined front and agfeed line, and a line probably at odds 
with the average villager's instincts. Curiously, inter-village communi­
cations are already rather good, thanks to the movements of monks and the 
apparent willingness of villagers to take a broad interest in what goes on 
in the rest of the community. Once individual villages were organised, a 
state-wide structure would be comparatively an easier matter although entirely 
without historical precedent, given the uncordinated, haphazard and long 
drawn out nature of settlement. If a state-wide leadership could then be 
found to head it and hold it together this would relieve village leaders of 
the heavy strain of dealing with local politicians and administrators 
directly. A state leadership, though, would need 'independent means' (i.e. 
independent of villagers' erratic contributions) and a regular supply of time
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and energy for visiting the far-flung settlements, and probably a private
car* These things are not usually given to a rioe farmer. A government
16
servant or teachei Is indicated. But the tiny handful who have made or 
are malting this grade through English education, apart from being too young 
by the Thais* standards for leadership, bear witness to the sad - and uni­
versal - syndrome of the intelligent, thoughtful, and diligent youth alien-
17ated by his education from parents, elders and contemporaries.
In sum, the prospects are discouraging for a secular Thai leadership to 
emerge spontaneously either at state or village level, although in the smaller 
settlements without an abbot or a separate Naaj,go-betweens with the Malay . 
community show the makings of leaders. The fact that both these persons and 
the official Uaajs in some sense already perform a bridging or representative 
function to the political system certainly provides a useful precedent for 
civil leadership having an *external* role as its major attribute. But until 
an independent leadership structure does come into being the community has no 
alternative to its passive client role. Up to the present time this has not 
been contrary to integration. The client role is what the Thais are best 
adapted to. They are even prone to reject new types of leadership for fear 
of the new types of political role and risks which they might be called upon 
to accept by such leaders. Even the new political communications of demo­
cracy and changing economic expectations in this period of more rapid change 
and social mobilisation need not immediately cause the client role to be rejected. 
If the first priority is religious and ethnic integrity, and clientship 
(either to the D,0. or to the local Alliance or both) guarantees this, an 
independent political role will not be sought. At the worst one might say
that the 'civil* (i.e. lay) authoritative structure in the village is simply, 
from the people's point of view, entrusted with a function which the Sangha 
would perform if it could i namely, to protect the practice of Buddhism in 
the community, but by arranging the appropriate external relationships rather 
than the internal ones. This essentially negative requirement from the envir­
onment has made the client role a correct and acceptable one up to the present 
time, and the government-appointed Naaj an acceptable representative.
Unfortunately, client ship may abruptly cease to be the guarantee of cul­
tural security and integrity that it traditionally has been. This is apart 
from material equality, which democracy rather doubtfully guarantees to the 
client minority which cannot stand on its own feet. The Thais are generally 
not concerned about their lack of political leadership. They are largely 
ignorant of any need for it. But there are interests willing to supply the 
need, in a way which, so far from moderating, could aggravate the dangers of 
the democratic system for the Thais, at the same time as teaching a new role 
and correspondingly sharpening expectations* These interests are the Alliance 
party of ICelantan. The dangers that the Thais might perceive in Alliance 
plans for organisation of their community are independent of the outcome of 
the 1969 state elections - although this itself could become a turning point, 
even with an Alliance victory. In Chapter VIII we shall review and interpret 
Alliance plans for the Kelantan Thai, and the chance of an Alliance victory, 
as developments which, in the continued absence of independent political 
organisation, could initiate a change of direction away from integration.
Such a change can never be excluded from the range of possible developments 
in the plural society* The appeals of the 'motherland', to which we turn next, 
are an additional factor in the balance.
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FOOTNOTES
X. In particular, cermonies of Saj Baad at cremation and at prescribed
intervals thereafter; entering the monkhood; and Saj Baad Paa Chaa 
(the festival of the cemetery) at the beginning of the third month.
2. But obviously the Thai peasant does get a large part of his metaphysical 
beliefs from the teaching of his abbot.
3. via. Thai Culture and Behaviour by Ruth Benedict, Southeast Asia Program 
Bata Paper No. 4, Cornell 1952. See p.36 for her remarks on conventional 
virtue.
4. The author is not in a position to assert that Kelantan Thai beliefs 
are unique, having no personal acquaintance with peasant communities in 
Thailand, Indeed although some texts, such as Ruth Benedict's cited 
above, paint a different picture, there is one account which suggests 
that there may be far-reaching similarities between traditional village 
beliefs in Central Thailand and those met in Kelantan. This account is 
Phya Anuman Rajadhon's Life and Ritual in Old Siam (New Haven, 1961).
On page 68, concerning the motives of the act of buad (entering the 
monkhood) he writes: "A son who becomes a novice or a monk is in popular
belief a mysterious agent for helping save his parents from hell when 
they die."
5. Ruth Benedict's compilation from older sources (op.cit. p.17) is more
helpful here, although making a distinction between the 'soul* and the 
'lovrer soul' that the author never heard expressed by Kelantan peasants 
(this could represent a failure of understanding by the present author, 
but in general he is satisfied that the Kelantan Thai live happily with 
a number of contradictions which they do not seek to resolve for them­
selves or to explain to others). Ruth Benedict's explanation is as 
follows: "Acts and prayers of propitiation in Thailand are made not
in the Buddhist woiship but to the phi. Even a peasant hardly makes an 
appeal for specific help in Buddhist worship, but the phi are propitiated 
and besought. These are spirits of the dead; not the soul, which re­
presents man's full character and passes on into endless reincarnations, 
but his 'lower* soul, his passions, which may haunt the world he has left 
and disturb the living," The nearest to this elucidation that the present 
author heard in Kelantan was the remarks of the abbot of SamBBrag about 
phii, when the author asked him what a Buddhist should believe on the 
subject. The abbot asserted that the villagers' beliefs were absolutely 
erroneous: there are no phii, only the essence or soul of each human
being which passes on in some way. The abbot is not in a position to 
educate his folk in the distinction because he could not avoid condemning 
some of their most strongly-held convictions, which would only arouse 
undesirable resentment and friction.
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6, Co p. de Young, J.E.s Village Life in Modern Thailand. Berkeley 1955?
p. 148s "The wat is politically and socially important in the new as 
well as the old type of Thai village. No community program can succeed 
without its approval. Some sort of religious service accompanies the 
announcement of any new measure by the central government to gain for 
its decrees and programs the aura of the wat's sanction."
7, c,p. Mulder, J.A.N.s "De boeddhistische monniken als instrument van
regeringspolitiek in Thailand" in Mens en Maatschappij, jrg.40, No.4*
1965? p.287s "Het ziet er naar uit, dat de monniken met hun prestige 
de zelfde weg op sullen gaan als- de dorpshoofdens Immers, sinds het 
dorpshoofd een semi-regeringsambtenaar is geworden, die, hoewel door 
het dorp gekozen, niet meer op basis van het dorp staat, maar veeleer 
als laagste ambtenaar aan de regeringspyramide hangt, heeft hi 3 veel 
invloed verloren. Zijn gezag was het gezag van een primus-inter-pares; 
het uitvoeren van regeringsorders .en aanbevelingen lieeft zijn positie 
verzwakt. Mutatis mutandis sal hetzelfde voor de monniken gelden. Door 
sich actief te bewegen op moderne niet-religieuse terreinen, lijkt het 
mij, dat zij niet alleen hun potentiBle extra-religieuze invloed sullen 
verliezen, maar bov.endien aan godsdienstige invloed zullen inboeten,"
In this passage the declining prestige of the village headship In Thailand 
is compared with the foreseeable fate of the monkhood. The incorporation of 
the village headman into the administrative structure in Kelantan shows 
comparable consequences with Thailand, but the- Kelantan Sangha has not 
gone tliis way.
8 , Corollary to individualism are poor communications between one villager 
and another even on very elementary matters...yet channels of commun­
ication about non-wat affairs would seem to be one pre-condition for 
structures of secular organisation and leadership to arise. Of two men 
not kinsmen working contiguous vegetable plots at SamUBrag one was a van- 
driver whose access to outside information had enabled him to buy an 
effective insecticide against a caterpillar pest. His neighbour had the 
same pest on his plot but never knew of the other's problem nor that there 
was a cheap cure for it. These two villagers were on friendly enough 
terms but the state of the other's crops was aomething neither felt it 
appropriate to ask about. There is also an astonishing variation in 
knowledge and expectation about politics even between close neighbours.
The author interviewed seven blue-card-holding male villagers aged between 
35 and about 60, to elicit expectations about whether an Alliance victory 
would make it easier to obtain nationality and land; and knowledge about 
what party held 'power in the neighbouring state of Trengganu, and at 
Kuala Lumpur. The group questioned were close neighbours of the author 
and of each other, A rather uniform result was expected because the group 
was not randomly sampled from the whole village. In the event the exer­
cise proved highly instinctive about the poor state of communications. 
Concerning (a) land, and (b) nationality under the Alliance....neighbour 1. 
didn’t know; 2. wasn’t sure; 3» was certain of improvement; 4 couldn't
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answer for (a) but thought (b) would be as before; 5° expected an 
easing; 6. didn't know; 7° answered yes, easier for (a), because he 
had seen the result of Alliance government in Trengganu, but on (b) he 
wasn't sure. Concerning the identity of the governments in (a) Trengganu, 
and (b) Kuala Lumpur.. .Neighbour 1. didn't know; 2. didn't know;
3. knew that (a) was Alliance, but didn't know about (b); 4° answered
'Alliance' for both; 5. 'Alliance' for both; 6. didn't know; 7° gave 
(a) Alliance, but didn't know (b). Only No, 5° of this group was pre­
pared to state which authority issues nationality, but he gave Kelantan.
No, 7 knew that Kuala Lumpur had a hand in the issuance of birth-cert if id­
eates and thought that this might possibly apply to nationality as well.
9. It must not be thought that the larger Thai groups are so unstructured 
that they are incapable of acting in unison in the face of any challenge.
Ad hoc leaders arise and make their voices heard in different circumstances 
as in organising some kind of petition on a specific issue. Thais are 
very adept at following one man of recognised qualification in his part- 
icular field, and submerging their own ego. There is excellent corporate 
effort on wat works under the guidance of carpenters, etc. But a£ ' 
specific skill alone qualifies to lead there is at times a crippling 
reluctance to take the initiative among a group of equally unqualified 
men. It came about that in the course of building a coffin at SamdBrag 
the group of amateur carpenters perceived that one board was too long
but in the absence of direction, two of the group set to sawing at 
opposite ends. The result was a plank that1was too short.
10. Young Thai farmers of an intellectual disposition, with a good Thai 
education, are no better placed than the dominant personalities to win a 
following. If their personalities are acceptably modest, their youth 
still counts against them, and ultimately their political proposals are 
likely to appear too radical to a community still so thoroughly con­
ditioned to passivity in dealing with the Malays. The idea of abstaining 
in an election for instance would conflict right at the start with the. 
Thais' idea that voting is compulsory and not really secret.
11. See Chapter VIII, note 21 p. 252 for an analysis of marginality in
state and national constituencies in Kelantan on the basis of 1964 
voting.
12. There seems to be an incipient trend to taldng the Penghulu-ship out of
Thai hands. This has happened now at SamBBrag and Jung Kaw and Khaw Joon
to the author's knowledge. The first two communities would seem to be 
large enough and distinct enough to justify the British policy of a 
separate Thai Penghulu. Xet one should not immediately assume Malay 
malice-aforethought. At Maalaj a goung Thai has succeeded to his father 
since Independence and it is certainly significant that he had to be 
cajoled into it. (The father was not allowed to retire till'the son
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agreed to take over). It appears that unwillingness to serve the Malay 
structure can be an initial cause of the Penghuluship being withdrawn.
The alternative post of unpaid katua kampong is then, naturally, even 
more difficult to fill. Meanwhile, at the other end of the scale, the 
Penghulu of MuLcLm Repek in which Baan BangsS. stands, is a Thai with 
many Malays under his authority (but he lives outside the Thai village 
and is an exceptionally 'Malayan1 figure, Malay-educated before the war 
and with English-educated children. One of his sons is a headmaster at 
Ketereh.)
13. One of the most influential (among many influential people) at Bangsa"1 was
the Sangkharii, the lay messenger of the wat. This office, existing in
every village, is still officially recognized by the state government and 
the incumbents may apply for a small stipend, in consideration of assist­
ance (formerly) rendered to the Naaj. But the office exists independ­
ently of the government and is considered by some at Bangs SI1 a potential 
foundation for a lay leadership - or at any rate a structure which (in 
that village) cannot be ignored. This has its negative side, it is 
clear. The vitality and authority of the Sangkharii-ship at Bangsd' is 
attributable partly to the importance of the Bangsd1 wat. The Sangkharii 
might stand in the way of alternative leadership; nor could he himself 
pursue, as a leader, any course which the Chief Abbot might judge incom­
patible with his basically ecclesiastical appointment.
14* Even the concept of pre-emption (of any leadership role) would be hard 
for most Thais to accept. The formal position is that the abbot.has no
secular functions, just as the only lay leader formally acknowledged is
the Naaj. Also entirely absent in Kelantan is the idea that monkhood 
could or should be a period of training or preparation for leadership 
af'terwards.
15- See Note 8 above.
16. They ares 1. The headmaster of Ketereh English Primary School (aged 25? 
ex-Bangsd'); 2. The post-master at Bachok (ex-Tumpat); 3- A student 
trainee at Serdang Agricultural College (ex-Tumpat); 4. A student 
trainee at the Rubber Research Institute (ex-Tumpat); 5* A sixth-form 
science student at Alam Shah Malay Secondary School, Kuala Lumpur (now 
at University of Malaya?)(ex-Baan Jasmuu, aged 24); 6. A Thai (once of
Baan Jang) who migrated to Kuala Lumpur, took work with an English 
company and was encouraged and sponsored by European friends to pursue 
an education which has led to London University; he is said to have 
severed his ties with Kelantan almost completely and to have forgotten 
his mother tongue. There is a regular, small contingent of Thai boys 
at Tumpat Secondary English school, some of whom will continue to 
qualify for government grants for traineeships, etc., but this group will 
surely remain very small and inconsequential.
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There is one other institution which had a potential utility in giving 
the Kelantan Thais leadership, hut is now bankrupt. This is the office 
of "Head of the Thai Community", currently occupied by a Thai Chinese,
Enche Tan Ker Liang, As this office was the object of a manoeuvre by
the Alliance early In the 1960s, its role will be explained at Chapter VIII.
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CHAPTER VXX: THE ROLE OF THAILAND
Thailand's interest in the Malay Peninsula has waxed and waned across 
the centuries according to her capacity to assert It. After the intervention 
of the British empire, first on the west, then on the east coast of Malaya, 
and the drawing of a firm boundary between Thailand and British Malaya, 
Thailand's interest in the parts of the Peninsula south of that boundary lay 
repressed. But there are more ways than conquest to develop and further an 
interest in a neighbouring area; and if the neighbouring country is later 
transformed from part of a foreign empire into a friendly-disposed nation 
state, given adaptability (on the part of the 'interested' country) to the 
changed conditions, a traditional interest may be reasserted in contemporary 
form.
It may appear a little facile to equate the contemporary interest with 
the old as manifestations of a single historical phenomenon. The 'historical 
perspective1 can too easily blur important distinctions. However, in Thailand's 
case it may be observed that the frontier drawn in 1909 did not sever the 
whole of the Malay Peninsula from Thailand. Indeed the Anglo-Siamese Treaty 
of 1909 confirmed the Thai interest in the area north of the frontier as 
never before. Thus there is a strong continuity of Thai interest throughout 
the century, in the Peninsula as such. The present manifestations of Thai 
interest in Kelantan are in part repercussions and extensions - as it were, 
an overspill effect - of the assertion of Thai hegemony north of the frontier. 
There is also an element of response to Malay nationalism's rival concern 
with Patani, as well as an instinctive concern for fellow Thais across the
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border. But most striking of all Thailand's 'excursions' into the affairs
of Kelantan since 1909 has been, of course, the period of bogus sovereignty
1
bestowed by Japan on 20 August 1945*
Thailand's administration only came into effect three months later and
thus had a duration of some 21 months in all - but it left some traces, not
least, and most appropriately, the idea entertained by a minority of Kelantan
Thais that the 1944-45 interregnum restored an earlier Thai sovereignty over
Kelantan rather than intermittent suzerainty. This re-reading of history is
today reinforced by certain itinerant monks from South Thailand, together
2
with another tenet of the chauvinism of the 1950s; that the Thai race com­
prises the Lao (Thaj Laaw) and the Cambodians (Thaj Khameen), as well as the 
present inhabitants of Thailand,
Activities undertaken by Thai nationals in Kelantan, or inspired from 
Thailand, and policies formulated in Thailand concerning Kelantan, may be 
analysed as belonging broadly to two kinds; (a) acts and policies reflecting 
solicitude and traditional responsibilities towards the Kelantan Thai, but 
respect for Malayan sovereignty; (b) acts and policies implying a non-recog­
nition of Malayan sovereignty. Naturally enough, the line between the two 
categories is not easy to draw, for solicitude for Kelantan Thai welfare can 
contribute to enhance the Thai identity of the community and alienate its 
loyalty to the Malayan state. Moreover there is flexibility on both sides 
about the restraints which sovereignty imposes, and a tolerance of certain 
acts which in a European context would be defined as unfriendly.
The Thai occupation of 1944-45 was the most extreme possible expression
of Thailand's denial of foreign sovereignty over the Malayan territories that 
were onoe 'hers', and it left behind a minority current of thought in the same 
spirit, in particular among certain village intellectuals of BangsU'. But the 
immediate impact on the majority of Kelantan Thai was very slight. It is 
difficult to elicit recollections of the Thai occupation. What is recalled 
is often the rapacity of the Thai soldiers compared to the Japanese, and one 
or two temporary 'marriages' with Thai women. The most lasting memorial to 
the occupation is the institution of four grades of Thai primary education
for boys and girls in villages where a monk or layman was qualified to teach.
3At B9psamed village a school house was erected outside the wat.
The Thai Ministry of Education has continued since the war to support
primary education in the Thai villages of Kelantan, notably by supplying
text-books. This meets no resistance from the Malayan authorities, as the
4
classes are held in the wats, often by monies, and the purpose is assumed to 
be religious. Gertainly most villagers associate Thai education with religion 
alone, even though the text-books are secular in content. The books are dis­
tributed from Bp^samed wat by the Kelantan Sangha. This is a policy com­
patible of itself with respect for Malayan sovereignty.
However, just as the background to the introduction of primary education 
was rampant Thai chauvinism, so also part of the drive behind current assist­
ance to wats, to young monks, and to wat primary schools, etc., is nationalist 
and the assistance indeed not without anti-national possibilities from a 
Malayan point of view. To understand more fully such possibilities it is 
necessary to consider the governmental and ecclesiastical structure behind
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the pastoral and educational effort in Kelantan; the scope, in more detail, 
of this effort; and the nature of Thai government policies in that part of 
the Malay Peninsula belonging to South Thailand. But before considering con­
temporary developments we must give attention to the traditional basic struc­
ture binding the Sangha of Kelantan to its parent body, and the longer-standing 
consequences of these links.
The normal organisational structure of the Sangha in Thailand reflects 
the structure of regional civil administration. The whole is headed by the 
Supreme Patriarch (Somdedphrasangkharaad), assisted by a deputy (Mahaathee- 
rasamakhom) and certain monks of 'ministerial' rank, such as the Somdedphra- 
raachaakhana1. Under the latter are ranked in descending order (a) the heads 
of regions (Cawlthana'Phaag); (b) the heads of provinces (Cawkhana'Cangwad);
(c) the heads of major districts (Qawkhana'Amphbb); (d) heads of minor
districts (Cawkhana'Tambon); (e) the abbots of wats (Cawaawaadwad). The
Kelantan Sangha fits into this structure, under the authority of the chief 
monk of the southern region at Nakornsrithammarat. In only one respect does 
the organisation in Kelantan diverge from that in the provinces of Thailand - 
and this is merely a reflection of the small size of the Kelantan Thai com­
munity: there is no intermediate administrative rank between Cawkhana1
Cangwad and Gawaawaad. (However, a few abbots have more senior status than 
others. During the war the Thai government appointed four to the special 
dignity of 'Thankhruu'.)
The chief abbot of Kelantan, whose rank properly expressed is Phraraa- 
chakhana'Phra'khruusanjaabad, has equivalent status with the head monk of
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5
any Thai province. The phad jod or long-handled fan which is the insignia
of the office is bestowed on new incumbents in the name of the King of Thailand
and the Council of Great Elders, who make the appointment. The late *Caw 
6Khun1 of Kelantan died on 19 November 1962 and at the inauguration of his 
pupil and successor Caw Khun Can (following the cremation at BangsM,' on 8
rj
June 1965) it was the First Secretary of the Thai Embassy, Kuala Lumpur,
Naai Wichet Suthayakhom, who represented the King of Thailand and brought 
the insignia.
The chain of religious authority from the King of Thailand down to the
least Kelantan novice is uninterrupted by international frontiers. Only the
8presence of a Thai diplomat and the Sultan of Kelantan stand to remind one
that these ceremonies are not taking placing on Thai soil. The Kelantan
Sangha is more integral to the Sangha of Thailand than Kelantan ever was to
the Thai state, and the completion of the rail link from Songkhla shortly
after 1950 facilitated a more regular flow of communication and influence from
9the Sangha of Thailand than in the past. The wats of Kelantan find a natural
place in the itinerary of any Songkhla monk who decides to tour the region to
the south, for in every way except politically these Thai villages and wats
are part of one system with their Narathiwat counterparts. Some monks of the
South spend extended periods in Kelantan, where they perceive a need for their
services. The abbot at one of the two Maalaj wat is a young Thai national
who first stopped behind in Kelantan to teach the children at Sambbrag
10village. A similar case is mentioned by Phan Eeg Pin Muthukan, of a monk 
from the Golok district who has moved to Baan Khoogsijaa to run the primary
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school classes* Sometimes monks are invited from South Thailand by the
Kelantan Sangha or by individual villages to come and preach, or to help with
11the instruction of monks* Another type of regular visitor are the annual
committees of examiners of religious instruction (for monks). The departure
of two committees from Bangkok was recorded by on© of the daily newspapers 
12in 1968, One committee headed for Kelantan, the other for the west coast, 
where it was due to advise also on the arrangements for the cremation of 
Kedah's chief abbot.
All these manifestations of the activity and influence of the Sangha of 
Thailand are consequences of an ancient reality: the geographic continuity
of the Thai Sangha's organisation from South Thailand into an area long under 
Thai suzerainty. That this influence continues sixty years after suzerainty 
came to an end is not the consequence of a political decision taken in Thailand, 
but of the fact that neither the British nor subsequent regimes in Kelantan 
have seen any cause to interfere with Thai religious affairs. So the Kelantan 
Sangha has continued to be a member of the Sangha of Thailand. This tradition­
al relationship is without political consequences, unless we count the uphold­
ing of a Thai identity as one. Apart from a nationalistic leaning on the 
part of some individuals, the motivation behind the trips of the monks from 
South Thailand is generally no more nor less political than the maintenance of 
the Sangha in Thailand by a state whose legitimacy and stability are tradition­
ally bound up with its Buddhist religion. But if the Thai state has felt an 
instinctive interest in maintaining the national religion, it has also firmly 
excluded the Sangha from a political role in the active sense. The traditional 
influence of the Sangha of Thailand in Kelantan has therefore been almost
totally devoid of any political overtones, and its activities are not a
challenge to Malayan sovereignty.
This judgement cannot he applied, however, to certain developments which
have overtaken the Thai Sangha since World War II, incidentally augmenting
and modifying its impact in Kelantan. The concept of an apolitical Sangha
has ceased to be a useful tool of analysis in Thai affairs, unless carefully
qualified. It is no longer thought sufficient that the Sangha should merely
exist, stabilising society in negative fashion. On the one hand its authority
13is mobilised in support of the government's civil programmes and decrees.
On the other, the Sangha is given a more positive religious role, appropriate 
to an era of nation-building in place of simple stabilisation or perpetuation. 
It is this Buddhist revivalism that has a marked impact in Kelantan, through 
the 'overspill' activities of new Sangha agencies and the government depart­
ments with which they work in closest collaboration. A new type of monk is
14
seen in Kelantan, committed - even militantly - to national and social 
renewal, well-educated, well-trained, sometimes quite charismatic.
The political objectives of the Buddhist revival are apparent in the 
tasks allotted to the batch of new agencies founded since i960. The enter­
prise is a little more diverse and complex than an attempt "to tap and
strengthen some unifying national emotion that would enable the country to
15resist the corrosive effect of Communism" but the nation-building content 
(to use the up-to-date terminology) is prominent, even an element of 'revol­
ution for export’.
The Thammaphadthanaa is an agency based at Chiengmai which prepares
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monks and boys from private schools to go into northern villages as teachers 
and community developers. The Nuajphrathammacaarig, in collaboration with the 
Department of Social Welfare (Ministry of Interior) takes the Buddhist 'out­
reach1 to the Hill Peoples. The Thammathuud trains and sends missionary 
monks abroad, working with the Department of Religious Affairs (Ministry of 
Education). The Muajphadthanaakaanthaangcid, a creation of the Mahaathaad 
Foundation, is committed to raise the standard of welfare and dignity of 
Thai Buddhist communities, by diffusing positive attitudes to modernisation, 
health, education, and so on.
The work of Thammathuud is oriented to the world beyond the boundaries
of Thai Buddhism. Kelantan is situated within those boundaries and is not
subject to a missionary effort. But by the same token Kelantan does attract
the attention of monks concerned with the revival of Buddhism and national
purpose in the South. The great revivalist preacher Panjaanantha*, who tries
to visit Kelantan once a year, if a busy schedule allows, is not attached to
any agency (he and his followers are something of an agency unto themselves).
But his purpose corresponds to that of Nua jphadthanaakaanthaangcid in that
both see a special responsibility in the South. Panjaanantha' raises funds
for his mission from wealthy Thai patrons and can draw on Ministry of Education
funds to assist temple building or to assist young monks further their
16education in Bangkok. The Wuajphadthanaakaanthaangcid, as an agency of the 
Mahaathaad Foundation, can draw on funds collected by its lay following, or 
contributed by the government; or call in Ministry of Education/Department 
of Religious Affairs assistance with teaching material so far as the Ministry
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is not already active. Monks of either group see themselves in a catalyst 
role. Secular funds are called in when the will to use them constructively 
has been brought to life by preaching and example. This example is offered, 
of course in situations' where a Buddhist Thai infra-structure already exists. 
Kelantan, with its wats, and wat-schools supplied since the war by the 
Ministry of Education, constitutes such a situation.
When the new Buddhist college of the Nuajphadthanaakaanthaangcid at
Chonburi - "The School for the Propagation of Buddhism" - comes into action,
17this agency will add an expressly missionary role to its repertoire, for it 
will then train novices from outside Thailand as well as Thai nationals willing 
to spread Buddhism abroad. Malaysian nationals will qualify for places at 
this college. But at the present, Kelantan is affected by Buddhist revival 
because of its geographical and structural links with South Thailand, and 
our analysis continues along these lines.
What is the attraction of South Thailand to an organisation like 
Nuajphadthanaakaanthaangcid? Why does the government support the Foundation 
with funds and patronage? The proximity of North and North-east Thailand to 
the unstable - if not already communized - territories of Laos, North Vietnam, 
Burma and China, and the interest and support of the United States, have caused 
Thailand's nation-building enterprise to become loosely equated with the 
struggle for the allegiance of the Thai-Lao and the hill peoples. Yet before 
this problem came to the attention of either the world at large or the Thai 
government, there was a southern question, whose ingredients were the resist­
ance of the Malay population of the South to cultural or political assimilation 
and the traditional (but since 1909 intensified) drive for Thai hegemony over
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the area. Since the 1950s the drive for effective control has taken on
18nationalistic, if not frankly chauvinistic overtones, while the Malay 
population of Patani, Yala and Narathiwat, never in historical record a 
malleable element, has become just as much affected by the nationlist spirit 
of the times and inspired by the rise of two Malay nations to the south. We 
need not be detained by cases of downright provocation. There is a funda­
mental anthipathy between Islam and Buddhism (which Muslims perceive more 
clearly than Buddhists)”^  so that however cautiously and liberally the Thai 
government moves, there can be little prospect of anything but many decades 
of continuing tension and -unrest.
Now what is of great interest to our study is not so much Thai policies 
towards the Malays of the South, as policies towards the Thais of the same
area* Not only must Thai numbers be brought up (partly through sponsored 
20migration) but Thais in the South must develop a positive loyalty to the
Thai state, for if even the Thais of this strategic and unstable area cannot
be relied upon, all is lost, (it must be remembered that the rural Thais of
old Patani, like the Thais of Kelantan, have been remote from the centres of
Thai power until recent decades. Loyalty to the modern Thai state will not
21
grow unassisted out of the old cultural identification with myang thaj, ) 
Positive loyalty will arise with rising standards of living, through education, 
and through the influence of a revitalised and modernising Buddhism, incul­
cating both values of direct loyalty to a Buddhist state and values favourable 
to the modernisation which indirectly leads to the same goal. A modernised 
Buddhist culture, also, will bring not only satisfaction and self-respect to 
its Thai members but become a more attractive model to members of the alien
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culture.
The young monks involved in this mission are frankly patriotic and they
see more or less clearly that Thailand and her religion are under scrutiny on
this cultural frontier. As the Malays cannot be proselytised the mission is
22a national and Buddhist priority of the utmost urgency. But in no case in 
the author's experience did this patriotism smack of chauvinism; and love and 
sympathy towards the simple and long-neglected Thais of the South - a minority 
in their own country - were always felt more strongly than any political emo­
tion. The elements of a political grand design may be inferred, though, from 
the government's keen support of the Buddhist mission to the South, from one's 
knowledge of the role of Buddhism in nation-building in other minority areas 
of the country, as well as from any pragmatic assessment of the conditions for
southern security. The role of the Thais of the South must be central in some
23way to any political strategy.
The mission to the South reaches to the Thai minority of Kelantan, again, 
through the unbroken structural link with the Sangha of Thailand. The agents 
of the Buddhist revival follow the same circuit as the southern monks who come 
without special motive. In estimating the significance for Kelantan Thai poli­
tical attitudes of the new monkish activity, we recur to the continuum proposed 
above, a continuum from acts derogatory to Malaya's sovereignty, to acts rep­
resentative of simple solicitude for the Kelantan Thai. The revivalist monks 
of the author's acquaintance, as men of considerable intelligence and idealism, 
were not chauvinistic - albeit there is room for speculation about the govern­
mental motives behind the heavy support given to revivalist activities in 
Kelantan. (if anything, it is the uneducated monks of South Thailand who betray
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anti-Malay prejudices and put about the idea that Kelantan was once a part of 
Thailand.) Motivated primarily by sympathy for these forgotten Buddhist com­
munities, the revivalists preach tolerance to Malay neighbours and the necess­
ity of acquiring basic literacy in Malay so as to prosper in the country in 
conformity with its laws. But given the monks' special training, no sermon 
exhorting the folk to raise its standards by diligent effort can avoid reference 
to the model rural communities of Thailand. Such communities prosper and ad­
vance because they observe the Buddha's precepts, while working industriously 
to improve their standards in collaboration with the welfare and agricultural 
services of the Thai government. The Malayan government is not (one feels) a 
comparable entity, for it has no place in a Buddhist design. A Buddhist com­
munity in Malaya should obey Malay laws with sincerity, but more in pragmatic 
recognition of its situation than from respect for the positive qualities of 
the government. (The monks know nothing, in any case, about Malayan programmes 
for rural development and public welfare.) The reaction of some of the 
villagers of Sambbrag who heard one of these sermons was to be confirmed in 
their political philosophy of conformity to Malay law; the implicit exaltation ! 
of modern Thailand found no response on this occasion. But there is a basis 
for a response to grow - even at Sambbrag, so far from the border - in the 
villagers' vision of a myang th$j, to which they have always belonged. The very 
person of the new type of monk, by his intelligence and outstanding moral stature, 
corresponds to the old idea of a monk from the myang. His voice is an echo of 
the Thai metropolis, for he is a native of Central Thailand or Bangkok, not of 
the south. His sermons conjure up an image of the myang which corresponds to
the villagers vision — albeit with some modem accretions.
The Thais of Kelantan do strongly identify with 'Thailand1; but Thailand
in the form of an esoteric image with ascribed qualities (an 'ideological
model* of the ancestral home) not the modern nation state, and the realities
of its corruption and power indelicately wielded. The Thailand of the Kelantan
Thais' romantic imagination is a distillation of idealand some real cultural
24elements. It has all the characteristics of a 'Great Tradition' but with a 
purified Sangha (under the King) occupying the role of elite, rather than some 
secular aristocracy. (This is particularly understandable in that the sole 
Experience of Thailand that many Kelantan Thais have, is a pilgrimage to the 
shrine of Nakomsrithammarat, where thoughts and the limited environment of 
the pilgrimage are all directed to build up strong religious images.) The 
ancestral home, myang thaj, is frequently held up for wonder on account of the 
purity and beauty of speech there, compared to the 'coarse* country dialeGts 
of Kelantan. The folk are exquisitely courteous at all times, in the romantic 
model. Dedicated and educated monks who visit Kelantan villages reinforce (in 
spite of honest motives) this romantic or 'ideological* model and the Thais' 
orientation to Thailand.
There is an alternative, negative, model of Thailand current, based on 
experience of conditions in the South, whose significance will be mentioned 
in the next chapter. The positive model, meanwhile, is potentially unfavour­
able to political integration in Kelantan and Malaya; not merely for the cul­
tural identification which it carries with it, but for a certain political 
dimension which is inherent in the model and is capable of extension and ex­
ploitation in modem conditions. Pictures of the King of Thailand decorate
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the majority of Kelantan Thai homes. Although these Thais lack any tradition 
of Thai rule, the Thai King has always been at the head of the myang of the 
Great Tradition and has even continued to appoint the chief abbot of Kelantan. 
The Kelantan Thais conceive themselves to be members of the myang by virtue 
of their race and religion. It is not, certainly, a political nation within 
set territorial bounds, for it embraces Thais both within and without Thailand's 
borders. Even in the past when those borders were undefined, the Thais did 
not think themselves to be in a direct political relationship to the Thai King. 
There was no contradiction between their identification with him as head of a 
great cultural and ethnic family and of the Sangha; and acceptance of the 
day-to-day political reality of Malay power, mediating through the vassal 
system their political relationship to Bangkok. Nevertheless, there is a 
quite general expectation today of the solicitude of the Thai King and govern­
ment for the secular welfare of Thais outside the frontiers, and if this is 
neither a traditional experience nor a product of the short war-time occupation, 
it may reflect at least the rise of nation states in the area (particularly 
the state of modern Thailand just across the border) and the pretensions of
such demarcated political units to be the heirs of the ethnic, cultural, un-
25bounded 1nations1 of the past. Kelantan Thais often point to the attention
paid by the Malayan government to the affairs of 'their people* (chaad khaw)
in Patani, and take equally for granted that the Thai Consul in Kelantan should
look to the general welfare of the Kelantan Thais as the modern Thai government
does for its Gitizens. The new social obligations of the modern state are 
thus perceived but not its territorial delimitation, (But by no means do 
Kelantan Thais think themselves Thai citizens or subject to Thai law and 
government.)
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Such a ready adaptation of the primordial idea of membership in an ethnic 
myang thaj to new political conditions offers a fruitful field of activity to 
any person or interest that might wish to maximise Thailand's advantage in 
Kelantan. (The bureaucratic interests which finance education and Buddhist 
revival in the state can scarcely be unaware of the potential ihfluence of 
the new monies.) Acts directly and intentionally prejudicial to Malaysian 
sovereignty can go un-noticed, moreover, because of the general and quite 
remarkable tolerance on the Malayan (official) and (even) popular Malay side 
of manifestations of cultural orientation beyond the borders, even with 
moderate political overtones. It is therefore not only one small, unsophis­
ticated group (the Kelantan Thais) who take this kind of orientation for 
granted. Before considering the occasion and possible motives of Thailand's 
establishment of a consulate at Kota Bharu in April 1966, we will explore 
further this quite wide-spread feature of flexible interpretation of the new 
concepts of sovereignty and the state.
As a first example we may take the atmosphere of tolerance that surrounded 
the first visit of their majesties the King and Queen of Thailand to the 
Federation of Malaya in 1962. There is no objection to the traditional pat­
ronage of the King towards the Thai community of Malaya, expressed in terms
of religious ritual. The Straits Times reported without disfavour the unveil-
26ing of the eyes of the great Reclining Buddha at Penang. At Wat Mek Prasit,
Ipoh, the royal couple were able to greet about 350 guests, invited from all
27over Malaya, "many of whom were of Thai descent.1' Two dajrs later it was 
recounted how 70-year-old Mine Hia of Bangkok presented a cheque for Tcs 
20,000 to King Bhumibol towards the construction of a new Thai temple at
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Petaling Jaya* "A well-known philanthropist, she had made donations through
the Thai King to a number of temples in her own country. And King Bhumihol
had suggested that she comes to Malaya and make a gift to the new temple in 
28Petaling Jaya." But perhaps the performance of these ritual duties is less 
remarkable than the equally well tolerated appointment of chief abbots by the 
Thai King, which might be thought to carry political implications by conven­
tional (European) standards of sovereignty*
The elite attitude of indulgence towards manifestations of seeming loyalty 
to the Thai King has a potential counterpart in popular Malay conceptions of 
nationality. In Kelantan Malay linguistic usage a distinction is made between 
kera'ayatan (citizenship) and bangsa (race), and it is realised at one level 
of perception that people of non-Malay race do have the blue cards of citizens. 
However, bangsa, like the word phasaa among the Kelantan Thai, has a wide spread 
of connotation. Before the rise of ’kera'ayatan* and 'kewarganegaraan' to de­
note citizenship, 'bangsa* did service for ’a people' both in the sense of a 
'race' and of a legal nationality. In other words, it had the same ambiguity 
as formerly the English word 'nationality', which today is generally equivalent 
to legal nationality or citizenship, but at Versailles and in the inter-war 
years referred also to the ethnic entities or races of Europe regardless of 
international boundaries and legal status. The ambiguity of 'bangsa' in 
Malaya is being maintained today by official influence as well as popular habit. 
For instance, 'bahasa kebangsaan', the national language, is to be taken by 
the Malays as the language of the Malay race and nation, but by the Chinese 
and others as the language of the Malayan (recently 'Malaysian') nation* The 
government seems to have decided to uphold the double meaning of bangsa, hoping
- 197 -
that the Malays will in due time enlarge their notion of a people and nation 
to include other races than themselves. The people and nation (hangsa) will 
then he the Malaysian people or nation, while race will eventually he expressed 
only by the word ’kaum' (community, group). In the medium term, however, 
the deliberate confusion of the two concepts must have the opposite effect.
Rather than other raGes becoming included as equal parts of one nation, regard­
less of race, nationality will continue to be associated exclusively with one 
race. Non-Malays may come to be regarded, through popular assimilation of a 
new to an old concept, as members of other nation-states (i.e. if the Malays 
are the people of the state of Malaya,the Siamese must be members of Siam) 
even against the evidence of blue cards and citizenship documents - and frontiers- 
and despite a traditional, popular acceptance of a Siamese presence (see Appendix XK) 
Naturally this can haye discrimination as one of its consequences. Thais 
who have not yet received nationality are often stated on their red (non­
citizen) identity cards to be ’Siamese subjects1, even while their birth-place
29is given as Kelantan. But we must not hastily condemn these attitudes. An
incident at Pasir Puteh contained elements of disadvantage and advantage to
11
the Thai concerned. A* HMng of Samftdrag, a blue card holder, went to register 
a claim to part of his grandfather’s estate against his uncle. H&dng was told 
by the clerk in all friendliness, as reported, that as a Simmese he should see 
the Thai Consul in Kota Bharu about the laws relating to Siamese inheritance; 
only then could the clerk say whether the uncle was unjustly invoking Muslim 
law concerning inheritance through females who pre-decease their fathers (as 
H&Sng’s mother had done). The clerk, like the uncle, was wrong. There is a
statute covering inheritance by non-Malays. But if the clerk assumed, as
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apparently he did, that 'modem notions of nationality1 imply conformity to 
the laws of the majority (and what is so inaccurate about this assumption in 
general?) then we must give him credit for being willing simultaneously to 
waive these notions and recognise that a man's preferred way of life may be 
best understood by one of his own people, one who (however) in 'modern terms' 
is a foreigner. Political and cultural pluralism are recognised and accepted 
in a quite commendable way.
European eyes may see a contradiction in the readiness of certain Kelantan 
Malays (notably the traditional elite and various ranks of the state admin­
istration) to both generously accept 'the Siamese' as fellow Kelantanese; 
and then to surrender them, as it were, as 'Thais' into the hands of the modem 
state which appears to claim their allegiance on the grounds of race and 
religion. The contradiction is only present if the receiving side abuses this 
act of good f;aith, and really treats the 'surrendered* people jealously like 
newly-acquired citizens. The implicit intention on the Malay side, as it 
appears to this observer, is not to release, let alone expel, the Siamese from 
their traditional membership in the Kelantan community, but on the contrary to 
afford them certain cultural facilities which will enrich and reward their 
membership. It is the essence of this synthesis between the old concept of 
ethnic community and the new one of national sovereignty that the concept of 
sovereignty undergoes adaptation from its European form. It becomes both in a 
wanse more ambitious (in refusing to accept territorial limits) and yet less 
so, because such external responsibilities and claims as arise are expected to 
be characterised by humanitarian concern, not thrusting chauvinism and the 
seizing of political advantage. District Officers and other educated persons 
seem to find it natural that the Consul should be seen at religious ceremonies
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in the Thai villages, and if asked whether he has any right to look to the 
interests of the Thais, such persons are likely enough to reply that as the. 
PMIP is in power it is good for the Thais that the Consul should be there to 
take an interest. It is humanly desirable and right*
The ready indulgence of pluralism is rather more characteristic of Malaya
within her own territories, certainly, than of Thailand in regard to her
30southern provinces* We have suggested that the Thais benefit indeed from the 
political institutionalisation of pluralism which results from the preponder­
ance of Chinese in the west-coast states of Malaya. In South Thailand too the 
concept of a people is being extended to include Malays. Citizenship is much 
more readily available to Malays there than to the non-Malays in Kelantan.
But it is these ;Malays who are being required to make the big cultural con­
cession (by being called ’Thai1)* not the Thai people (by welcoming 'Malays' 
as fellow nationals)* In Kelantan the minority Thais do not receive the legal 
appellation 'Malay' when they take citizenship but rather 'Malaysian1. Ethnic 
identity in Malaya is respected. In South Thailand (in the Malay view) ethnic 
identity is directly threatened by the equation of legal nationality with race 
to the advantage of the ruling majority.
On the other hand, the Thai government puts a considerable effort into 
the building of mosques in the South and never fails to uphold verbally the 
principle of freedom of religion at least. As to the Thais of Malaya, most 
quarters in Thailand hold it as self-evident that Thais beyond the border will 
retain an orientation to the motherland or kin-state, and that this must call 
into being a sense of responsibility and concern on the part of the latter.
For all that nervousness and clumsiness in Thailand may cause recognition of 
her own southern pluralism to be withheld in some ways, or yielded only under
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pressure, one can nevertheless discern the common principle running through 
attitudes on both sides of the frontier that modern national boundaries are 
not absolute, that primodial cultural orientations should not be suppressed, 
nor the patronage which they call into existence be denied. Nothing illus­
trates this standpoint better than the article by Chawalid Panjaalag referred
31 32to above and the commentary in Phan Eeg Pin's book on Islam.
Phan Eeg Pin has written an eminently moderate and generous account of
the conditions of the Buddhist religion in Malaya, even accusing the Malayan
Thais (unjustly, in this student's experience) of an arrogant refusal to accept
33Malay education. But noting that as a result of a paucity of religious
education (notice this interestingly modern view of Buddhism) there are too
few men able to come forward as leaders of the Kelantan Thais, Phan Eeg Pin
then proceeds disarmingly to describe the new Thai Consul at Kota Bharu, Naai
Wicheed Suthayakhom as perfectly cast for the role:
"When one has contemplated the fate of the Thais in Malaysia one 
cannot help but think that the initiative of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs in establishing a Consulate at Kota Bharu will cause great 
delight among the Thais of that State. It will have the effect of 
giving them a moral boost in exactly the right way and just at the 
right time, especially as Naai Wicheed Suthayakhom, the present Con­
sul, is highly fitted to the duties of the office. He is a man of 
diligence and compassion, full of charity and generosity towards 
his fellow Thais, a thoroughly praise-worthy person." 34
Further on, Phan Eeg Pin praises monks who go to Malaya and Singapore to
establish wats, because - while creating international understanding - they
35allow Thais to uphold the dignity of their race and religion. ThtBs sort 
of effort is highly commendable and deserves the support of Thailand. But 
support should not be undiscriminating. In Kelantan there is far more need of 
Thai education than of funds for temple construction.-^
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Chawalid Panjaalag, in some ways more pragmatic than Phan Eeg Pin, points 
out the limitations of the consular role, but identifies with insight the cen­
tral importance of the wat in the community life of the ICelantan Thai. He 
dismisses the idea that the Consul should accept responsibilities for their 
leadership, and reasons that a corps of young volunteers from Thailand, to 
assist the community, might not conduct themselves with the decorum and maturity 
necessary to win the confidence and respect of old-fashioned country folk.
Given, however, the well-established pattern of invitations to monks to come and 
teach religion, Chawalid proposes that monies trained in agricultural techni­
ques and community development should be invited to Kelantan to help the Thai
villages improve their standards of life. He is confident that the government
37of Malaysia would concur in such a project.
Yet notwithstanding the considerable tolerance towards outside involvement, 
especially in Malayan circles, there is certainly a point in the development 
of any issue - a point never exactly predictable - where tolerance and patience 
will give way to impatience and obstruction. Naai Chawalid rejected the idea
of a lay 'Peace Corps' only on the grounds of their youth. He cannot be aware
that the Malayan Ministry of Rural Development has already refused to counten­
ance the plan of one of its expatriate advisers to survey the Thai economy of
38Kelantan with the help of a team of Thai students from Bangkok, Perhaps the 
combination of two foreign nationalities in the proposal was what tipped the 
balance towards a posture of conventional nationalist rigidity in this case.
Be this as it may, the posture of indulgence is not without limits, even on 
the Malayan side. Thailand is particularly bound by the circumstances of her
policy in her Malay areas to have a lower threshold of tolerance than Malaysia
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to outside concern. The involvement of certain Malay nationalist interests
(not excluding interests within the orbit of the ruling party, such as the
paper Utusan Melayu) poses a latent threat to the stability of the southern
39
provinces at all times. The Thai Ministry of Interior at least, by its
statements and warnings, clearly regards many manifestations of Malayan con-
40cern as having exceeded the acceptable limits.
We consider now a development on the Thai side which appears to be 
initiated with a view to restoring the balance of advantage somewhat in Thai­
land ’s favour, and which would certaihly be unacceptable to the Malaysian 
government if fully publicised. But acts blatently antipathetic to sover­
eignty can grow imperceptibly out of acts reflecting moral concern. Some acts
41are inherently ambiguoiis. Above all, the standards by which such things are 
judged are poorly defined: this is a moral environment perfectly structured
for interests seeking outright nationalist advantage. Another analysis of 
Thai and Malay orientation to their related minorities beyond the borders could 
be in terms of the plurality of nationalism: some parts of government and
society are more ready to exceed the locally acceptable limits than others.
But apart from any innate tendency to go to extremes, the ThaiB Ministry of 
Interior has adequate reason to try to secure the position in the South against 
Malayan provocation, by making a comparable issue out of the ICelantan Thai 
question. In due course Malaysia may find herself not only moved by a notion 
of reciprocity to tolerate the.augmented Thai involvement in Kelantan, but 
may even feel it in her interests to keep a tighter hand on her own excesses 
of involvement in Patani, to remove the excuse for Thailand*s activities in 
Kelantan. The limits of tolerance and sovereignty would by then have become
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much more explicit and indeed stricter, and the relations of the two countries 
would have entered a phase of more orthodox relations between two sovereign 
states.
The ideological unity and common interest against Communism which are a 
self-evident condition for the tolerance of outside concern towards minorities, 
also form the background to the appointment of a Thai Consul to Kota Bharu on 
21 February 1966. There is much business connected with border security that 
a Consul can handle. But one should also take note of the exceptionally good 
relations between Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok at the present time owing to 
Thailand's readiness to maintain a friendly neutrality during Indonesian Con­
frontation - culminating in the mediation which brought Confrontation to an 
official end at Bangkok in June 1966. It is possibly due to Confrontation 
and Thailand's friendly attitude towards Malaysia that there has been no later 
official statement as nearly provocative and interventionist as the Tengku's 
of May 1961. The goodwill of Thailand towards Malaysia has been too vital 
to set at risk. The establishment of a Consulate on the east coast is likewise 
open to interpretation as a benefit to Thailand arising from Malaysia's crisis 
and Thailand's attitude to it. The Straits Times ignored both the appointment
of Naai Wichet from Kuala Lumpur (21 February 1966) and the official opening
42of the Consulate on 30 April 1966. But Malaysia's motives for granting the 
Consulate are of less concern here than those of Thailand in seeking it.
The first activity of the Consulate that came to the author's attention 
after he took up residence at Semerak (October 1966) was a secret survey of 
Thai population,land and livestock. This had1 been carried out by an incon­
spicuous Kelantan Thai, staying two or three days in all Thai villages and
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hamlets of Kelantan, Although the results of this brief enquiry must have 
been grossly inaccurate - for no Thai knows the acreage of his land except 
in the few districts where a recent land survey has produced a series of 
tracings for every land-owner - the author assumed that the purpose was to 
assess need and eligibility among individual families for plots on the pioneer 
colonies of Narathiwat. It was believed among Malay nationalists and Patani 
exiles in Kelantan that the Consul would be concerned primarily to recruit 
Thais to the Narathiwat population and to check on the movement of undesir­
able nationalist elements back and forth between Kelantan and Narathiwat,
(if you believe the Alliance is capable of any infamy, it is by no means in­
credible that Kuala Lumpur would collaborate in the Thai strategy for South 
Thailand), The author is still of the opinion that the secret survey was 
related to the Thai migration policy, not to any search for a propaganda issue - i 
for one of the Consul's major preoccupations is certainly recruitment of mi­
grants, Indeed he came to advertise the 'nikhom' at Maalaj village even be­
fore his move from Kuala Lumpur; and he collected names at Sambbrag not long 
after his posting, as a petition from that village had been forwarded to the 
Kuala Lumpur embassy in 1965 by the Chief Abbot of Kelantan, The only reason 
for doubt about the motive of the secret survey was presented by a remarkable 
rexoort which appeared in The Straits Times in November 1966, This axopeared 
at first to have such an exclusively propagandist inspiration that a similar 
interpretation suddenly seemed possible for the survey. The outcome of the 
author's investigation, described below, was however that the report was con­
nected, if somewhat involvedly, with the migration policy, although certainly 
having a propagandist function as well. We will examine first the background
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to the Consul's role in migration policy, and then continue with the question
of propaganda function. (Both, of course, relate to the security of the Thai
South. The further general function of establishing the Thais' dependence
upon the Consulate or their orientation to Thailand is probably shared - in
view of their secular, bureaucratic sponsors - by the revivalist monks.)
The security of the South in Thai policy depends partly on filling it
with more Thais. This is objectionable to Malay ethnic sentiment whatever
the source of the settlers and to official self-respect if Malaya is made one
43of the recruiting grounds. The Consul has denied that Thailand aims to
bring up Thai numbers in the South, pointing out the folly of acting as if
racial ratios counted. If this principle were accepted, West Malaya would
have to be handed over to the Chinese, and Patani, for the time being, to
the Malays. But Kunstadter, in a note to a passage on resettlement, remarks:
"Thailand has not embarked on deliberate policy of resettlement of 
the population in minority areas for purposes of control, but some 
of the resettlement and development projects (nikhom), especially 
those associated with relocation of populations in areas affected 
by dams, have had this effect,..." 44
The Thai Government's own publication on the self-help colonies is even more 
45explicit.
There are now two nikhom near Sungai Golok, one established about six 
years ago, Nikhom Wddng, another established in 1966, Nikhom Suung, Professor
46Patayaa Saihoo of Chulalongkorn University has remarked on the anomaly that 
in a Malay area the Malay race cannot enjoy the advantages of these colonies. 
The Consul states that the recruits are people resettled from the barren 
North-east, or any Kelantan Thais who migrate voluntarily after being rejected
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47for Malaysian citizenship. But it is not denied that the recruits are Thais. 
The establishment of a temple in each settlement assists the cultivation of 
civic attributes and social stability which is one aim of the nildiom since 
their inception in 1940. But this marks them as Thai in every way. Under the 
land laws of Kelantan, as now operated, Kelantan offers a ready pool of Thais 
for recruitment. There is scarcely a village which has not seen a member 
migrate to the nikhom at some time in the past five years. The village with 
the worst land problem, Maalaj, sent forty families in 1966 as a result of 
Naai Wichet's advertisement.
The newspaper report of November which provoked the question whether the 
Consul didn't have some darker motive for his land and population survey, read 
as follows %
Malaysian or Thai Citizens? 5.000 don't know 
by Padman Copal. Kota Bharu, Mon.
"More than 5*000 people in Kelantan do not know whether they are 
Malaysian or Thai citizens. These people, scattered all over the 
State, have approached the Thai Consul here to use his good offices 
to obtain new land from the Gentral Government for farming. Now 
all have been politely told they are not Thai subjects. They cannot 
seek assistance from the Malaysian Government because as far as the 
Malaysian Government is concerned they are Thai Subjects.
The Thai Consul, Mr. Wichet Suthaya Khom, confirmed today that ever 
since the consulate was established six months ago he had been 
approached by hundreds of people who complained that they did not 
have enough land for farming. He said: "There are about 12,000
Malaysians of Thai origin all over the State and about half of them 
are regarded by the Malaysian Government as Thai subjects. Our 
problem is that of these red identity card holders about were 
born in Kelantan. Most of them have never set foot on Thai soil.
Their ancestors had been living in Kelantan before the British came 
to Malaya and the land they own now belonged to their great grand 
parents some 80 to 100 years ago. So according to the Thai Nation­
ality Act they are not Thai citizens and cannot be considered as 
such. Almost every day I have these people coming to me for help
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and I have had to explain the difficult position to them. We 
sympathise with them but legally we cannot accept them as Thai 
citizens. So these people are faced with a problem of being 
stateless. X have raised the matter with our Embassy in Kuala 
Lumpur and I am confident the Malaysian and Thai governments 
will be working out an amicable solution to the problem.1 48
Observe the almost unanswerable jibe about Malaysia making aliens out
of its own people by the red card system. The Consul knows full well that
the Malaysian law does not regard its red card holders as being necessarily
foreign citizens, but nothing could serve the purposes of propaganda better.
He also knows that even when the Thais get nationality the Central Government
will not be able to help them; the land problem is due to the special
political conditions in Kelantan.
The Straits Times with exquisite but characteristic condescension explained
the error of these "unfortunate people" but seemed itself to be in deep water
legally where it suggested that the law. on citizenship was so hopeless to its
tasks that it would have to be changed. (Note the willingness to entertain
Bangkok's concern and even consult the Thai government about people who "for
most practical purposes...are Malaysians.")
Stateless People
"About 6,000 people in Kelantan have recently found themselves to 
be stateless persons. Till a Thai consulate was established in 
Kota Bharu which could gently tell them otherwise, they had thought 
themselves Thai nationals. But the Consul has had to explain that they 
were not born in Thailand and that no amount of sympathy can change 
the law by which Bangkok determines citizenship. But neither are 
these people Malaysians, as they carry the red identity cards of non­
citizens. Thus through no fault of their own they have no country, 
a condition which,sets them apart from all other racial groups in 
Malaysia,
There seems to be a clear case for federal action to help these 
people. As there is no question of dual citizenship arising, as 
the Thai government has made its position clear, and as for most
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practical purposes they are Malaysians, a special legislative 
initiative would be both humane and realistic. Bangkok would 
need to be consulted, of course, (and so would the unfortunate 
people themselves) but it is hard to imagine any difficulties 
arising. This would not help the people get land in Kelantan,
* the issue which took them to the Thai consul in the first place, 
but it could offer something much more valuable." 49
The next day, the Malaysian Prime Minister was questioned at his post­
cabinet press conference. 'Normal' considerations of self-preservation 
might have been expected to lead someone at Kuala Lumpur to check on the 
Consul's figure of"about 12,000 Malaysians of Thai origin", which exceeds 
the 1957 Census figure by a round five and a quarter thousands Tf/o in nine 
years without migration. Even the inflated figure of 50$ stateless should 
have aroused suspicion, Yet the Tengku's comment was that he knew nothing 
about it, but was going to investigate and find a solution for this undesir­
able situation. "Perkara ini tidak harus di-benarkan berlaku. Mereka tidak
2 50boleh di-benarkan terapong tanpa negara,"
Bangkok's reaction was to appoint a committee of the Foreign Affairs
Ministry to which the Consul was summoned for questioning about the status
and needs of the Kelantan Thais. By December 20 the Thai government had taken
51the position that: "Malaysians of Thai descent are not Thai nationals..!"
but that the Thai government "could ask the Malaysian government to request
52
the state government to give consideration to the request of these persons," 
Although the setting up of a committee on the question had seemed at the time 
to be the second step in a concerted propaganda exercise, the matter petered 
out quickly but for an accusation by the Minister of the Interior in February 
1967 that relief rice donated to the Malaysian government after the great flood
was not given to the Thais of Kelantan as to other races. "Malaysian citizens
of Thai descent living in Kelantan have been discriminated against and are not
53receiving equal rights like Malaysians of other racial origins."
If there was to be a government-inspired press campaign no worse time 
could have been chosen for it, with the King's birthday following on the heels 
of the announcement of the committee, and then the Bangkok Games. The Bangkok 
Post. Phim Thai. Thai Rat. Daily Hews and Sayam Nikorn carried reports on 17 
or 18 November of The Straits Times report of 15 November, without comment, 
but mostly selecting and stressing the shortage of land and livelihood. On 
December 2 only Bangkok Post and Savant Rat, and on December 3 Sayam Nikorn. 
carried a statement by the Foreign Ministry announcing the committee of enquiry. 
The only person, ironically, to comment sympathetically about the Kelantan 
Thais was the eminent Kukri t Pramoj of Sa.vam Hat - a man who abhors all ex­
cesses of natiohalism and is a thorn in the government's side for this very 
reason. By coincidence he was running a travelogue of a recent tour from 
Ceylon through Singapore to North-west Malaya, when the news about the Kelantan 
Thais was current. On December 3 he wrote of a meeting with Tengku Abdul 
Rahman in Kedah and concluded as follows:
"I think I can say that my feelings in coming to stay at the house 
of my distant relative (Tengku Abdul Rahman) were persistent and 
irresistible feelings of pride and delight to see him having his 
own little house and being able to live there happily. And when I 
thought this way, all I wanted was to wish on all my brethren 
across the border prosperity in greater measure still. I had 
never thought that these junior relatives ought to respect their 
more senior kinsmen and accept their opinion on every single 
matter. Far less did X ever think it fitting to 'knock down the 
fences' and absorb us all into one family.
As a matter of fact in Kedah and other states of North Malaya there 
are people of Thai race, in considerable numbers. A large propor­
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tion of them are Malaysians, having equal rights with Malaysians 
of all other races, enjoying security in their general livelihood, 
in their religion, and in their culture, exactly like other Malay­
sians. There is not a single matter which should give rise to any 
trouble. Now we Thais, whatever the circumstances, will always be 
Thais. Even if we had to use the language of Malaysia to have 
communication with other people, and on government business, in 
our own homes we should go on speaking Thai with each other. As 
to our religion, we should certainly continue to be Buddhists,
The only way those Thais (of Kedah) will be able to live happily 
is through their conviction that they must call themselves Malay­
sians and show loyalty to the Paramount Ruler and the Malaysian 
people, without any feeling or suspicion of being anything else,
I write all this because I have come to understand that there are 
certain Thais who stupidly think of themselves as a Great Power 
and like to take a trip round Malaysia; and when they come across 
Thais there, they get excited and say or do things which produce 
doubts in their listener's mind which nation he does belong to.
Now this sort of behaviour is rather contrary to a sense of res­
ponsibility and cannot be of profit to anyone whatsoever.
Very recently there was news that there are as many as 5000 Thais 
in Kelantan who are faced with the problem of having no land to 
find their food. When they went to petition for land from the 
Malaysian government, it then came to light that these Thais have 
not become registered as Malaysian citizens according to the correct 
legal procedure* I wonder whatever these people were at when 
Malaysia got its independence for the first time! When this prob­
lem arose these 5000 Thais came and complained to the Thai Consul 
in Kelantan, asking him to help, but the Thai Consul is not com­
petent to help at all because, according to Thai law, these 5000 
Malaysian-born Thais are not in fact Thais anymore. However, 
judging by what I have gathered, there is good reason to believe 
that the Malaysian government has a benevolent and sympathetic 
attitude to all these Thais and that it will be possible to resolve 
and overcome this problem for their good and welfare. Of this there 
need be no doubt." 54
If it is ironical that the anti-chauvinist Kukrit should be the only 
editor to give the matter a slightly sympathetic word, more ironical still is 
the editorial of Kietisak on December 5 - a paper characterised by many as of
'the sensational type'. The logic of the original is extremely difficult to
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follow. But the following paraphrase in the Bangkok Post column "What the 
Papers Say" gives perhaps a fair impression, including the editorfs dismissal 
of the Thais' complaints as a fiction of The Straits Times. From a reading 
of the original it appears that the writer is afraid that it is a case of 
interests in Malaysia trying to disturb the good relations between Malays 
and Thais in South Thailand, because he stresses how Malays and Thais trade 
together and live harmoniously, as brothers.
Malaysia Distorts Reports 
by Tee Mahapaurya
"Kiettisak yesterday said in its editorial that the problem of 
the Thai Islamic people in Malaysia's Kelantan State would not 
have gained such magnitude had not the Malaysian newspapers 
publicised it. That problem should not become an international 
affair, the paper said, because those people had been residents 
of the state for generations and are not concerned about any 
special rights or privileges, it said. It is regrettable that 
the Malaysian papers should see fit to publicise any news over 
this problem, it was said. This may lead only to more misunder­
standing. As for the Thai people, although it is known that 
Kelantan used to be a part of Thailand, Thais still feel that 
Islamic people are brothers, and inseparable, it was added. The 
Malaysian newspaper reports may aggravate the matter rather than 
improving the situation, Kiettisak opined,
St also questioned Thai government involvement in the matter in the 
joint special committee. It said it did not understand what will 
be the benefits of such action. The proposition of moving these 
people back within Thai territory is out of the question, it was 
stated. Kiettisak said although the matter seemed to come to a 
head with the reports in the Malaysiannewspapers, it expressed 
the hope that the Thai, and Malaysian governments would not hold 
this matter as an international dispute between the two countries 
because it belonged to the past and should not concern the present, 
it was said." 55
The Kiettisak writer is aware, like Kukrit, of the dangerous possibilities 
in this kind of issue, but it may be surmised that he was kept from steering 
too close to the .reef himself only because he couldn’t believe that there are
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true Thais in ICelantan. No eloquence could speak as clearly as this sad 
muddle for the lack of any government inspiration. The Thai government's 
facile belittlement of racial distinction, when it calls the Malays of the 
South 1 Islamic Thai', has rebounded against the true Thai of the deeper South, 
who are conceived here as nothing more nor better than a Malay variant. The 
Kiettisak editorial neither serves the purposes of would-be propaganda against 
Malaysia (The Straits Times excepted!) nor does it even convey the ostensible 
Foreign Ministry position that the Consul is faced with a genuine but unsol­
icited problem which can best be disposed of by going into the facts.
The author was privileged to obtain two interviews at the Foreign Ministry 
56in September 1967. His assumption prior to these interviews was that there 
was an ostensible and a real reason for the setting up of the December 1966 
committee. As it was not clear, however, what the real reason really was, 
access to the Ministry was sought so as to elicit, if possible, an answer in 
this respect* Certainly after the complete lack of a propaganda campaign had 
become apparent from a reading of the press, the hypothesis of propaganda 
motive no longer exerted much attraction. But enquiries in Kelantan in the 
intervening months had in fact produced another hypothesis, which the Foreign 
Ministry encounters might help to confirm.
The most surprising element in the Consul's original statement to the 
press was the claim that hundreds of Thais had approached him within six months 
of the opening of the Consulate, to ask for help in obtaining land in Malaya. 
Although the Thais hold that the Consul can and should use his good offices on 
their behalf in various ways, it was a surprising claim that the Consulate had
been besieged by hundreds of voluntary petitioners from the countryside. The
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Consulate is not located on one of the roads which Thais travel to reach 
Kota Bharu. Country folk do not naturally incur the expense and trouble of 
a trip to the capital without a clear knowledge of their destination and the 
certainty that on the day of their visit their business will be dealt with.
How could such numbers have made the journey to the newly-opened Consulate 
without some special information and inspiration?
In due course it became apparent that the Consul was in the habit of
summoning Thais to his office in connection with, notably, recruitment to the
colonies in Narathiwai. It seemed that the Consulate had indeed received many
visits from local Thais, but neither to petition for land in Malaya nor on
purely rustic initiative. Why then the misleading statement to the press?
Propaganda was certainly served by it, but the function of smoke-screen to
57 mthe illicit side of the consular role seemed increasingly plausible. The 
Consul had gone to some lengths to convince the reporter from the Straits Times 
of the genuineness of his story, and the reporter, Padman Gopal, probably be­
lieved it himself, even while realising that the Consul was anxious that the 
story should not be known to have been inspired. (Copal x-ras called to the 
Consulate to meet four men of Baan Jaamuu, but told, the author, when asked in 
December, that these four men had approached him at the Straits Times office, 
whereupon he had interviexred the Consul in order to verify their story.)
The meeting with the Consul and the four Jaamuu men had been carefully 
■ 58stage-managed. , The four farmers were men who had been short-listed, at the 
request of the Consul, by their abbot, for plots at Nikhom Suung. They were 
attending the Consulate on a pre-arranged date in November 1966 to make arrange­
ments about their move to South Thailand, The abbot of Jaamuu led them to 
the Consulate as they didn't know the way. Only one of these men had a red 
card, the other three were Malaysian citizens. The Consul took away these 
three blue cards and retained them till after the meeting with the reporter. 
However, the men did not realise that the man talcing notesvas a newspaper man; 
the Consul spoke to him in English; and the would-be state-less petitioners 
for land in Kelantan were hardly required to say anything or answer any ques­
tions.
The aim of the interviews at the Foreign Ministry, then, was to try to 
establish whether the Consul's report and the committee of the Ministry had 
been designed to screen the use of the Consulate as a recruiting centre rather 
than - but not excluding - to create propaganda. The manifest motive: to get 
to the bottom of an unsolicited problem was not held to be plausible before 
the interviews took place. The first interview was with Prachaa KhanaJ Keesom 
of the Information Department. He was a member of the December Committee which 
had sat on the problem. He gave an impression of very considerable astuteness; 
his answers were diplomatically perfect: to the point and not apparently
evasive. But they reiterated the official reason for the establishment of the 
committee, and their very virtuosity (he had had no warning of the interview) 
left the author with doubts of the Foreign Ministry's sincerity. The gist of 
the interview, written up a few hours later, is as follows:
K.: What has the committee decided?
P.: Well, we discovered that the situation in Kelantan is due to the
Kelantan government, not the Tengku's government. Anyway, there 
is no cause for action, because these people cannot under any cir­
cumstances be considered Thai citizens.
K*: If this is so obvious, why did the Consul make the statement
to the press, and why did you appoint the committee in the 
first place?
P.: The Consul did not volunteer his statement - a reporter came and
asked him. Whenever there are people making a lot of complaints 
the press tends to hear of it.
K,: Wasn't there a risk that the Malaysian Government would accuse
you of interference?
P.: If ever any little problem did arise between us, we could
settle it immediately on the golf course. There would be no 
public recriminations. We have absolutely excellent contact 
with Razak and Mohamad Ghazali Shafie. But of course we for 
our part would never do anything that could lead to misunder­
standings. Our committee was established just to find out the 
facts.
But any suspicion that Prachaa Khana* Keesom might be willing to conceal 
any matter was allayed by his cordial invitation to seek out the officer in 
charge of the Malaysia desk. This officer was Naai Suwat. The author felt 
that Naai Suwat was reminding himself intermittently that as a diplomat he 
should not be too open with enquirers; there were moments in this 50 minute 
discussion when there seemed to be some suppression, some sticking to an 
official story as opposed to a known, real, one. But these moments were inter­
mittent and striking only for the contrast they afforded with Naai Swat's 
quite ' undiplomatic1 personality. He gave his time beyond the call of courtesy 
or duty, and was frank even when trying to be guarded. He talked freely for 
minutes at a stretch. His thoughts were not all easy to follow in English.
He may not have grasped the meaning of all the author's questions at once, and
59the interview as reported is more structured than in reality. Only the last 
sentence of Suwat's is verbatim, because unforgettable.
K.: It seems to me that Thailand has been taking some interest
in the Kelantan Thais. Why is this?
S.: Well, we are Thais and they are Thais. It is natural for
us to feel some moral obligation towards them. They came
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from our country originally and. now they find themselves in 
Malaysia.
K.: Is the Committee still in existence?
S. s There is no committee.
IC.: But the committee which was announced in the press last December?
S.s Ho, not now....well, that committee still exists really, it 
hasn't been disbanded. It can meet again if necessary.
K,: What was the committee's conclusion?
S.: Principally that this is Malaysia's problem, and that the 
special political conditions in Kelantan have given rise 
to it. It is not Thailand's business. But perhaps you can 
tell me something about the situation in Kelantan. Will the 
PMIP win the next election? How, in your view, does PMIP 
rule affect the Thais, and what about their attitude to 
Patani?
K.: The prospects of the PMIP in Kelantan are still good, but
you have nothing to worry about from the Malaysian Government - 
the agitation on Patani will remain an opposition thing, and 
even there subject to strict surveillance by the Alliance 
government. As for the Thais, the problem arises because PMIP 
won't give land for rent or for alienation to non-Malays - 
nationality is not the crux of it. But who informed your com­
mittee about the special conditions in Kelantan - Wichet?
S.s Yes.
K.: If Wichet knew so well about the situation why did he raise 
the question in the first place?
S.: The issue was forced on him, really, by the flood of people 
coming to his office. That's why we have not finally closed 
the question: that is, we cannot say these people are no
concern at all of ours. If they come and plead for help you 
cannot turn them away. Yet we have to be careful not to 
appear to interfere with Malaysian affairs. What do you think?
K.: I think it is admirable that Thailand takes this humanitarian 
view. On the other hand if the Consul helps them as much as 
he is doing, getting them nationality, sending them to the 
nikhom, he will make them think of themselves as Thais even 
more, and then it will be more difficult for them to find 
their place in Malaysia.
S.: But excuse me, the Consul is not helping the Thais in the way 
you say.
K.: But he is recruiting settlers for the Hikhom.
S.: Ho not now. 5 years ago the embassy at Kuala Lumpur took the 
names of Kelantan Thais who applied of their own free will.
How they cannot apply to anyone in Malaysia. If they want to 
get a place at a nikhom they must go to live in Thailand first 
and apply there. Of course we cannot prevent them coming across 
and nor can the Malaysian government stop them from leaving.
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IC.: I feel rather embarrassed to inform you about what Wichet 
is doing....
S.: What is Wichet doing? Please mention it.
K.: I hope that you will not mention to him that I told you.
S.: Wo, no, no.
K,: Well, he has actively recruited settlers round the villages 
and the Thais go to his office to put down their names.
S.: Wot now, I think. That was five years ago, but not now.
IC.: May I ask you, could the Consul be asked to cooperate with 
the Minister of Interior in getting people for the nikhom?
S.: He's a very important man. (Waai Suwat's actual words, 
spoken reluctantly.)
The author parted from; Waai Suwat with the conviction that this officer
had not known about the recruitment in Kota Bharu. It was a conviction owing
much to intuition, but observers at the University confirmed that it was quite
in the order of things in the Thai bureaucracy for the Interior Ministry to be
60working at cross-purposes with the rest and without their knowledge.
Professor Jacques Amyot pointed out that the Minister of:Interior, General 
Prapart, besides Police, Interior, and the primary schools, has many foreign 
appointments in his hand. (The Consul in Kelantan had indeed held a* military 
rank.) Even if the author was deceived by Mr. Suwat, the result is much the 
same. The Interior Ministry's policy is not in line with Thailand's inter­
national policy on the southern side. If the Foreign Ministry knew about this, 
they would certainly have liked to forget it.
What has been shown in this account is that Thailand has two postures on 
the Kelantan Thai question. That explains why the appointment of the committee 
in Bangkok was not the second step in a campaign against Malaysia. The Foreign 
Ministry and the Prime Minister are firmly wedded to friendship with Malaysia. 
By contrast, the Interior Ministry seems capable of making use of the Kelantan 
Thais. The Consul's first statement showed good propaganda sense, and the
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Interior Minister used flood relief blatently for the same end. But the 
primary purpose of the Consul's statement does seem to have been to screen 
his recruiting activities from the public view - and perhaps from the view 
of his Ministry as well, so that the Committee was set up quite sincerely 
for the purpose of fact-finding.
It is -understandable that the Interior Ministry, which has to control 
the situation in the South if the Malays get out of hand, is the least likely 
to take an optimistic view of what might come out of Malaya in the future, 
particularly from its press and nationalistic elements. The Interior Ministry 
under its military boss is like a Thai counterpart to the watchdogs of Malay 
nationalism, Utusan Melayu and the PMIP, although the Kel&ntan Thais are 
probably too small and forgotten a community to excite genuine emotions of 
sympathy in that quarter of the bureaucracy. Their existence is merely use­
ful in the context of southern security. (Such a conclusion is enhanced by 
the very unsympathetic personal attitude of the Consul himself to the Kelantan 
Thais.)
But why has the advantage not been further exploited? The ignorance and 
indifference of the Thai press could easily be overcome but it is likely that 
the Interior fears that over-propagandising this issue could stir up annoyance 
in the Malay press and have a rebound in new unrest in South Thailand, The 
Kelantan Thai issue, once created, is best kept as a card in reserve, to be 
played defensively. The situation in the South dictates a defensive approach 
at this stage of nation-building. Furthermore, if Malay resentment were pro­
voked the illicit activities of the Consul - which it was probably the prior 
aim of the tactic to conceal - might come under scrutiny, and the strategy in
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the South receive a set-back on the migration front. Calm, and assimilation,
are the priorities in the South. For the time being propaganda, if overdone,
would defeat these ends.
The recruitment of Thais for the nikhom is already an intrusion into
Malaysian sovereignty but the Consul seems to be working out a yet more
grandiose long-term design, namely, to establish the Consulate as the natural
focus of the Kelantan Thais' dependence (phyng), the Consul or the Thai state
61as their primary patron. If loyalty is successfully kindled the future may 
see (a) spontaneous migration from Kelantan, unconnected with the nikhom; 
while (b) the Thais remaining in Kelantan would have been transformed into a 
sphere of extra-territorial influence of the Thai government, a 'constituency' 
to be exploited in the overall southern context as desired, and on a more 
ambitious scale than the propaganda to date has hinted. What is astonishing 
to the outside observer is the extent to which the Malaysian government not 
merely overlooks but cooperates in this enterprise. The Alliance government, 
pressed by the Alliance Party of Kelantan for some little time past to inter­
vene in the procedures which were obstructing citizenship for the Thais, only 
took earnest cognizance of the question after the Consul's press statement in
November 1966. No legislative changes were made (as The Straits Times pro- 
62posed) but a no less radical departure was undertaken in giving the Consul 
forms of application for citizenship by registration and forms for the late 
registration of birth. (This was without the knowledge of the Federal Regis-
\63
trar in Kelantan, who alone is entitled to issue forms under the known rules.; 
Even those Thais who succeed in achieving Malaysian citizenship through the 
Consul will say that it was the Consul who did it, not 'the Malays*. But a
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far more significant class are those who went to the Consulate early in 1967
and heard it from the Consul's own mouth that no one, not even he, could
achieve citizenship for them, because they were without birth certificates
or some other means of establishing birth in Kelantan. The Consul has not
taken upon himself to peddle Malaysian naturalisation, and it seems plausible
that while acting on behalf of the Malaysian government and Alliance Party to
get one group of Thais registered as citizens (and so onto the voting rolls),
he is isolating for his own ends another group by dashing their hopes of ever
finding an honourable place in the Malaysian state. A significant proportion
Of this group are, of course, 21-31 year-olds, as was illustrated at Chapter
64-IV, and a desirable acquisition to Thailand if they chose to migrate. To
ensure that Thais of both groups - registrable and naturalisable red-card
holders who had no application in process of consideration through the normal
channels - would make the trip to the Consulate, the Consul in March 1967 let
it be known throughout the Thai villages that if red-card holders did not get
a blue card soon, they would be fined $100. But this was a gross misrepres-
65entation of Malaysian policy.
On his visits to villages the Consul affects an authority in the Thais' 
affairs, and responsibility for their conduct, whose intention is unambiguous. 
At Jung Kaw he spoke to the assembled villagers and told them that as Thais 
in a foreign state they had a duty to behave decorously and in conformity with 
local law. At Khaw Joon he left his card with the widow of the late Naaj and 
told her to come to his office if ever any Malay clerk gave her trouble. The 
secret survey of land and live-stock was the first ever done with a view to
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helping the Thais. The Consulate is now the clearing house for Ministry of 
Education funds for temples and wat schools. The school of Pali opened in 
1967 at B9psamed was set on foot by the Consulate. Itineraries of preachers 
are now fixed by the Consulate and the Consul always makes an appearance at 
the inauguration of new buildings which were constructed with Thai funds.
This bold bid for the Thais' allegiance is being made with the partial 
connivance of Kuala Lumpur, but the Consul is also much assisted by the 
popular and official view-point in Kelantan that the Consul's attendance at 
Thai wats, so far as not religiously motivated, is proper to the office of 
one to whom people of Thai descent are hound by a common language and religion. 
This view is strong among moderates in the state's district 'administration.
(As for PMIP intellectuals, if they are not in touch with all the Consul's 
latest moves, they foresaw them in principle before he took up his post; but 
protest could lead to an angry Thai reaction in Patani and disturb the sur­
face calm which the secessionists need, as much as the Thai government, while
66their strategy matures. ) The Consul has little active competition from the 
district administration for the 'hearts and minds' of the Thais. He was the 
first and only representative of any government to inspect the irreparable 
flood damage at Samdbrag after the disaster of January 1967*
The first consequence for the Kelantan Thai of their becoming an inter­
national issue is likely to be that the government in Kuala Lumpur will take 
more notice of their existence and problems than it has been wont to do. But 
as and if the Consulate establishes itself as patron and leader of the Kelantan 
Thai community, not only the minority who are recruited to nikhom, but the
community as a whole, will be subject to a new appeal and pressure to reconsider
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its loyalty. This appeal will augment that exerted by the new monks of 
Thai nationality. Although the monks' appeal is not wholly deliberate or 
conscious on their part, it is unlikely that the Departments subsidising 
their journeys across the border would spend the money without the prospect 
of some political advantage. To this extent the Buddhist revival is not mere­
ly an accidental or 'over-spill* phenomenon in Kelantan, but, like the 
Consular functions, part of the continuing aspiration of Thailand to hegemony 
or influence in the Peninsula. Malayan official indulgence and insouciance 
assist this aspiration and threaten to vitiate the undoubted advantage to 
the integration of a plural society which flows from a policy of tolerance 
towards cultural diversity.
It is inconceivable that true hegemony over Kelantan will ever be res­
tored. The Kelantan Thai are no future fifth column in an irredentist 
situation. Their role is more likely to be instrumental in strengthening Thai 
hegemony further north. Yet whatever the case, they are being faced with an 
alternative to political integration with Malaysia. The following chapter 
will further develop the assessment of the Kelantan Thai response to the 
Thailand option.
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FOOTNOTES
1. See F. C. Jones, Japan's New Order in Asia. London 1954i p.349.
T^engganu, ICedah and Perils were also handed to a Thai administration in
belated fulfilment of the secret conditions of the Japanese-Thai Alliance 
of 21 December 1941.
2. See Sir J. Crosby, "Siamese Imperialism and the Pan-Thai Movement",
Fortnightly. Vol. 153, 1943.
3. The school house erected at Bppsmmed was subsequently handed over to
the Malayan government and is now a Malay 'national-type1 primary school.
The Thai occupation affected the state school system of Kelantan only in 
the addition of Thai to the curriculum, along with Japanese. (English 
had been proscribed completely by the Japanese.) Some Thai teachers were 
brought in to teach the language. No reorganisation could be undertaken 
in such a short period and under conditions of terrible hardship. This 
applied to the state administration too, as officials recall; but they 
too had to study Thai and all correspondence and even verbal communication
was supposed to be in Thai.
4# The mobilisation of Kelantan monies as primary school teachers offers a 
further interesting contrast with the role of the Sangha in modern Thai­
land. (c.p. Chapter VI, notes 6-7 p. 177). Although since the war the
Sangha has been mobilised for new secular purposes, as noted by Mulder
(op.cit.) and de Young (op.cit.), one field where the monks have lost a 
traditional function is education. K.P.Landon noted already in his 
article "The Monks of New Thailand" (Asia. New Hampshire, March 1940) 
that even though the majority of primary schools in 1936-7 were still 
located in wat grounds, they were nearly all under government auspices. 
Thus at the time when the Kelantan Sangha found its educational respon­
sibilities growing, the secularisation of primary education across the 
border, aspired to by King Chulalongkorn, was just reaching fulfilment. 
However, some laymen have also been conducting school classes in Kelantan.
5. There are three other monks of this status in Malaya: the Chief Monk of 
Kedah; the deputy Chief Monk of Kedah; and a special appointee at 
Penang. (The names and addresses of all four are given in the more com­
prehensive type of Sangha desk diary, the Patithinsaadsanaa. published 
annually in Bangkok.) But the Kelantan Thai and the Kelantan Sangha 
have no communication with Kedah, indeed virtually no knowledge of it.
All communication is north-south.
6. His photograph appears in Stuart Wavell, op.cit., as also that of his 
successor,
7. Dates supplied by Enche Tan Ker Liang, "Head of the Thai Community of 
Kelantan".
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8. The Sangha of Kelantan recognises the Sultan's civil authority and 
technically it is by that authority that a new Chief Abbot is appointed.
The Sultan attends the inauguration by invitation of the Sangha and 
listens to a petition that the monks be allowed to proceed to a nomination
and appointment. The Sultan in turn directs that they do so proceed.
The introduction of insignia from Thailand is thus not considered in 
breach of Kelantan sovereignty.
9. The picture that the author has been able to reconstruct of the patterns 
of communication earlier in the century is of long-term Kelantan monks 
spending much more extended periods in South Thailand than they do today, 
while rather few monks from Thailand ever made the journey down to 
Kelantan. In more recent times the trend has reversed, although the 
majority of short-time monies do manage, through improved transport, to 
devote a small part of their time in the Order to a trip into Thailand.
10. In Fai Arab kap Phan Beg Pin Bangkok. 1967s p;100. The author was 
formerly a chaplain to the army, and is now a leading official of the 
Ministry of Education (Department of Religious Affairs). His book is an 
examination of the political and social conditions of Islam in several 
countries, including Malaysia. In the case of Malaysia the state of 
Buddhism is considered extensively.
11. Chawalid Panjaalag, an executive assistant on The Social Science Review, 
Bangkok, writing in the December 1967 number* -under the title
''Khwaamdyadr9pnkhppngkhonchyachaadthajthii kalantan" ("The hardships of 
the people of Thai race in Kelantan") finds such invitations a very sig­
nificant pattern in Kelantan Buddhist life, and a potential basis for 
enlarged activities in the future (see p.71 of his article). For further 
commentary on this article see infra, p.201.
12. Siam Nikorn, February 2 1968.
lj. See J.E. de Young op.cit., p.148. However, the author's friend Aacaan 
Kamol Somwichien finds that Western analyses go too far when they infer 
a complete break with the past in the adoption of civil commitments.
The monk always had a civil role of some sort, as teacher or healer, for 
instance.
14. The author is inadequately informed about the state of affairs in Thailand; 
but it would not be astonishing if the Thai government found that it had 
unleashed, in Buddhist revival, a tiger which was not always willing to 
be ridden by its secular master. Professor Hans-Dieter Evers has sug­
gested to the author (personal communication, April 1968) that the old 
distinction between the Mahaanikaaj and Thammajud sects - long lost ex­
cept in the names owing to the adoption of the Mongkut reforms by the 
whole of the Order - has been revived, with the 'reformed sect* becoming 
the home of a new generation of social reformers. However, while in 
Kelantan the author was not aware of the reformist travellers being associated 
with one sect as against another.
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15. V. Thompson & R. Adloff, op.cit. p.271, writing on Thailand's Buddhist 
revival in 1954.
16. Phra' Silananda, a disciple of Panjaanantha', told the author that these 
young monks were sent up to Bangkok (up to twenty at any one time from 
Malaya) in the hope that they would later take up positions of leadership 
in the community. He regretted that far too many of them took the 
opportunity to settle in Bangkok and gave up all thought of returning
to Malaya.
17* With its own broadcasting unit as well, the Mahaathaad Foundation may
be considered a 'fast-growth' sector in the revivalist field. If one is 
to search for potential centres of independent and even oppositionalist 
reformism, it may not be necessary to look further than this. That the 
government is alert to such a danger may be deduced from the arrest of 
the head of Wat Mahaathaad in 1962, on suspicion of subversive activities, 
by the Sarit government. (However, the foundation stone of the new 
missionary college was laid in July 1967 by the new Prime Minister - as 
the author was informed at Wat Mahaathaad.)
18, E.g. the decree that all men should wear trousers and topees, one of a 
number of measures of the fascist period that Fraser notes as being 
particularly offensive to Malays. (T.M.Fraser Jr., Rusembilan. Cornell 
I960: p.94*) But the measures of the Phibul era fell heavily upon many 
Thai traditions too, Thai chauvinism in the South today is directed 
towards the Malays and, judging by their resistance, is felt by them. The 
author is indebted to M.R.W.Kukrit Pramoj for information about an enor­
mous Buddha statue that it was recently planned to construct in the Malay 
part of Thailand, from the proceeds of a tax on rubber. Rubber is tapped 
by the Malays, who would have had to bear the tax more or less in full. 
Another more general grievance is the terminological tactic of calling the 
Malays thaj isalaam, ostensibly to show that Thai citizenship is for all 
natives of Thailand whatever their religion, but suspected of being a 
means to undermine Malay culture by denying its existence.
19, The Thai may find the Muslim's belief in "God" an oddity. The Malay can 
only regard a Buddhist as an atheist and idolatror. But the underlying 
antipathy is obviously aggravated by a measure like the inclusion of 
Buddhist morals in the curriculum of primary schools (see T.M.Fraser Jr., 
op.cit., p.116) - something that the Thais in Kelantan are spared.
20, See p.205 paragraph 1 infra et seq.
21, This concept is elaborated infra, p. 194.
22, This account of Buddhist aims in the South is the author's interpretation 
of information given to him in the course of a year by some half-dozen 
monies concerned actively with revival. The most explicit statements were
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made by Phra1 Silananda, who accompanied Panjaanantha1 to Sambbrag in 
June 1967, and by a young executive monk at Wat Mahaathaad - Phra* 
Yaanuttaroo - in Bangkok, September 1967.
23* Regrettably the author has been too short a time in Thailand to collect 
evidence with a direct bearing on such a 'Grand Design' behind the 
Buddhist mission in the South. But M.R.W.Kukrit Pramoj and Aacaan 
Patayaa Saihoo in conversation with the author supported his assumptions 
from their own observations.
24. I.e. the concept of a 'Great Tradition* elaborated by Robert Redfield in 
Peasant Society and Culture. Chicago, 1956.
25. In contrast to the unbounded and interpenetrating, yet political systems 
of Burma as described by E.R.Leach in his study "The frontiers of Burma" 
Comparative Studies in Society and History, 3, I960, this posited myang
of the Kelantan Thai is strictly a cultural tradition, a 'Great Tradition'. 
But as Leach points out, there is a common, if misguided, tendency in 
Europe and Asia to equate ethnic groupings retrospectively with political 
systems. Some Kelantan Thais make this mistake, whereas in reality they 
have for centuries been members of the Malay political system, linked 
only indirectly to Bangkok. On the other hand, the Kelantan Thai did 
migrate originally from the Thai political system into the Malay area.
It is not as unwise as it may be in Burma to attribute ethnic distinctions 
to archaic political identities, even if the semi-political identity is 
only re-added at a later date. And even this part of the Malay system 
continued to be attached to the periphery of the Thai system. But what is 
in any case, quite striking about the new sense of bonds to the modem 
Thai state is the parallel with the way Wanyang Chinese identification with 
modern China was rewwakened out of inherited cultural identity at the 
beginning of this century.
26. The Straits Times. 26 June 1962.
27. The Straits Times, 25 June 1962.
28. The Straits Times, 27 June 1962.
29. But at least it is standard practice to write "Warga Negara Malaysia" on
all blue cards in the 'bangsa' space.
30. See Chapter V, p. 141 above.
31. Chawalid Panjaalag, op.cit. The present author believes that this article
may have been commissioned by the editor (Sulak Sivaraks) of Social Science
Review, as a result of the present author drawing his attention to the 
existence of the Buddhist Thai in Kelantan, in September 1967. One does 
not work in a vacuum.
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\ Phan Eeg Pin, op.cit *
35. Phan Eeg Pin, ibid., P.99.
34. Phan Eeg Pin, ibid., p.101.
33. Phan Eeg Pin, ibid., p.105.
56. Phan Eeg Pin, ibid., p.106.
37. Chawalid Panjaalag, op.cit,,
58. The author understands this on the good authority of Professor Jaques 
Amyot, Chulalongkorn University (personal conimunication, August 1967).
59* The Malay propensity to become involved in Patani's affairs was most 
evident, this decade, in 1961, but as recently as 1966, in a period of 
unprecedented good will between the two countries. The Straits Times 
reported under the date line Sungai Patani (Kedah) on 2 July:
"Malaysians were today urged;, not to get themselves involved 
in the separatist movement in South Thailand. The call was made 
by the Minister of Education, Inche Mohammed Khir Johari,,.."
40. E.g. a statement by Police General Luang Chattrakam Kosol, reported by 
The Straits Times July 26 I960, in which he called allegations in the 
Malay press "part of a smear campaign for political purposes"; or the 
report in the Bangkok Post 17 March 1961 entitled "Alert in South during 
Festival" which inter alia stated: "It is generally believed that most 
of the Thai Muslims in the southern provinces are loyal to Thailand but 
certain elements would appear to be under the influence of Malayan mis- 
chief makers," Thailand could do little about it, which may explain 
why she adopted a conciliatory approach to Malay criticism of her policy 
in South Thailand at this time: c.p. the press conference given by 
General Luang Chattrakam at Kuala Lumpur on 5 August i960 (see The 
Straits Times 4 August I960), However, one advantage accruing from 
Thailand's restrained reaction may have been that the Malayan authorities 
felt bound to show a certain reciprocity (as well as spontaneous indul­
gence) in accommodating the Thai King’s patronage to Thai temples in 
Malaya the next year.
41* A case in point is Tengku Abdul Rahman's speech to the IMHO General
Assembly of 1961, paraphrased in The Straits Times' leader of 8 May 1961, 
A typical passage from the leader: "The Federal Government's leaders are
not without strong sympathy for the desire of the Malays in the four pro­
vinces to live their way of life - as non-Malays in Malaya are allowed 
to live theirs. Tengku Abdul Rahman on Saturday spoke warmly of the love 
the Malays bear for their brethren across the border...What he will not 
do is to engage in courses of action that would undermine Malaya's 
friendly relations with Thailand..."
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42. These dates were obtained from a member of the Consulate staff. Naai
Wichet, of course, was the official who attended the inauguration at 
BangsM.1 in 1965- He had had a brief for east coast affairs while at 
Kuala Lumpur.’
43* At an interview granted to the author by the Consul in December 1966.
44* P. Kunstadter, op.cit,, Introduction, p.7.
45. See Thailand, Department of Social Welfare: Self-Help Land Settlement
in Thailand, Bangkok, 1964, which gives the following types of project 
under the National Economic Development Plans
"(a) Ordinary Self-Help Land Settlement Project
(b) Land Settlement for the Hill Tribes
(c) project for Resettlement of People in Some Areas
(1) Project for Resettlement of people displaced by the 
construction of the Bhumipol Dam, Hod, Chiengmai;
(2) Project for Resettlement of people displaced by the 
Nam Pong Project, Khon Kan;
(3 ) Project for Resettlement of people displaced by the Lam 
Pao Project.
(4) Project for Removal of people into Provinces along the 
southern Border.
46. Personal communcation, September 1967.
47* The truth is that Malaysian citizens are accepted too. Three out of the 
four pioneers met by the Straits Times reporter in the incident described 
at page 214 infra, were citizens. Malaysian citizens can get government 
help for their private rubber holdings in Narathiwat. Thais from 
Kelantan can even move freely in South Narathiwat without border passes.
48. The Straits Times, 15 November 1966.
49. The Straits Times, (leader), 1§ November 1966,
50. Berita Harian, 17 November 1966, "This matter ought not to be allowed to 
go on. We can't let them drift along without a nationality."
51. Prime Minister Thanat Khoman, quoted in The Straits Times 21 December 1966.
52. Bangkok Post, 20 December 1966,
53. The Straits Times, 2 February 1967.
54* Savam Rat, 3 December 1966, The author acknowledges gratefully the help 
of Aacaan Kamol Somwichien in the translation of parts of this passage.
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55* Bangkok Post, 6 December 1966
56. These were arranged through the influence of Dr. Puey Uhgphakom, whose 
generous help to the author while in Bangkok must here be acknowledged.
57. The Consul may have feared that the Malay staff of the Consulate might
have become suspicious and make complaints outside.
58. As Copal had identified to the author the village from which his inform­
ants came, it was an easy matter to seek them out and compare their story 
of events with Gopal's. (in spite of the 'stage-management' the first 
initiative in the Jaamuu involvement in the nikhom question had come from 
one Caw Need of that village, who had made a petition for nikhom land to 
the Consul; this led to the Consul's request for a short-list, A 
Samdbrag man had also taken the first initiative on behalf of his village 
in this matter: see p. 204 above.)
59* Apart from the fact that the author's records of the interviews are not
complete accounts of all that was said, this method of presentation is 
open to criticism on grounds of bad taste and pretension in that the 
author intrudes his own personality too much and in an unpleasantly 
superior posture. The author has felt moved, nevertheless, to do this 
in order to lend credence to judgements which took shape in these inter­
views, as a product of the whole ambience of the exchanges rather than 
of any single reply.
60. C.p* also D.A.Wilson, Politics in Thailand, Cornell, 1962, on inter­
departmental competition (p.163): "The tendency of the bureaucracy to
break up into competing groups because it is under no pressure from 
articulate expressions of interest from constituencies outside the govern­
ment results in a dispersal of power to make policy,,."; or on the role 
of the military in politics (p.188): the soldier "believes himself to be
a part of the organisation upon which the fate and honour of the nation 
depend. This tends towards the belief that what is good for the army is 
good for the country. Coupled with this sense of the vital importance
of the army itself is a very limited view of politics and government. The 
highest virtues of duty, honour and nationalism do not lend themselves to 
a subtle sense of restraint and patience,"
61. In the view of Tan Ker Liang (about whom further information in Chapter 
VIII) Naai Wichet first revealed his pretensions at the time of the cre­
mation at Bangsh* in 1963. He forced Bnche Tan to amend the Thai version 
of his loyal address to the Sultan in accordance with good Thai style 
and terminology, removing the Malay element. (Enche Tan, as "Head of the 
Thai Community,"reads the address in both Malay and Thai.)
62. See the editorial of The Straits Times, 15 November 1966, quoted at p. 207. 
above.
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63. A PMIP type of hypothesis to explain the Federal Government’s indulgence 
towards the Consul would he that Kuala Lumpur is committed to betray Malay 
nationalism in Patani by allowing sponsored Thai migration into the area, 
in return for the Consul's assistance with the recruitment of new Alliance 
voters in Kelantan. Stability in mid-Peninsula would be assured by an 
Alliance victory in Kelantan and a stronger Thai hegemony in south 
Thailand. The war against the Communists on the border could then be 
prosecuted more effectively. Sutbh a hypothesis would seem to be untrue
to the Tengku's generous and un-Machiavellian nature, which never leads 
him into conspiracies but often into rash statements and disastrous friend­
ships, The trust extended to the Thai Prime Minister and the Consul in 
1966 is more likely to be found to belong in the latter category.
64. Morally, the Consul is well justified in regarding as potential recruits 
those whom Malaysian law so unjustly hinders from becoming citizens.
65. Its only possible relation to truth may be through a report that appeared 
in The Straits Times. 15 December 1966, to the effect that "Anyone who 
came to live in Malaysia after Merdeka Day will have to pay a $100 fee for 
citizenship by naturalisation "
66. A Machiavellian hypothesis to explain PMIP silence would be that a run­
down of the Thai population of Kelantan may be seen as producing an incre­
ment of land to the Malays.
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CHAPTER VIII: PROSPECT
The 20th Century has been an era of intensifying communication and
whereas this brought with it steady assimilation to a Kelantan society,
Thailand has been able increasingly to assert an attraction from across the
border. As important as the assertion of Thai control down to Sungai Golok
has been the rise of new means of communcation between Thailand and Malaya
such as the railway link to Pasir Mas (opened in the early 1930s), and in
recent years a strong short wave radio service. Young people, notably from
the villages of Pasir Mas and Tumpat districts, have cheap and rapid access
to Thailand, while in the return direction come not only itinerant Bhikkus
but school text books, novels and pin-ups. Marriage of women across the
border is increasing from villages like Bangsd', Jung Kaw and Jamuu and this
is in part already a second generation repercussion of earlier movements into
Naiathiwat to plant rubber: there are uncles and aunts across the border to
arrange these liaisons. These same uncles and aunts in the Sungai Golok
area are to be found adopting nephews and nieces from Kelantan to give them
1an elementary public schooling in Thai. The young 'intelligentsia* of the 
border villages - and even as far south as Sadang - are progressively and 
consciously dropping their dialect and its Malay accretions and using standard 
Thai tones, idiom and vocabulary.
Yet, interestingly, there is some scepticism about this education among 
those peasants (the majority) whose families have no experience of it, and 
even among the boys who return to Kelantan to help their parents when their 
schooling is over. They find themselves at a disadvantage compared to their 
contemporaries who attended a Malay school. Even close to the border there
is a feeling - as deep as at SamBBrag - fox* the realities of the situation: 
this is a Malay state and if we choose it as our home we must make our adjust­
ments. Three of the most successful Bangs&* boys, understanding the logic 
of their situation, have stayed on in Thailand, two talcing further or higher 
education* It is reported by Bangsh' contemporaries that these youths ex­
pressed strongly nationalist sentiments on their visits home. However, this 
led them to seize the opportunities offered in Thailand, not to return home 
and spread the nationalist gospel among unenlightened peasant kinsmen. Pro­
bably their decision was for the best. Nationalist activity would be a thank­
less and frustrating task among the Kelantan Thai at this time, particularly 
if starting from the assumption of Thai nationalism and alienation. The 
Kelantan Thai do not want to be alienated; they want to become integrated 
on terms of dignity. The would-be prophets would also lack employment in 
Malaya consonant with their abilities. In any case, education in Thailand 
is not being put to this kind of use. Its effect is even to drain off some 
of the intellectual and socially conscious resources of the community through 
emigration.^
Attitudes to Thailand among the generality of peasants are equivocal.
On the one hand there is the ideal model of a Thailand complete in moral 
purity, which the better type of visiting monk keeps before the community's 
eyes. But improving communications have also given rise to invidious com­
parisons between the state of security in Thailand and Malaya. Not a few 
Thais give as a reason for hesitating to accept pioneer land in Thailand that 
the local inhabitants are allowed to settle petty feuds with the gun. Then
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there are reports of thieves and vagabonds talcing refuge in the Buddhist 
Order. But the most disastrous damage has been done to Thailand's image by 
the nikhom experiment itself.
This damage is unrelated, essentially, to the physical destruction of
Nikhom Suung in the January 1967 flood. The loss of houses and topsoil
merely frustrated; as did the difficulties of maintaining two establishments,
one in Thailand, one in Kelantan, which the Kelantan farmers - rather unwisely
3from Thailand's point of view - has been allowed to do. What was psycho­
logically devastating was the first experience of Thai bureaucratic venality 
and lethargy. Kelantan Thais were considered fair game by Thai clerks and 
met obstacles in drawing their rightful pioneer allowances. Medical attention 
was not forthcoming as in Kelantan when called for - nor was it free. On 
their return to Kelantan the Consul vented his rage on the unfortunate pioneers 
for the failure of the project. The Consul's arrogant demeanour with peasants 
has begun to rankle indeed with nearly all Thais who have had dealings with 
him. Although expectations from the Consulate are growing, this is not yet 
by any means equivalent to a new identification with Thailand, excluding 
the aspiration to become integrated with Malayan society.
It is a paradox that while emigration might be motivated by dissatis­
faction with Malayan conditions, and the material and spiritual attractions of 
Thailand, the departure of the discontented and the patriotically inclined 
lowers the level of discontent in the community - not least through the relief 
of pressure on physical resources. Migration is a safety valve which could 
postpone political alienation for longer than might be projected from other 
indicators, notwithstanding the possible long-term alienative effect of having
- 254 -
successful and contented kinsmen in Thailand* But the sponsored migrants 
have not sent - or brought - back glowing reports.^ Moreover, diversi­
fication into tobacco at Maalaj and the extensive use of artificial subsidised
fertiliser on rice-fields this decade has increased yields and counter-
5balanced the startling growth of population since 1957. Wise villagers 
note that although their fathers had more land (per family) they didn’t get 
so much rice from it. All the Thai villages show signs of material prosperity 
in some degree in the form of solid and quite costly new houses on concrete 
piles with boarded walls, shutters, and tile or corrugated asbestos roofs.^
In sum, the attractions of Thailand, such as they are, are countered by cir­
cumstances in Kelantan: both the sense of relative status described in
Chapter V, and economic standards. Further, although one may speculate 
that reluctance to migrate will increase pressure on resources - and hence 
political alienation - in the long run (just as migration can be supposed to 
have the opposite effect), the appearance at the moment is that a disappointed, 
returning migrant tends to count his blessings in Malaya and make up his mind 
to flourish in it on the terms to which he is accustomed,
More paradoxical than anything else was the political situation observed 
by the author at BangsR' in the course of a four-day visit in August 1967.
Here the effect of modern Thai culture is seen more clearly than anywhere 
else in the state. Thai consciousness, even patriotism towards Thailand, is 
not confined to a few young men, but flourishes among their fathers (we are 
talking here in terms of not more than some half-dozen men in their fifties, 
but this is a striking number by the standards of other villages). They
form an impromptu clique when occasion offers and speculate on the origins 
of the Kelantan Thai. They subscribe to the principle that Kelantan was once 
part of Thailand, one of them to a quite paranoiac degree. Yet as literate 
and thoughtful men they have mostly welcomed the Alliance initiative in 
offering them a party branch at Bangs&’, because this could be a means- to 
organise and integrate the far-flung and unenlightened Thai peasant mass 
into the Malayan democratic system on just terms, where previous tentatives 
have foundered. Wee Suu Hung, the Kota Bharu tom councillor who set the 
idea on foot in Kelantan, had no doubt that the high level of education at
Q
Bangs A* qualifies it to have the first branch. He is not mistaken. Thai 
consciousness is not incompatible with a genuine wish to remain Malayan.
One young rubber tapper, an English-educated activist of the new branch,told 
the author that he loved Thailand but believed in the Malayan political system.
It is certainly, then, not primarily from Thailand that alienation will 
come. Its roots are rather in the Kelantan situation, except in so far as 
communications from Thailand help maintain a Thai cultural consciousness. 
Firstly, self-consciousness is heightened by the unfavourable aspects of the 
present environment. Discrimination on nationality (and hence, for young
j
people, on employment) and on land, and the ostracism experienced by some 
children from the Muslim majority in school, not to speak of the declared 
religious principles of the Kelantan government, all combine to define the 
community more sharply in distinction to its environment. Unlike the sense 
of identity enhanced by British rule - which was at the same time integrative 
with the society because of the favourable status enjoyed in it - identity is 
now potentially defensive instead of outgoing in terms of the environment.
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Identity is ceasing to be assimilative, albeit, for the reasons already dis­
cussed, the colonial responses have retained some of their force and validity 
into the later period. PMIP rule, considered as a new stimulus to behaviour, 
has not dictated the whole response in these ten years of Independence. Con­
sidered as a new learning experience, on the other hand, it must act to erode 
the inherited and spontaneous assumption of membership in Kelantan*s society, 
^specially among the younger people, the ’recruits* to the political system, 
who have no personal recollection of the period of satisfactory membership. 
Any future deterioration, even a lengthy stabilisation of the present con­
ditions, must increasingly be perceived from a standpoint of estrangement, 
unequipped and unwilling to see mitigating circumstances.
At the same time education, and Alliance propaganda, are implanting an 
idea of popular will. This has been truly a decade of political mobilisation. 
While the Alliance still relies in the last resort on the authoritarian or 
patronising directive of a Penggawa or Penghulu to get out a full Thai vote 
at elections, the idea of a free partnership of the races is disseminated 
by word of moutji between times. This is done spontaneously and sincerely by 
Chinese friends and kinsmen and by neighbouring Malays to keep up the Thais’ 
morale or reinforce their party loyalty. The Alliance ideology (at least 
for consumption by non-Malays) is far more explicit than ever British prin­
ciples were, that ethnic groups are entitled to cultural identity and equal 
rights. Moreover, the right to identity and equality is willed by the people 
through elections. Plainly, this notion gives the desire for equality a 
greater urgency than under colonial rule; the community ceases to accept
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what is bestowed without complaint. The founding of Alliance branches in 
Thai villages which we shall give an account of below, is now institutional­
izing the Thais* will for equality and identity.
Equality for the generality of Thai farmers still means, before anything 
else, equality of access to new land and the right to buy land fx’om others.
The retention of power by the PMIP after the 1969 election would be blow 
enough but, curiously, one can foresee a greater shock from developments 
after an Alliance victory. The Alliance, to keep power in Kelantan, once 
won, would be obliged to pursue a pro-Malay policy in the land sector. Nor 
would it be under pressure at all from its ill-organised Thai clients (the 
appearance of an independent political structure in the form of party 
branches is deceptive). One can anticipate greater security of Temporary 
Occupation Licence land but not necessarily equality of access to the jungle 
fringes. Would a new government be prepared to modify the Malay Reservation
Enactment? This Is a cardinal Malay tenet. As to Federal citizenship laws,
9these are not affected by changes of power at the state level. Only under
Alliance rule would many Thais be brought to realize that the Malays are the
dominant partner in the party.^ This insight is not altogether absent in the
11Thai villages, but it has only come to a minority. It is conceivable that 
Kelantan*s socio-political structure might for the first time come to appear 
irrevocably hiea?archical and repressive under Alliance rule.
In these circumstances the essentially provisional nature of the Thais* 
previous integration would be laid open to a 'final analysis'. Identification 
with Kelantan has been assisted by effective integration, as clients, with
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certain parts of the political system of the state. The claim of these 
elements to the Thais' loyalty has been based not only upon tradition and the 
provision of a certain security, but (more especially) on the promise of a 
transformation when the PMIP is ousted. The Thais' partisan identification 
has been, in fact, with a political minority within the state, whose exclusion 
from power has helped to obscure - by default as much as by design - the true 
balance of power and interest within it. Kelantan is a unique political sub­
system within the Malayan system; it awaits its own integration with national 
patterns. So long as this integration is postponed, the Thais must await the 
true test of their capacity for national integration. One must feel pessi­
mistic about the outcome when this test eventually comes.
Yet, worse than any sense of material deprivation and social discrimin­
ation under Alliance government could be a feeling of threatened identity 
through Alliance organisation. The secret of the astonishing success of the 
Alliance system in Malaya lies partly in the size of the Chinese community, 
which enables it to extract acceptable rewards from the system. Now these 
rewards are not only of a material nature, but embrace the assurance of cul­
tural integrity: the rate of assimilation is negotiable like other political
goods. The setting up of Alliance branches in Thai villages is too recent a 
development for the observer to be dogmatic about possible consequences; yet 
it is possible to indicate dangers in the light of the pattern of Chinese 
integration and the given resilience of Thai culture.
The outside attempts to organise the Kelantan Thai date from the earliest 
days of independent political activity. In the 1959 period persons unknown 
are reported to have approached the late Caw Khun (Chief Abbot) at Bangs#'
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12with a proposal that a state Sangkharii be appointed with the functions of a 
political organiser (presumably with Alliance loyalties). The Abbot went &o 
far as to request the eminent Waaj (subsequently also deceased) at Khaw Joon 
to consider talcing up a state-wide role. But informants at Bangs#' and the 
late Naaj's brother, recall that he was already past the age when he could have 
actively fulfilled the proposed functions. It was also suspected that the ven­
erable Caw Khun, suspicious of politics, deliberately appointed a man of his 
own generation whom he knew would not be able or even inclined to cariy out 
the radical functions of the proposed state Sangkharii-ship.
At some time not long after the 1959 victory of the PMIP an initiative came
from Bppsamed in favour of outside intervention in Thai affairs. The young Caw
13Sug felt at that time that the office of "Head of the Thai Community" was 
occupied by an inappropriate person, being Enche C.W.Sook, an English-educated 
clerk of mixed Indian and Thai parentage who had stood as a Socialist Front 
candidate in the Tumpat Tengah State constituency in 1959 and carried a number 
of Thai kinsmen and friends with him. The office of "Head of the Thai Commun­
ity" has - and had then - as almost its sole function the salutation of the 
Sultan on behalf of the Thai community at his birthday, although it acts as 
intermediary with the state bureaucracy on the occasion of the cremation of a 
Chief Abbot. The bureaucracy has a hand in the appointment, and Enche C.W.Sook's 
qualifications were his literacy combined with domicile in a Thai village 
(B99samed) and knowledge of the Thai language. His position at B99samed is in 
fact socially peripheral for his interests lie outside. But he was well 
qualified for the bridging role. Caw Sug, his neighbour, was alarmed by the 
Socialist Front candidacy and approached Enche Wee Suu Hung of Kampong China,
Kota Bharu, to take over the "Headship" and use it to bring some organisation 
to the Thais but with an Alliance bias.
Wee Suu Hung is the head of an 'old Chinese' family- of Kelantan with a
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tradition of service to the Thai community. He regretted not being able to 
take up the "Headship" himself, through pressure of other political commit­
ments. But politically he liked the idea of using the "Headship" to steer 
the Thais away from a potential S.F. connection into the Alliance fold. In 
terms of his family's traditional sense of responsibility to the Thais he was 
glad to have the chance of organising them in such a way, so that their general 
interests could be represented to the state government, (it was essential 
however to keep the party-political element secret.) Wee Suu Hung decided 
to put an Enche Tan Ker Liang up to the tasks a Thai-Chinese petition-writer 
of assured Alliance sympathies.
It is difficult to understand how Enche Wee could regard Enche Tan as an 
appropriate candidate. The British Military Administration had relieved him 
of his position at the Kelantan Customs (Preventive Branch) in 1946 in con­
sideration of certain services to the preceding Japanese and Thai administra­
tions.^ However, the choice was made. Wee Suu Hung inspired a Thai 
petition to have C. W. Sook removed and the state bureaucracy accepted Tan 
Ker Liang in his place. Ker Liang proceeded to propose to the state govern­
ment in June I960 that his office be expanded into a Protectorate along the 
lines of the Protectorate of Aborigines. This was turned down but the
Registrar of Societies accepted the formation of a Thai society called
15SamaakhomphudthabprisadthajtrakunhSHngrathakalantan. Ker Liang motored to
all the Thai villages, collected initial membership fees of $3 from up to 
16400 villagers, issued membership cards and returned thereafter to collect 
50^ a month. This appears to have been too much, especially when Ker Liang
fail@d to produce any achievements in the way of successful citizenship
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applications (some Thais gave him much more than 03 for this favour) or 
state assistance to temples (which he is alleged to have claimed to be able 
to arrange). The Thais believe their money went into Ker Liang's pocket.
Ker Liang told the author that driving round the villages consumed part of 
the money while the Chinese owner of a house hired as a meeting place at 
050 a month employed thugs with grudges dating from the war and pre-war period 
to intimidate him into paying the rent before the society was properly establish­
ed. He applied to wind up the society in 1967 but it had long been moribund.
The unfortunate fate of this plan did not reflect on the Alliance because 
the political motive had been concealed. Wee Suu Hung's next move was his 
attempt from about 1965 to institutionalize Caw Sug's incipient leader's role 
at Bppsamed by showing him how to organise a Friendly Society to pay funeral 
expenses and prevent Thais from mortgaging or selling land to do merit when 
their parents died. This society is now functioning unofficially. Its
leader is credited in the village with obtaining the new crematorium singie-
17handed, which is a valuable boost to his authority.
The latest and boldest development, but the one with the potential to
alienate the Thais affected by it, is the establishment of Alliance party
13branches in Thai villages. Wee Suu Hung is again the driving force and it 
is a move in the same spirit as his policy on the "Headship". He sees advan­
tage to the party in mobilising the Thais as party members and advantage to 
the Thais in building up a state-wide lay political structure to represent 
their interests. But unlike the "Headship", which was not expected to develop 
native roots, the accent now is on autonomous and self-sustaining existence 
once the branches are under way. Bangs#' was chosen for the first experiment.
The branch was set up in April 1967 on the visit of a delegation from the
Alliance state caucus. The Thai coffee-shop keeper was easily persuaded to
become the leader but there is no shortage of educated men in the village who
19could have taken the position. There was general confidence among the 
educated that Bangsd' could become in this way the leader in the Thai political 
structure that they had so long seen to be necessary to the community. Like 
Wee Suu Hung they saw this future structure as a Thai organism with its own 
personality, operating as autonomously as the other ethnic parties within an 
Alliance framework, if on a more minor scale and without the title and status 
of a party.
The strong element of altruism in Wee Suu Hungfs make-up contributes to
20Thai confidence in his schemes. Like Mr. Nagaratnam of Kota Bharu and 
other patrons he is a builder of bridges for Thai identification with and 
now participation in the Alliance Party. But not least striking about the 
party branch scheme is how a democratic institution is here passed down through 
a patron-client structure - in much the same way as voting has been influenced 
quite largely by exploiting feelings of clientship and obligation. However, 
there is here a tangible element of deliberate cultural engineering by demo­
cratic politicians committed to a new 'mode' or ’formula1 of politics. In 
their scheme of things a patron-client relationship cannot any longer be defined 
as integrative: a democracy can only integrate its citizens 'democratically1,
even if the initiative has to come from above. The Thais, meanwhile, will 
accept the party, branches partly on trust because their 'pedigree' or ascriptive 
qualities are good, and the Bangsa"' people in general understand that a future
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Alliance government will reward its friends for their loyalty. But both Wee 
Suu Hung and his intelligent 'clients* at Bangsd' are aware of the pragmatic 
necessity for an independent Thai voice in a democratic political system.
And the party branches as they are established village by village will in turn 
put a greater insistence into Thai aspirations to equality through the demo­
cratic idea which they symbolise. One problematic question is how far this 
new structure will be able to make its voice heard in the democratic jungle.
It will surely lack the autonomy to which it aspires and this will deny it the 
ability to exert pressure on party and government (in the event of an Alliance 
victory). In terms of material rewards, this 'participation' will thus prove 
bogus, frustrating the very expectations it raises. Through the peculiar form 
of its bonds to the rural Alliance it may also increase, in absolute terms, 
the subjective sense of inferior status in the plural society; and altern­
atively, or in addition, may pose a subjective threat to cultural autonomy.
As in any democratic system, the most effective sanction of the Thai
electors for equitable treatment by the Alliance party and by any future
Alliance government would be a withheld or transferred vote. Since the Thais
are not going to be constituted a party with access to the characteristic
bargaining between Alliance partners before elections, it is especially
necessary for them to preserve the free dom to withhold their vote as a group
21once they are organised. But it seems improbable that the Alliance will 
supply the transport and other facilities of communication necessary for a 
state Thai leadership to arise. In the event of a unitary state leadership 
arising and the threat of a withheld vote being made, the possibility can be 
conceived of a counter-suggestion coming from U3M0 to the effect that the
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branch of the 'ungrateful1 leader could easily be closed by allowing its 
members' subscriptions to lapse. Without an Alliance branch that village 
would no longer qualify for any favours from party or government. The most 
fundamental weaknesses of the Thais would be uncovered in such a contest of 
wills: apart from their numerical weakness-, there is no other party to which
the mass of peasants wish to go. They are not like the Malays whose thorough­
ly plausible sanction against UMWO is a threat of transferring allegiance to
22PMIP, For the Alliance to withdraw its support from a Thai leader would 
very effectively bring the rest to heel during the long transition from a 
docile, client culture to psychological autonomy. But of course the defeat 
would be resented and be a blow to integration.
Wee Suu Hung has an instinct for‘the need of a small ethnic community 
for organisation in democratic politics but he also assumes - instinctively 
but by contradiction - a basic -unity of interest between all races. The 
Alliance having given political form to this natural unity, every group has a 
unity of interest with the Alliance. As an MCA man of long standing Suu Hung 
forgets that the Chinese owe more to their size and bargaining power than to 
natural identity of interest with the Malays. The minute size of the Kelantan 
Thai community makes it probable that democratic politics will continue to 
show up a disharmony of interest with the majority. Party or governmental 
largesse will have to continue to be motivated by a sense of patronly oblig­
ation.
The true motivation will be of no concern to the Thais, provided their 
growing expectations are fulfilled. But these may not be fulfilled. If this 
happens it will be a function of two factors: (a) the lack of bargaining
power of the community which we have just analysed; and (b) the likely 
weakness of the non-Malay patron element in the Kelantan Alliance to assert 
Thai interests on their behalf.
This brings us in turn to the structure of the bonds of Thai Alliance 
branches to the rural Alliance, which could have damaging effects apart from 
material disappointment. To the Thais the Alliance is not a Malay party in a 
proper sense. In reality, UMNO is^  the dominant partner in the Kelantan 
Alliance, and to a far greater extent than in Malayan areas of Chinese concen­
tration. In the rural areas the Alliance is entirely synonymous with UMNO 
and the consequence of establishing Alliance branches in Thai villages is to 
subject the Thais to the command of a local Malay political boss and his 
lieutenants for the purpose of organising rallies, canvassing and voting. 
Alienation could arise in these circumstances in one or both of two ways.
Firstly, UMNO party enthusiasts necessarily slip from their role of 
friendly, neighbourly persuader, into that of coercive mobiliser where a 
Thai branch has arisen, for the Thais have thereby incurred party discipline. 
Taking an order from a Malay peasant is something that no previous political 
system has asked of the Thais but the new structure which gives rise to such 
a thing also brings a more urgent sense that it Is impermissible. The hectic 
pace of the last hours of an election campaign puts a particular perempt­
oriness into instructions delivered by word of mouth. This was observed in 
the parliamentary by-election held in Pasir Mas Hulu constituency on August 
19 1967» involving the new Bangs&’ branch. UMNO in the country districts has 
never thought it necessary to exert special effort to win over Thai hearts
and has nowhere canvassed them as carefully and courteously as the PMIP.
Now that Bangs&' is incorporated into the party its loyalty is taken even 
more for granted, and the local hierarchy apparently thought nothing of can­
celling the candidate's visit to the village without warning or subsequent 
apology when the Deputy Prime Minister descended upon the state to give a 
speech somewhere else. This was an instructive experience to several untutored 
Thai farmers; while the 'intellectual* founder members of the branch ration­
alised the incident but could not entirely conceal their sense of confidence 
abused. The Malay peasant organisers take Thai quiescence for granted but as
cogs in the larger machine themselves they know no obligation to reward or
23
recognise Thai loyalty as patrons would do. The reciprocity of a patron- 
client relationship is lost, but the dignity of the autonomous man does not 
take its place. Nothing could be better calculated to give the Thais a sense 
of being subordinate to the Malay race.
To understand the second, and more serious, potential factor for alien­
ation, let us look at the Thai Alliance branches from the point of view of an 
UMNO local secretary. His attitude to the Thais is tolerant. In common with 
many Kelantan Malays he allows them freedom, in principle, to choose their 
cultural orientations. But as they speak Malay well and fit in with Kelantan 
society he may tend in practice to discount their distinctiveness. "They are 
like us" it is often said. As they have made an apparently democratic choice 
to join the Alliance but not through a separate ethnic party he is even more 
strongly given to assume identity of interest between them and UMNO. He begins 
to take their reliability for granted less on the grounds of their traditional
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docility as clients than on the assumption of ideological identity with the
Malays as represented in UMNO. He and his party workers assume a fraternal
bond with the Thais over-riding and subsuming that or discipline. He sees
himself as a leader to the Thais, democratic style. This new type of posture
is becoming visible in the behaviour of party officials towards Thais. It
could come to be viewed by Thais as the most insidious consequence of their
political mobilisation. It demands a completely new kind of assimilation to
Kelantan society whereby Thais are offered equality (of sorts) not on the basis
of separate identity but of notional merger with the Malays as one brotherhood.
This must be wholly repugnant to a community whose cultural identity remains so 
24
distinctive.
This projection of a hypothetical trend may be unduly pessimistic. It 
was proposed in the first chapter of this dissertation that no trend is inel­
uctable, and this applies to alienation as well as to integration. The Kelantan 
Thai case is one that is exceptionally difficult to make predictions about in 
that Thai political culture is not stable or consistent. Theonerging, demo­
cratic-impregnated culture, with its more insistent expectations of equality, 
has not yet achieved institutional form throughout the community. Thailand's 
influence is likewise at any early stage. However, this influence is instit­
utionalised and will be a permanent factor. As and if changing Thai political 
culture increasingly perceives its environment as unfeeling or hostile,
Kelantan Thai affairs could become the troubled waters proverbially fished in 
by unfriendly interests. Having failed to find leadership towards honourable 
integration with the democratic system, the Kelantan Thai would be susceptible
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to offers of leadership and political organisation oriented to alienation 
and resistance. The community could become cumulatively an object lesson 
for the frequent failure of political integration in this, world of the later 
20th Century,
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FOOTNOTES
1. From Bangs&' (a village of 80 households) where this trend is most appa­
rent, at least 12 hoys and girls are being or have been since the war 
educated in Thailand.
2. c.p. the anxiety of Phra' Silananda (see Chapter VII, note 16 p. 225) 
that young Kelantan monies sent to Bangkok for education do not return 
to take up positions of leadership in their community.
3. At Maalaj, which contributed by far the largest number of settlers at 36 
house-holders, only three had sold up their Kelantan property. 12 returned 
to Maalaj for good after the flood disaster, while another 21 continued to 
work on their plots but on a commuting basis. A shortage of padi land at 
Maalaj has now been compensated by the establishment of a Malayan 
Tobacco Company station close by.
4* In contrast, pioneers who go privately to open up jungle illicitly for 
rubber seem to be more successful. This is perhaps because they go 
without fanfare or haste and only those who make a success are remembered. 
(See H.Freyn, "Land of Smiles", Far Eastern Economic Review. 22 February 
1962 for a note on illicit occupation of state jungle land in Thailand.
The government was said to be planning at this time to use helicopters 
to spot the law-breakers and their works.)
5. In Pasir Puteh district on the author’s count, the increase has been
some 21,4^ in 10 years, (c.p.Chap ter II. p.48 Chap ter IV, p. 137? 
note 32 .) The growth for the whole state between 1921 and 1957 was 
from 6,255 to only 6,727. (See J.E. Nathan op.cit,: and Federation of
Malaya Department of Statistics 1957 Population Census, op.citl)
6. But there is a genuine subjective sense of mounting pressure - enhanced 
perhaps by the unfavourable political atmosphere and the fear that no 
matter how much the population rises in the future the land will not be 
increased. The Consul's offer of nikhom land certainly met a ready 
response at Maalaj. Elsewhere individual villagers had taken the init­
iative. It was the appeal of Thais to Mr. Nagaratnam of Kota Bharu that 
brought him to approach the state government on their behalf in 1965.
The government suggested that he demonstrate the desire for land by 
sponsoring a petition. This he did and it contained 500 signatures and 
marks. The government asked if the Thais would be willing to occupy 
land in the IJlu, at Kemubu. The community was again sounded out by Mr. 
Naga and he understood that they would accept land in the Ulu. At the 
time of the author's departure from Kelantan in August 1967 no decision 
had been taken by the government,
7. Apart from elementary education in Thailand in recent years there has 
always been - since 1944 - a very good wat school at Bangs&* (the chief 
wat of Kelantan),
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8 . Bangs&' has several potential leaders; but it is not implied that "elite- 
mass communications" are much better here than in other villages. The 
Bangs&* elite constantly complain about the lack of peasant receptivity
to new ideas. The Alliance's role is seem as providing a needed outside 
stimulus to Thai organisation.
9. However, by 1969 the efforts of the Alliance party and the Consul to 
register Thais as citizens will be beginning to make some inroads into 
discontent on this score. 12-year-olds who apply for identity cards will 
begin to get citizenship by operation of law.
10. Some villages call the Alliance 'MCA1 because they know it chiefly 
through Chinese kinsmen or patrons in the nearest district centre. But 
even where UMNO Malays are commonly met, many Thais maintain that "we 
do not support a 'Malay party' - the Malay party is the PMIP." In the 
two Thai settlements of Trengganu cynicism about the Trengganu (Alliance) 
government is a much more dominant trait. See note 24 p.252 infra.
11. But already a quite common grievance (not linked to an analysis or under­
standing of the Alliance party structure) is that the Alliance (i.e. the. 
Ministry of Rural Development) spends considerable sums of money on mos­
ques and madrashahs, and next to nothing on Buddhist facilities. Only 
B99samed has received a subsidy of $3*000 to build a modern crematorium. 
This is compared unfavourably with the Thai government's heavy outlay on 
mosques in South Thailand, not to mention its donations to wats in 
Kelantan which have considerably exceed the Alliance's $3»O0Q. An 
Alliance government of Kelantan would be expected to improve on the party's 
present performance in this regard as for land. A new view of the nature 
of the Alliance would be hastened by Chinese disaffection from the party
as Malay cultural and economic pressure builds up on the national level.
The young B99samed man, Caw Sug, who acts as village go-between with the 
party and who organised the building of the crematorium, is the most 
cogently sceptical of all Thais met in Kelantan about what the Alliance 
stands for. Apart from personal experience, he has had a touch of the 
P.A.P. heresy from travelled young Chinese friends in Tumpat town. (He 
learnt to speak some English in Penang while a monk). At Sambdrag, the 
highly sophisticated Caw DMng returns from UMNO rallies less amused by 
its feuds with PMIP (c.p. Chapter VI, p. 167 ) than angered by
the irrelevance of most of its propaganda to Thai needs and its compla­
cent disregard of the Thais' existence when UMNO figures of Federal 
stature visit the Kelantan countryside.
12. c.p. Chapter VI, note 13 p. 179 for definition*
13- c.p. note 11, above, regarding his present attitude.
14* Services popularly alleged to have been those of informer and procurer 
to the Japanese and Thai administrations respectively. Tan Ker Liang
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spates that his (admitted) unpopularity in certain quarters is due to his 
scrupulous work in the Customs Police before the war and his favoured 
position as interpreter to the Thai administration.
15. "The Buddhist Community Association of the Thai Clan of Kelantan", 
rendered in Malay "Persatuan Keturonan ICaum Thai Phuth Kelantan". Its 
aims were stated to be: to raise the Thai standard of living to the
level of other races; encourage their study of the National Language and 
other matters including civic responsibility; to help Thais over misfor­
tune and accident; cherish Thai custom and religion while encouraging 
good relations and association with other races; to cooperate with the 
authorities in matters affecting Thai welfare; and to bring Thai prob­
lems to the notice of the authorities.
16. Ker Liang's estimate.
17. c.p. note 11, p. 250 above. The 'fairy-godfather' was of course Wee Suu 
Hung, now a leading agent of the Ministry of Rural Development in 
Kelantan. But more remarkable and praiseworthy that steering Rural 
Development funds into Thai hands was his achievement in launching Caw 
Sug as a leader in a community so reluctant to give any authority to 
younger laymen.
18. This had been made possible by a change in Alliance policy in December 
1965, allowing individuals or groups other than Malays, Chinese or 
Indians, to have direct membership of the Alliance. Eurasians and 
intellectuals were particularly aimed at by this move. See The Straits 
Times. 20 December 1965, which quoted Tengku Abdul Rahman as saying:
"This will allow all Malaysians like the Eurasians and Ceylonese, tp 
join the Alliance Party direct. It will also enable Malaysians, for 
example, some Chinese, who may want to join the Alliance, to do so, even 
though they do not want to be M.C.A. members," The Straits Times also 
noted that the success of the same policy in Singapore earlier in the 
year under Khir Joharfs chairmanship, had prompted the move. However, 
Mohammed Khir Johari stated in The Alliance Vol. 1:7, July 31 1966, that 
the change of policy was merely forced on the Alliance by a change in 
the Societies Act barring associate membership of UMNO, MCA and MIC.
(He did not mention non-Malay ordinary members of UMNO, who were not 
forced to transfer to direct Alliance membership in this way. See note 
24, p. 252 infra.)
19. In July 1967, 11 members were recruited at Maalaj but a leader was diffi­
cult to find. The Bangsd' branch was claiming in August that all the men 
of that village had joined. This may be attributable to the number of 
committed 'founder members' able and willing to visit the rest and per­
suade them to part with $1,
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20. Both men have recently put some considerable time and effort into 
informing Thais how to apply for citizenship and persuading them to go 
to the Registry in Kota Bharu, where Mr. Nagaratnam is on the language 
board, and not to their District offices. The sense of a patron's 
obligation outweighs party interest markedly in the author's observation.
21. As will be seen from the figures at Appendix X there are 10 state 
constituencies of a marginal nature (defined as a seat held by either 
party by less than 1000 votes.) In fact, only two of these constit­
uencies, Pasir Puteh Tenggara and Tanah Merah Barat count a body of 
Thais among their electorate, whose abstention or switch of loyalty could 
destroy Alliance hopes of winning these seats in 1969. On the other hand 
Tumpat Tenga^, with an Alliance majority (October 1964 by-election) 
standing at 1,743, owes its status to the very large number of Thai 
voters as well as Chinese in that district. Massive Thai defection could 
be just as unwelcome to the Alliance here as in Pasir Puteh Tenggara.
Given the symbolic importance that the Kelantan state assembly has 
acquired as the last bastion of the PMIP, there is really no part of the 
state where a plausible threat of defection would not cause the Alliance 
considerable concern, (in parliamentary terms it is again Pasir Puteh, 
Tanah Merah, and Tumpat, which combine marginality with a partly Thai 
electorate: see Appendix XI). The relevant map is at p.117.
22. Having set up Caw Sug as a leader of B99samed, Wee Suu Hung is faced 
with a dilemma in deciding whether to establish a party branch there, 
for Sug is quite open to Suu Hung in his new-found criticism of the 
Alliance (see note 11, p. 250 above). But if he does establish a branch 
with Sug as leader it might prove an effective curb to Sug's rebel ideafe. 
He would find it difficult to argue for not supporting the Alliance if he 
were the official Alliance leader. This will indeed be the subtle 
strength of any Thai Alliance branch from the hierarchy's point of view.
No Thai peasant will see the logic of not voting Alliance when he is a 
paid-up member of it. This attitude will join with both the lack of an 
alternative party, and the idea that voting is compulsory (See Chapter VI, 
note 10 p. 178) to make abstention unlikely for some years to come.
23. Even so lowly a figure as a Malay Penghulu, if he has the authority to 
sway or reinforce the Thais' voting preference, does so on the unspoken 
understanding that he will be attentive to the Thais' needs in the years 
to come.
24. In September 1964 the UMNO General Assembly decided to admit non-Muslim 
natives of Malaysia as ordinary members. Non-natives were also to be 
admitted as associate members for the first time. (See The Straits Times 
7 September 1964). The motive for the admission of non-Muslim natives 
was to strengthen UMNO in Sarawak and Sabah. However, within a few months 
UMNO Trengganu had recruited the Thai men of Pog Kiang and Batu Balai as 
ordinary members and they were still ordinary members in 1967* At
Batu Balai (9 Thai households) membership was regarded as a way of 
placating the Malays, although some genuine respect attached to the 
Headmaster who had initiated the offer. There was not yet a sense of 
dangerous political mobilisation, perhaps because this was not a party 
branch as in Kelantan. But the payment of the annual fee of $1 was 
regarded as a way of keeping the Malays at arm's length and the senior 
man found Malay pressure on him personally to join in canvassing very 
distasteful, (in fact UMNO had not invited Thais to any of its meetings. 
Only a big taukeh at Jerteh town had summoned them once or twice to - 
MCA? - meetings). There was certainly a pervasive sense of alienation 
because Alliance rule had not lived up to hopes in the material respect. 
At Pog Kiang (l8 Thai households) Thais had been invited to UMNO 
meetings and voted on some kind of resolution. Those who had attended had 
not seen any menace in this activity - perhaps because the Malay Head­
master had coopted them as members and they were happy to accept his 
patronage. But here no-one had been dragooned into canvassing. Those 
at Pog Kiang who were sceptical about the Alliance were so because of 
its land policy, which was said to have disappointed expectations.
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APPENDIX I
Discussion of The Naga King's Daughter (by Stewart Wavell; London, 1964) as 
a source on the Kelantan Thai.
Wavell's theme is the unity of South-east Asian culture and legend, 
particularly as between the Malays, the Negrito and the Thai along the road 
from Pahang to Nakorn Sri Tammarat. This theme does seem to the present 
student to be taken, perhaps unintentionally, to the point where real differ­
ences between Malay and Thai are glossed over. Thus on his visit to Maalaj 
village, near Bachok, to record Thai Npraa he writes (page 134)•
"The Menora is a form of opera which was performed in the Courts of 
the ancient kingdoms. No one could tell me its origin. It was 
thought to be Thai* The words belonged to old Kelantan: many were
identifiably Malay, but there were a good many which even the per­
formers themselves could not understand."
Perhaps it is merely careless expression which gives the impression that 
in Wavell's view the Npraa in Kelantan is not a Thai art. If so, then notice 
how he claims a difference in name between the 'Menora* of Kelantan (the Malay 
word) and the 'Nora* of South Thailand (page 159). This is without basis in 
fact: the Kelantan Thai also call Nora 'Npraa'. He also attributes the
"preservation" of Npraa in Muslim Kelantan not to the Thai but to "the 
Buddhists":
"Then occurred to me what should have been obvious: the Menora had been
performed in a Buddhist temple. It owed nothing to the Buddhists but 
the Buddhists had preserved it. How strange." (p.135).
Now the book's primary theme is cultural unity across religious boundaries 
which in turn implies the limited impact of the great religions on ancient cul­
ture. If these phenomena - such as Npraa - are pre-Islamic and pre-Buddhist, 
it seems inconsistent to then attribute the survival of N9raa to Buddhism, 
rather than to its own resilience as a non-religious cultural activity among 
the people who perform it. Wavell is surprised by his own attribution. "How 
strange'!,he says. Is it perhaps that he has created an imaginary problem by 
postulating one hundred percent cultural unity across the area? Of course if 
the people are essentially of one race and culture, only religion can explain 
diversity. Only if we allow the Thai a separate ethnic identity is the sur­
vival of distinct cultural forms otherwise explained.
Unwilling to admit that the Kelantan Thai are Thai, Wavell even appears 
to say that Buddhism itself in Kelantan is sui generis. He made his N9raa 
recordings, it seems, in one of the m M  wad, or kud (priests' dormitories) at 
Maalaj, but he refers to this "large, ramshackle wooden structure" as a tem­
ple (p. 134). If it be agreed that 'temple' is the popular English tag for a 
Thai Uposatha Hall or Bood, it may also be agreed that some readers might be 
given a strange idea of the type of Thai temple found in Kelantan, and of the 
uses to which they are put! Wavell uses the word 'Siamese' only once in ref­
erence to the Kelantan Thai (p.136), in a quotation; and once, independently,
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in reference to a temple (p. 134); but he uses the term freely for the 
Kelantanese Malay shadow play (e.g. p.114) without explanation. This might 
create doubts as to the particular significance of 'Siamese' when applied to 
a temple, (The word 'Thai' is used exclusively in the book for the Thai of 
Thailand.) Wavell repeats without sceptical comment an offensive Malay 
account of sexual rites associated with becoming a monk (p!36), arid shows a 
"novice11, in a picture opposite page 129, with long hair and a blue sarongl
Perhaps this is not a book to be taken seriously. What one at first 
takes to be the central theme, the cultural unity of the area, is maintained 
for Kelantan but not, contradictorily, for the case of 'Menora* south of the 
border and 'Nora' north of it. The population becomes 'Thai' north of the 
frontier but is Malay in Kelantan, The real sense in which cultures do mix 
in the area - through the migration of peoples and settling in discrete units 
side by side, disregarding modern frontiers - is completely lost on Wavell. 
His true position would sometimes appear to be that what is in a Malay state 
is Malay and what is in a Thai state is Thai, And this is no more realistic 
than to pretend that all culture up the Peninsula is the same. Were either 
proposition true there would be no call to write the present dissertation.
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APPENDIX II
Festivals and Ceremonies at Sambbrag. or participated in by Sambbrag
•people at other places.
Wan Phra* is observed four times eveiy lunar month, and time is counted 
in lunar months and weeks by all except a few men employed in the fishing 
industry. Daily rab siin in Lent is not observed at Sambbrag, unlike some 
other Kelantan villages. This appears to be connected with the lethargy of 
the Sambbrag abbot.
10th Month. On an. auspicious day towards the end of 10th Month (October 
10 in 1966) the chief 11199 holds M&g Naa - a simple offering to the spirits 
of the place to initiate transplanting. Simultaneously, two fighting cocks 
are set at each other three times. One informant said this was thought to 
protect the crops from vermin.
End of 10th Month. Sa.i Raan, where food is heaped upon platforms as an 
offering to departed parents and ancestors. One of the year's many Saj Baad 
for the monks is also held.
Middle of 11th Month. Qog Phansaa (end of Lent) is marked with a Saj 
Baad. On 29 October 1966, the eve of this ceremony, the Abbot, who alone had 
observed Lent at Samddrag that year, received cloth and other utilities in a 
ceremony of Thood Phaa Paa sponsored by a Thai-Chinese business woman of 
Cherang Ruku. Cloth was also given to the two sangkharii (wat messengers) who 
were beginning a year of duty.
5th day, Second Half of 11th Month. Several villagers journeyed to Baan 
Sadang for a much bigger, but similar ceremony of Thood Kathin. The abbot of 
Sadang is one of the most venerated in Kelantan. Income from his charms and 
talismans has helped to make the wat a comparatively wealthy and well-appointed 
one. This in turn attracts many monks to spend Lent there.
I2th Month. In late November and early December, as individual families 
finish transplanting,the draught animals (oxen or buffalo) are fed with glut­
inous rice in banana leaf packets, as a sign of gratitude for their help in 
ploughing. This is called Poon Ngua.
1st Month. At about the same time (l5 December in 1966) the monks chant 
the montra over vessels of water in the ceremony of Suad Naa. The water is 
sprayed by each family over the young rice to protect it from harm. (Like 
many wat ceremonies, this one is preceded by offerings of sweetmeats and rice 
to the spirits of the place, gods, ancestors and past teachers, on the part 
of a B199.) A lapsed custom of performing Suad Naa in a pavilion in the fields 
themselves was revived from 26 to 28 February 1967, when the rice was attacked 
by insects.
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End, of 2nd Month. Chinese New Year. Families with some Chinese an­
cestry may bum prayer books and let off crackers. Most families make
Chinese cakes in case of visits by Chinese,
Middle of 3rd Month. (24 February 1967)> Sa,i Baad Paa Chaa: a festival 
of remembrance, with visits to recent graves. Sumptuous food is prepared 
for the monks, the men assisting* in carrying it (haab) to the wat. In the 
evening thev.people carry sand to the wat and process round the abbots house.
4th day. 5th Month, (15 April 1967) 9 Wa.i Khruu; a ceremony held by men 
at the house of the former N9raa master. 15 years ago, when there was still 
a troupe and orchestra, a full Jtyraa was held. Today, the N9raa masks are 
taken out and honoured. At the same time, the women folk carry rice to the
most esteemed members of the village, (usually the elderly).
Middle of 5th Month. Aab Haam Phra1, the bathing of a small Buddha 
image and of the Abbot. The youths splash the women and girls with water on
their way out of the wat.
1st evening, Second Half of 5th Month. Hew Year. The 11199 petitions the 
spirits and past teachers for favourable consideration in the year ahead. 
Candles are burnt on a makeshift tree, firecrackers let off, and small flags 
made for storing in the roof of every porch, to mark the age of the houses,
5th Month. Following the harvest, some merit is acquired by making rice 
noodles (khanom ciin) and taking them to the monks and to friends.
4th day. 6th Month. Recently cremated hones, and the exhumed skull of
a buried man, were taken on this day in 1967 to Baan Tanoong for collective 
incineration in a paper temple.
Middle of 6th Month. (25 May in 1967). The Kathin Hog D.van when magni­
ficent gondolas of bananas are taken (haam) to the wat for the monks, who 
draw lots for sharing out the offering. There is a morning procession to the 
wat, led by a tall flag-pole, with much banging. In the evening, a procession 
three times round the Abbot’s house, and carrying sand to the wat. This coin­
cides with the Chinese Buddhists’ Wesak Day in Malaya, and a small Chinese 
.shrine is decked out at the wat. However, no Chinese or Thai-Chinese came to 
Samddrag for this ceremony in 1967.
17th evening and 18th morning of 6th month. Wa.i Bang Bood. or the 
honouring of the Caw Ceb Caw Khaj (the Lord of Sickness and Fever) alias Pb.99 
Than Somded, who visits the village with his band of spirit followers once a 
year. A tiny sampan loaded with food (including roasted ’puff rice - khat99g) 
is launched on the river to carry away PI199 Than Somded with all the village’s 
sickness and ill fortune. The abbot splashes the assembled people with conse­
crated water after the patron spirit’s departure. Although the traditional 
three nights of rtyraa are now no more than a memory, this ceremony retains a
powerful hold on people’s emotions and imaginations (and it may not he extra­
vagant to see in it a special prop to village identity, and to Thai identity 
within a Malay environment). It takes a different form in other Kelantan 
villages (except Maalaj) but in some villages is not known at all.
7th Month. Between harvest and transplanting is the season of ordinations. 
Sambbrag villagers responded.to several invitations to attend these ceremonies 
in other parts of Kelantan. This is not an annual event in every village, but 
in 1967, seven young men of Sambbrag village, or the Pasir Puteh and north 
Trengganu area, were due for ordination. The festivities and ceremonies took 
place over three days and nights from 30 June to 2 July. The Cnief Abbot of 
Kelantan presided at the religious ceremonies. The tham khwan naag was per­
formed by a skilled 11199 of Maalaj. The candidates in their princely finery 
are borne to the wat on bamboo biers, accompanied by a raucous recital of phaag 
naag. A shadow theatre team from Jung ICaw and Ramwong and Hpraa groups from 
Maalaj were hired for the evening entertainments.
11th day. Second Half of 7th Month, this being the day immediately 
following the ordination, i.e. 3 July 1967> the village observed the ceremony 
hong Bood. This consisted of a saj baad for the new monks held in the 
bood itself. Joss-sticks are burnt in the sand around the wall of the bood.
16th, 17th and 18th evenings of 8th Month. Khaw Phansaa - entering Lent.
The villagers offer puff rice and coconut oil to the monks. On the mornings 
following the evening ceremonies the resident monies line up outside the wat 
to receive their cooked rice. (On other days of the year the wat boys - joom - 
tour the village to collect rice in the early morning. The monks at Sambbrag 
rather rarely come out begging themselves.) Young monks often spend Lent in 
another village than their own. As Kelantan is subject to the eastern monsoon, 
the anomaly arises that Lent falls in the dry season.
Occasional Ceremonies
Marriages are animistic ceremonies performed by a 11199 - who is conveniently 
synonymous with the headman at Sambbrag. They are not reported to the Penggawa, 
for fear of obstacles to divorce. Glutinous rice flavoured with coconut milk 
is cooked by male kinsmen and friends. The festivities are simple at Sambbrag, 
compared to some other villages. There is no procession of the bride-groom’s 
entourage to the bride’s house, no dousing of the couple, no extended invo­
cation of the spirits (as observed at Jung ICaw). Betrothal occurs a few weeks 
before the wedding when a delegation of ladies carries betel leaves to the 
bride's house to ’ask for the bride*. A modern type of ring is presented at 
an unspecified moment before the wedding and is returned with the bride money 
if the bride runs away. Although one heal’d tales of quite large sums of bride 
money being paid to the bride’s father in other villages on certain occasions 
in the past, at the most expensive of three Sambbrag marriages in 1966-7 the 
bridegroom's expenses amounted to: a nominal bride money of $24, the cost of 
the ring ($23), plus $198 for the wedding clothes and hospitality. $40 was
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recuperated in the form of gifts of cloth. The balance of a total cost of 
$566.50. (including the $40 of cloth given to the couple) was met by the
gifts, in kind and cash, of guests, presented at first to the bride's father,
in whose house the ceremony was held. Although the bulk of the wedding ex­
penses seem to fall invariably on the groom, the ceremony and entertainment 
will be held in whichever house (the bride's parents' or the groom's) appears 
to be most fitted to it in terms of size and cooking facilities.
Another occasional ceremony is 3uad Ryan - consecrating a house. This service 
is performed by monks.
On 24th April 1967 the boys banged pots and pans and shouted Ohuaj 00 kM& 00 khaj 
to rescue the moon from an eclipse.
The midwife performs a waj khruu at the house of a mother 40 days after birth.
The new mother annoints the midwife's hair and limbs.
The dead, if they die 'well* - i.e. not by an accident or before old age -
are cremated two or three days after death. The extent of chanting by monies 
in this interval will depend upon the investment in yellow cloth (for doing 
merit) on the part of the deceased; or the resources and taste of the sur­
viving children. All women of the village assist, uninvited, with threshing 
rice. All families take an offering of milled rice (tham khaaw) to the house 
where the body lies, to do merit by the deceased. The men make a coffin and 
on the day of the cremation construct a pyre. A saj baad is held on the cre­
mation morning and again a week after the death, a bundle of bone fragments 
being placed in a pagoda on the latter occasion. People who die 'badly1 are 
buried without ceremony, but the skull can be exhumed and burnt at a later 
date.
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APPENDIX XII
Marriage Patterns at Sambbrag:. with a note on
divorce
Data on marriage were collected in the following way. Every living 
person was asked to state every marriage which he or she had ever contracted. 
All except the oldest villagers were asked about all the marriages of their 
parents, so that a partial picture was built up of the generation now passed 
away - people who would now have reached ages of from 70 to 100 if they were 
alive. All living persons were asked to give the last or latest known mar­
riages of their siblings deceased or not now resident in the village. The 
overall result, therefore, is an outline of marriage patterns since a little 
before 1900, with gaps inevitably occurring in the earlier years. Anyone of 
the deceased generation who migrated from the village leaving neither chil­
dren nor an elderly brother or sister beind who could have informed the author 
of it, would be unrecorded. But as only the last marriage of known emigrant 
siblings was recorded, and not marriages prior to the departure, if any, the 
figures for endogamous marriage are also lower than they probably should be. 
The figures have the advantage of reflecting movement in and out of the vil­
lage reasonably well, but not the total of marriages contracted by the people 
who figure in the survey. Conversely, since several of the marriages refer 
to the same person, the numbers of people involved cannot be found by adding 
up the recorded marriages.
The data are now presented in two blocks, divided at those villagers who 
had reached or would have reached, if living, their 70th birthday in 1967 - 
and whose first marriage would have taken place, probably, not earlier than 
1917, at least in the case of the men. The 71-100 (?) group needs to be taken 
separately because there are inevitably marriages missing from the record for 
that generation. But for what it is worth, the available information does 
suggest a much more strongly endogamous pattern compared to the later genera­
tions, with outside links predominantly to the sister village of Maalaj.
Of 74 known marriages of Sambbrag men in the 71+ group i
68. were to women of Sambbrag (of these, 2 couples settled outside the
village, 1 at Batu Balai, 1 at Pog Kiang);
2 were exogamous (patrilocal) with Thai women from other villages, viz.
Maalaj, 2;
3 were exogamous (matrilocal), Sambbrag men settling at: Maalaj, 1;
Cee Hee (Sungai Padi, Thailand), 2 (these were 2 brothers who went to
perform N$>raa); 1 man became Malay,
Of 69 known marriages of Sambbrag women in the 71+ group;
54 were with men of Sambbrag (with 2 couples settling outside);
5 were exogamous (patrilocal): vis. 3 at Pog Kiang; 2 at Maalaj;
1 was exogamous (matrilocal), a man of Maalaj coming to Sambbrag;
1 woman married a Maalaj man with whom she settled at Sera* hamlet near
SamCBrag;
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4 women married Thai-Chinese, matrilocally;
4 married ethnic Chinese (only 1 of whom came to Samd&rag).
None are known to have been lost to Islam.
Out of 185 known marriages contracted by Thai men of Sambbrag. aged 
under 70 in 1967:
138 were with women of Sambbrag - but of these, 8 couples settled else­
where: viz., 2 at Pasir Puteh; 1 at Bukit To* Chit, Pasir Puteh; 1 in 
lower Trengganu; 1 at Batu Balai; 1 at Cherang Ruku; 1 at Kota Bharu;
1 at Jarnuu, Patani;
13 were exogamous (patrilocal) marriages with Thais of: IChaw Joon, 2;
Sadang, 1; Maalaj, 1; Pog Kiang, 2; Liigii, 2; Batu Balai, 1;
B99samed, 1; Jung Kaw, 1; Gee Hee (Thailand), 2 (the latter refer to
2 marriages of one itinerant female shadow player who settled for short 
periods in Sambbrag and took a different husband on each occasion - she 
was in fact the daughter of one of the two N9raa players who left 
Sambbrag earlier);
9 other marriages were exogamous (matrilocal) with Sambbrag men settling 
at: Baangs&, 1; B99samed, 1; Batu Balai, 1; Maalaj, 2; Khaw Joon, 2;
Pog Kiang, 2. Additionally, 3 men are known to have migrated to Baang 
Naraa in Narathiwat, where they may or may not have found wives. Another 
was sent to Cee Hee as an orphan child and may have married. Another 
still migrated to Pabani and is known not to have married...;
7 men took wives from other villages but settled neither in Sambbrag nor 
in the village of the wife: Maalaj, 2 - moved to Batu Balai; Maalaj, 1 -
moved to Kota Bharu to join the staff of the Thai Consulate in 1966;
Khoog Sijaa, 1 - settled at Gee Hee; Khaw Joon, 1 - moved to To1 DMng, 
Thailand; Bukit To* Chit, 1 - moved into Pasir Puteh town; Baangsb, 1 - 
moved to Khaw Joon;
4 men married Thai-Chinese women who took up residence at Sambbrag;
4 married Thai-Chinese women matrilocally;
2 married Thai-Chinese and settled in a place other than the village of 
the wives;
2 married Chinese and left Sambbrag;
6 only, became Malay - pen khMg.
Out of 292 known marriages contracted by Thai women of Sambbrag in the 
age group up to 70:
152 were with men of Sambbrag (the discrepancy of 14 with the male
statistics arises from the fact that as men usually marry at a later age
than women, some of this group are found in the over-70 generation); 8 
of these couples left the village, as noted above;
26 were exogamous (patrilocal) marriages with Thais of other villages,
viz., Kota Bharu, 1; Pasir Puteh 1; Besut 2; Pog Kiang 4; Batu
Balai 2; Khaw Joon 2; Liigii 1; Baan Sadang 1; Thaa Song 1; Maalaj 9* 
One woman moved to Rantau Panjang on the Thai border and is not knomto 
have married* A middle-aged widow accompanied her son to To1 Dbilng, 
Narathiwat. Two others found husbands at unspecified places across the 
frontier....;
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13 other marriages were exogamous (matrilocal), with Sambbrag receiving 
men from: Jelawat 1; Maalaj 7. Some 50 years ago a messenger of the
Sangha from Nakornsrithamarat took a liking to the village and raised 
a family there. One woman was married for a short time to a Thai over­
seer on a nearby European copra plantation on the eve:tof the war - this 
man had come from Bangkok and was the brother-in-law of the European 
manager. 3 other women became the temporary wives of Thai soldiers 
during the Thai occupation (1944-5);
4 women took husbands from other villages but settled neither in Sambbrag 
nor in the village of the husband: Maalaj 1 - moved to Kuala Krai;
1 BaangsE* - settled on a nikhom (pioneer colony in Narathiwat);
Maalaj, 1 - moved to Bukit To1 Chit; Baan Naj 1 - moved to Bukit Kechik 
(Melor, Kelantan);
22 more married Thai-Chinese men patrilocally;
4 married Thai-Chinese men matrilocally;
69 married ethnic Chinese (only one of whom came into Sambbrag); this 
group breaks down thus: Age group 61-70:8/65 marriages;
" " 51-60:20/67 "
*' " 41-50:20/73 ’*
" « 31-40:11/45 11
" ” 21-30:10/38 "
" " Under 20:0/8 "
1 married a Ceyloni employee on a nearby copra plantation;
1 lastly, married a Malay soldier. It was not her first marriage, and 
she returned to the village to die.
A Note on Divorce
The formal rule about divorce is that both parties must agree and inform 
the headman, who will give his consent if his mediation fails. But a state 
of de facto divorce arises when a young bride runs home to her parents and 
resists all pressure and entreaties to rejoin her husband. In the Thais* own 
view there is less divorce today than formerly, because parents today consult 
their children before arranging a marriage. This complimentary account of 
changing parental norms is perhaps a little idealized, in that even if girls 
are formally asked their opinion, they are too obedient to their parents* pre­
ference to say no. First marriages do still break down. But second marriages 
are generally very stable and live up to the Thai ideal of a life-long, har­
monious partnership. There is sincere contempt for the Malays' habit of dis­
posing of a wife when her charms cease to satisfy - although a Thai man has 
sound reasons for keeping a wife in a situation where women are (a) scarce, 
and (b) often well dowered with land (inheritance is entirely equal between 
children and a woman's estate is not surrendered to the husband on marriage).
A woman of restless temperament combined with outstanding beauty is corres­
pondingly freer to desert her mate and marry again, and these factors are often 
found to be present where a woman was divorced more than once. An alternative 
outcome, where these factors obtain, may be adultery, which the husband is 
willing to overlook, both from material and charitable considerations. But
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if the 'lover1 really falls in love with the woman, this may lead to divorce 
anyway, or to two divorces if the lover is himself already married. There is 
a distinct reluctance to confess to a history of several marriages (say over 
three) but if others are present when the question is asked they will tease 
the informant and remind him of the rest amidst much laughter. The author 
did not attempt to work out an essentially meaningless average of divorces 
per person. Sambbrag' gives an impression (with which it is suitable to con­
clude) of stable family life, within an atmosphere of tolerance towards minor 
deviation. The very tolerance towards minor deviation (such as an occasional 
adultery) may be a factor against frequent divorce. Perhaps one in ten, men 
or women, marry more than three times in a life-time; and of course the 
three-timers, who are a little more common, often become so through the death 
of a spouse.
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APPENDIX IV 
Thai Dress
Women's dress in one respect is still distinctively Thai. Although 
there are few black sarongs now at Sambbrag (this is however almost standard 
attire up at Jung Kaw); and the horizontal upper garment, which used to be 
wound around the torso, leaving the shoulders and arms bare, when a woman went 
to the wat or further afield, has generally given way to the Malay baju ke- 
baya with long sleeves (they call it sya); yet in her home and its immediate 
vicinity - as when fetching water or visiting a friend with baby on hip - 
many Thai wives are unlikely to wear any top garment at all. This applies 
to all Thai villages in Kelantan but if Malays pass by frequently, the habit 
tends to be suppressed outside the house. Some women of middle age who have 
lived long in towns as the wives of Chinese, and returned latterly as widows 
to the village, prefer to remain covered either by a sya or by a sarong 
hitched and fastened above the breast to act as upper and lower garment in 
one. But the trend among younger women is equivocal. As teenage cooks and 
baby-minders in Chinese families the junior generation learn to wear short 
skirts and blouses with, of course, the universal brassiere; if they return 
and marry in the village they will practise the traditional undress after 
the first child.
The author offers here the conclusions of himself and his wife about the 
psychology of the phenomenon, based on their enquiries and observation. The 
pretty bosom of a young woman is appreciated as in other societies and trad­
itionally at adolescence a girl would feel shy and cover herself. The time 
when they first wore a horizontal cloth (pld nom, i.e. covered the breasts) 
is one of the convenient landmarks in the life of an elderly lady, by refer­
ence to which other events can be located, as:
"I had already begun to wear a top garment when the first white 
men were seen in this district."
But after two or three children were bom they would no longer feel self- 
conscious, because their breasts had lost their beauty and were regarded as 
just a utility. Three intelligent and perceptive men of the village, aged 
between 50 and 60, admitted smilingly, when asked, that Thai women are not 
shy like others are, but this was simply because it was more comfortable to 
do the cooking, get bathed, and nurse the baby untramelled and unrestricted 
by an upper garment, and they only uncovered anyway after beauty had passed.
The last statement was made in complete sincerity; but two of these inform­
ants, when asked to say whether the charms of certain young women whom the 
author named had really faded so much, were obliged to admit that this was 
not so. It was the first time they had given it any thought, and they were 
astonished to realize that the traditional rules were not always being ob­
served. This change among the young women had not gone unnoticed however by 
two devout, elderly ladies, who said in scandalised tones that they would never 
have had the boldness to uncover so young, even to suckle their first child 
publicly.
The rule abotLt waiting till beauty has faded is surely a very important
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norm, which must be maintained in theory even while it has ceased to dictate 
the practice. The young women who uncover are able to display their beauty 
while it lasts, this being the privilege of the modern Malayan girl of the 
towns - and why not in the country too? The return to the village is not 
the absolute end of youth for them. But this is contrived not with modem 
clothes and a brassiere but by the manipulation of traditions They are not 
set on enticing their neighbours' husbands. This increases rather in direct 
proportion to the amount of clothes, so that the 'bad women', the khon chua, 
who keep an open window for almost any lonely . male, are always the most 
covered and the most dressy. If the husbands suspected their young wives of 
such motives they could not allow them to appear outside the house as they 
do. The convention that their wives are not beautiful at all because they 
are mothers saves face and freedom all round.
Elderly men and women shave their heads. Men, otherwise, have their 
hair cut in modern, urban style. Long hair worn by a boy is a sign of a 
female impersonator in a Nipraa troupe. The long and lovingly tended hair of 
the women a generation ago has succumbed to recurring onslaughts of the 
permanent wave (whose only lasting feature is not, indeed, the curls, but the 
clipped hair). One sure distinguishing mark of Thai men is their tatooing 
with Pali characters and various magical signs.
The men's dress is not unlike the Malay pattern, except that the very 
long chequered sarong worn by Malays when walking out on Fridays is confined to 
the 'joom' who live at the monastery in the last weeks before entering monkhood. 
Everyday wear is a sarong generally worn at knee length or less (shorter than 
a Malay would wear it), with some kind of shirt or no shirt at all, both for
work in the fields and attending the wat. Trousers are worn by the middle-
aged and young men to go to town, following the contemporary Malay pattern.
Some young men wear jeans to plant rice. All men except the oldest wear a
pair of shorts for work as often as a sarong. Teenage girls wear a batik sarong
and blouse (not a baju kebaya) when in the village, but put on their modem frock 
or skirt to go back to work or to visit the town. The phaa phaad chiang, the 
diagonal sash of the Thai, is mandatory for both sexes at the wat. It makes 
a handy baby sling too. The women always wear it to the market, Girls under 
the age of 13 today wear either a sarong or a print frock in the village, 
little boys wear shorts.
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APPENDIX V
Loan Words at SamBBrag
The following words are in general use. The list does not include Malay 
words used consciously for fun or effect by a few speakers. Otherwise, it is 
very nearly exhaustive, for Malay words are rather easy to spot in Thai speech. 
One tends to learn them fairly early in ones acquaintance with the dialect; 
in later months, the new words are predominantly of the monosyllabic, pure 
Thai type. In villages nearer the Thai border, a few young people are pre­
ferring Thai words to Malay loan words, but this is part of an effort to use 
standard Thai in place of the village dialect as such.
There are a very few words in use which are not readily identifiable as 
Thai, but neither are they apparently attributable to Malay or Chinese. Such 
words are not given here. But words which seem fairly certainly to be derived 
from Malay or Chinese are given after the main lists. The main Malay list is 
divided into four general, and necessarily overlapping, categories:
1. agricultural activities and objects; 2. household activities and objects, 
clothing and food; 3. economic, administrative and political terms; 4»other. 
The Thai version of the words is preceded by its Malay equivalent and followed 
by an English translation (of the Thai.) Meanings of words which have not 
excluded a Thai equivalent are asterisked.
Malay
1. Agricultural
biri
chamor
cherut
birii
chamaa
cuud
sheep
to sow* (not rice)
to cut (grass) with a sickle
footbridge
strip of rice land 60<* x 6001 
miniature axe 
a land lease, share-
jalor
kapak
pawah
geretak lcath9g
jaloo
kupaag
phuwaa
piama
sembeleh
sigai
terendak
tuak
phijaam
mal&f
sakaj
ceen99g
thuwaag
cropping arrangement 
(wet) season* 
to slaughter 
pole-ladder 
rice-planter's hat 
toddy
2* Household, etc,
aiskrim
bakau
beg
chat
choklat
gambir
gandum
guni
naam sakrim ice cream 
tobacco* 
shopping bag 
paint, to paint 
sweets 
gambier 
wheat flour
sacking, grain sacks
bakhaw
beg
chaad 
. chaglaad
kamM
kanom
kuning
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jabir jabee a sling basket of plaited 
straw for travel
.kendi khanii kettle
kopi ldi9phii coffee
lcopi Ith^ phii cigarette tin
kopiah k9piew hat*
meja m^ lj99 table*
rokok l99ldi99g cigarette
roti Ipthii bread
sekut sakhuud crackers (savoury biscuits)
talam talam large round tray
tebeng thebeng partition
3* Economic. etc.(This category is always expanding. Technical words of 
English extraction will soon be gaining currency in greater numbers.)
awak awaag fishing crew
bahagian bakian part (of an inheritance)*
bandar bandaa tom
has rod ba*1 bus*
benar benaa to permit*
beng beng van
bin beng surname, i.e. father*s name 
on birth certificate, etc.
chuchok c9C99g to vaccinate*
da'awa dawaa to accuse, prosecute 
double(d)(as of wages)daba dabaa
denda dend99 a fine*
D.G. Dii Oo District Officer
gaji kajii wages*
hasil asee land tax
ihtikar takaad monopoly, farm
jam jaam hour
kad lchad identity card
kansel khas&& to cancel*
kapal khaphaa steam ship
kawasan khaawaasan area*
kelan khalan deep-sea fishing month of 
about 21 days
lcerani khraaning clerk
keraayatan kharaaj athan citizenship
lcompas kupaad to measure, survey (land)
koyok kh9joog plaster
kuasa khwaspo civil authority
kuat khuwaad have rights, authority over*
laba labaa profit; advantage
laku lakhuu be a success (economic)
lelong l&long to auction
lesen leseng licence*
mahkamah roong khama^ magistrate's court*
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memerentah
mengaku
meshin
minggu
motor
notis
nombor
paip
pajak
parang
pas
pas
pejabat
pereksa
pesaka
plan
pom
ripot
rugi
saksi
saman
sharah
sijil
stop
teksi
tembok
tes
tep
tepek
tolak
tukang
tukang steshen
undi
wad
4. Other
adil
bagih
balah
balek
bichara
bidan
biru
bisa
r&thgh
ngakhuu
m&sheng (khaaw) 
mingguu 
mpthoo 
notee
lombong
phahlid
phajaa*
phar&&
pha*1
pha*1
phajabaad
pharMgS99
saakh99
phlang
phom
lip99d
rukil
sagsii
saman
sara*
baj sijee
satoog bia
thegsii
themb99g
th&&*
thMb
taapflfig
tpl99g
thukhang
thukhang satheshSng
unii
waaf
to have the running of 
(piece of land) 
admit (to a crime) 
to mill (rice)*
7-day week 
motor boat
to claim distribution of 
an estate 
number 
standpipe 
farm, monopoly 
to cancel* 
a pass, permit 
qualified, passed* 
office 
to examine* 
inherited 
map 
form
make a report, complaint 
material, economic loss 
a witness 
summons
to lecture, make a speech
a certificate
out of cash*
trishaw
highway
a (medical) test* 
recording tape, tape 
recorder 
pin, paste up (a notice) 
to transmit inter vivos, 
leave to 
a specialist 
petition writer 
to vote, ballot* 
hospital, hospital ward*
adee just, equitable*
bakUSL trance
bala*1 kan; I99 kan have a row, argument*
baiaUg topple over, turn turtle
chara (a) bother about;
(b) organise*
midan midwife
biruu blue*
bis99 poison*
- 269 -
bodoh
chadang
champor
chermat
dengki
gak
gamak
ganas
ganti
gelir
hala
harap
hairan
jadi
jaga
janji
jawab
lceramat
lcetelc
khemah
lcuning
kurang
kurang2
lebeh kurang
masing2
mujor
nak
nikah
padan
pakat
pelek
pengeras
pintas
pun
punah
raj in
restong
sadia
selut
silap
b9d99
chadang awaj
chaph99
chumaad
dekhii
kag
lcanaad
kantii Kan
lcilee lean
halaa paj
haraab
hajran
jadii
jakp9
janjii
jawaab
lchraraaad
khatMg
khema'
khuning
kprang
k9rang-k9rang 
lebee k9rang 
maasing-maasing 
muj99
n9g (negative: r 
maj npg) 
nikha*1 kan 
phadan 
phakaad 
phalMg 
kharaad 
pitha*1 khaang
pun
phuuna*1
rayon
raadsaduang
sadia
salud
silaab
stupid*
put aside, save*
mix*
careful
jealous
a pivotal enclitic in 
Kelantan Malay*
(a) to reckon, estimate, 
guess* (b) probably* 
to damage maliciously 
exchange* 
to take turns*‘ 
go in the direction of* 
have confidence in 
be surprised 
manage to*
look after, stand guard over* 
to promise, guarantee 
to reply
enchanted (places or objects;
sometimes persons)* 
monastery, wat* 
tent 
yellow*
(a) less than; (b) scarce, 
short of* 
at the least 
more or less*
each for himself, respectively 
fortune, fortunately
to want to 
to marry
be satisfactory, sufficient* 
cooperate
(speak with) an accent* 
doctor's fee
to cross to the (other) side 
(of road)*
Malay enclitic, used at 
Sambbrag with thyng 
(’although') 
devastated* 
diligent, busy at 
cancer of the nose 
ready to 
muddy*
silent, hiding*
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timbang
tipu
tiru
To1
wayang 
wayang gedak
timbang
thiphuu
thiruu
To’
wpjang
wpjang kad&kg
(a) weigh*; (b) consider, 
deliberate* 
to cheat, deceive* 
imitative, copied, false 
honorific prefix for elderly 
man 
theatre*
the Thai shadow theatre* 
(called in Thailand nang 
talung, and not to be con­
fused with the Malay wayang 
Siam)
Probable Malay derivatives
chakap?
rasa?
sahaja?
changkhab 
saa waa
jaa
Ghinese
efficient, competent
(a) to feel; (b) it seems
only
angni99 Englishman, European, English*
binp99 handkerchief
ciam a cent
kag 10 cents
lenchuu lipstick
teekhpp kettle
th99haa be in mourning
utaw flat-iron
Probable Chinese derivatives
lyng
wa*
lag
50 cents (imsaam lyng,$1.50|$)
refridgerator
to lock
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APPENDIX VI
Kelantan Candidates and Results in the 1955 Elections to the Federal 
Legislative Council (given in: T. El. Smith, Report on the First Election 
of Members to the Legislative Council of the Federation of Malaya* 
Kuala Lumpur, 1955.) ~
Kelantan Selatan
Abdul Khalid bin Awang Osman (Alliance) 21,746
Dato1 Nik Ahmed Kamil bin Mahmood (Negara) 7,175
Haji Mohamed Noor bin Haji Yusoff (PMIP) 3,600
Kelantan Timor
Nik Hassan bin Haji Nik Yahya (Alliance) 50,954
Dato* Nik Ahmed bin Haji Nik Mahmood (Negara) 4,019
Mohamed Asri bin Haji Muda (PMIP) 2,292
Mohamed bin Ibrahim (independent) 883
Pasir Mas
Tengku Ahmad bin Tengku Abdul Ghaffar (Alliance) 20,963
Haji Mokhtar bin Haji Ahmed (PMIP) 7,507
Kelantan Utara
Tengku Indra Petra bin Sultan Ibrahim (Alliance) 28,428
Dato* Nik Hussein bin Nik Zainal (Negara) 6,295
Kelantan Ten&ah
Abdul Hamid bin Mahmud (Alliance) 28,422
Tengku Annuar Zainal bin Tengku Zainal Abidin
(Negara) 2,970
Dato1 Nik Mohamed bin Abdul Rahman (independent) 1,154
Idris bin Haji Mohamed 721
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APPENDIX VII
The 1959 State Elections 
(source;The Straits Times. 26 June 1959)
Each group of three seats represents the area of one parliamentary constit­
uency. The equivalent parliamentary seat is indicated in brackets beside 
the name of the state seat. c.p. map, p. 117.
Map Reference No,
Tumpat Barat (Tumpat) 1
Tuan Guru Haji Daud, PMIP 4,208
Othman bin Mohamed Udin, Alliance 1,017
Ibrahim Tunggal, Independent 147
PMIP majority 5,191
Tumpat Tengak (Tumpat) 2
Mustapha Awang, PMIP 2,255
Poo Chow Yong, Alliance 2,200
Yahya bin Abdullah, Negara 968
C.W.Sook, S.P. 341
PMIP majority 55
Tumpat Timor (Tumpat) 3
Inche I shale Mustapha, PMIP 3,469
Haji Wan Idris Haji Taib, Alliance 2,754
PMIP majority 715
Kuala Kelantan (Kelantan Hilir) 4
Wan Yusoff bin Wan Yaacob, PMIP 2,780
Nik Hassan bin Nik Hussain, Alliance 1,405
Haji Abdul Karim bin Haji Abdul Malik, Negara 1,072
PMIP majority 1,375
Kota Bharu Utara (Kelantan Hilir) 5
Abdullah Ahmad, PMIP 3,426
Yusoff Bashah, Negara 1,262
Che Halimah b.inte Idris, Alliance 1.061
Haji Wan Dollah, S.P. 169
PMIP majority 2,164
Kota Bharu Pantai (Kelantan Hilir) 6
Nik Abdullah Haji Arshad, PMIP 4,437
Abu Bakar Mohamed Al-Ahmadi, Alliance 1,222
Mohamed bin Haji Abdullah, Negara, 421
Che Wil Alias Gan Ti Wah, S.F. 207
PMIP majority 3,215
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Map Reference No.
Meranti (Pasir Mas Hilir) 7
Nik Man, PMIP 4,989
Yusoff bin Mat Akib, Alliance 340
PMIP majority 4 , 649
Tenclong (Pasir Mas Hilir) 8
Tuan Guru Haji Che Hass an, PMIP 4,075
Mohamed Zain bin Harun, Alliance 1,074
Imam Abdullah Tepoyak, Independent 238
Che Gu Haji Awang, Independent 222
Mat Noor Yusoff, S.F„ 215
PMIP majority 3,001
Bandar Pasir Mas (Pasir Mas Hilir) 9
Che Gu Omar, PMIP 3,657
Che Hassan bin Haji Ismail, Alliance 1,715
Dato Lankimin, Negara 85
PMIP maj ority 1,942
Bandar Hilir (Kota Bharu Hilir) 10
Wee Khoon Hock, Alliance 3,027
Haji Nik Adeeb, PMIP 1,745
Nik Mat Dato Amar, S.F. 369
Nik Mahmood pin Nik Abdul Mia j id, Independent 15
Alliance majority 1,282
Bandar Hulu (Kota Bharu Hilir) 11
Haji Che Muda, PMIP 3,249
Hamid Haji Yaacob, Alliance 1,977
Hasnah Yusoff, Negara 204
Idris bin Haji Mohamed, Independent 87
PMIP majority 1,272
Kota Bharu Tengah (Kota Bharu Hilir) 12
Mohamed Asri, PMIP 4,357
Hassan Haji Yaacob, Alliance 1,206
Ustaz Salleh bin Daud, Negara 401
Noor Prol, S.P. 118
PMIP majority 3,151
Bachok Utara (Bachok) 13
Shafei bin Ahmad, PMIP 5,557
Jaafar bin Mohamed, Alliance 1,290
Haji Nik Mohamed Salleh, Negara 222
PMIP maj ority 4,267
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Map Reference Mo.
Bachok Tengah (Bachok) 14
Mohamed Amin Bin Haji Yaakub, PMIP 4,533
Che Wei alias Ismail "bin Yusoff, Alliance 1,022
Mohamed Yusoff bin Yahya, Negara 405
Nik Mat bin Haji Wan Haasan, S. P. 162
PMIP majority 5?511
Bachok Selatan (Bachok) 15
Haji Othman bin Haji Ismail, PMIP 4,493
Ismail bin Haji Ahmad, Alliance 1,220
Nik Abdul Majid bin Nik Abdul Rahman, S.P. 105
Otliman Adam, Independent 65
Haji Mokhtar bin Haji Ahmad, Negara 40
PMIP majority 3,278
ICota Bharu Timor (Kota Bharu Hulu) 16
Saufi Idris, PMIP 5,103
Che Gu Mat Haji Ali, Alliance 1,399
Ismail bin Daud, Negara 229
Tuan Man bin Tuan Salleh, SsF„ 134
PMIP majority 3,704
Kota Bharu Barat (Kota Bharu Hulu) 17
Abdul Rahman Awang Sulong, PMIP 5,426
Haji Zaid, Alliance 920
Haji Osman bin Saman, Negara 439
Ustaz Wan Semail, S.P. 358
PMIP majority 4,506
Kota Bharu Selatan (Kota Bharu Hulu) 18
Haji Ishak Lofti, PMIP 5,041
Nik Hassan bin Nik Yahya, Alliance 1,334
Ghe Gu Noor, S.P. 306
Haji Abdul Majid bin Haji Ibrahim, Independent 100
Ghe Gu Derahman, Negara 49
PMIP majority 3,707
Rantau Panjang (Pasir Mas Hulu) 19
Abdul Rahman Haji Daud, PMIP 2,521
Nik Yusoff bin Nik Lodin, Alliance 1,241
Gelap Pale Wei, Negara 66
PMIP majority 1,280
hemal (Pasir Mas Hulu) 20
Tuan Guru. Haji Haron, PMIP 3,367
Omar bin Haji Ahmad, Alliance 1,070
Mat S.O., S.P. 57
PMIP ma^ jority 2,297
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Tok ITban (Pasir Mas Hulu) 21
Ustaz Abdullah, PMIP 4,389
Yaacob bin Awang, Alliance 1,183
PMIP majority 3,206
Pasir Puteh Utara (Pasir Puteh) 22
Tangicu Mohamed, PMIP 4,666
Wan Isma! binte Abdul Kadir, Alliance 1,274
Hassan bin Yaacob, Negara 426
Mat bin Ohe Moh, S.F. 106
PMIP majority 3,392
Pasir Puteh Tengah (Pasir Puteh) 23
Ustaz Wan Sulaiman, PMIP 3,365
Haji Abdul Rahman bin Haji Yusoff, Alliance 2,826
Ustaz Abdullah bin Haji Mohamed, S.P. 218
PMIP majority 539
Pasir Puteh Tenggara (pasir Puteh) 24
Ustaz Abdul Rahman, PMIP 4,868
Ghazali bin Yusoff, Alliance 2,207
Haji Alias Tok Imam, S.P. 204
PMIP majority 2,661
Machang Utara (Tanah Merah) ‘ 25
Haji Mohamed bin Nasir, PMIP 4,466
Ibrahim bin Mohamed, Alliance 2,834
Mohamed Taib bin Haji Ibrahim, Negara 629
PMIP majority 1,632
Tanah Merah Timor (Tanah Merah) 26
Ghe Gu Daud, PMIP 3,184
Othman bin Ahmad, Alliance 2,094
Haji Wan Yusoff bin Wan Ali, Neg'ara 980
Mohamed bin Ali, S.F, 177
PMIP majority 1,090
Tanah Merah Barat (Tanah Merah) 27
Yusoff bin Abdul Latif, PMIP 3,345
Hussin Driver, Independent 865
Abdul Ghani bin Mohamed, Alliance 765
Wan Jaafar bin Haji Wan Mahmood Penglima Bayu,
Negara 712
Said bin Awang, S.P. 144
PMIP majori ty 2,480
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Map Reference No, 
(Ulu Kelantan) 28
Haji Mohamed Noor bin Haji Yusoff, PMIP 4,434
Ustaz Salleh Zaki Hussin, Alliance 2,655
Mohamed Ghazali bin Haji Noh, Negara 315
Ismail bin Omar, S.F, 241
PMIP majority 1,779
Ulu ICelantan Timor (Ulu Kelantan.) 29
Ngah Ali, Alliance 3,051
Wan Ismail bin Wan Ahmad, PMIP 1,978
Haji Nik Jaafar bin Nik Soh, Independent 608
John S.F. 305
Alliance majority 1,073
Ulu Kelantan Barat (Ulu Kelantan) 30
Khaidir IChatib, PMIP 1,472
Wong Yeow Wye, Alliance 1,126
Tuan Haji Mohamed Yusoff Bangs, Independent 853
Wan Yaacob bin Wan Ahmad, Negara 347
Ghe Hussein AR0, S.F. 99
Mat Ghe Lateh, Independent 56
PMIP majority 346
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APPMNDIX VIII
Parliamentary Elections. 1959 
(source; The Straits Times. 20 August 1959)
Tumpat
Haji Che Hassan, PMTP 10,249
Mahmood bin Zakariah Julian, Alliance 6,380
PMIP majority 3,869
Kelantan Hilir
Wan Mustapha bin Haji Ali, PMIP 12,438
Hassan bin Haji Yaacob, Alliance 4,327
PMIP majority 8,111
Kota Bharu Hilir
Haji Ahmad bin Abdullah, PMIP 9,463
Nik Ismail bin Nile Hussin, Alliance 6,302
PMIP maj ority 3,161
Kota Bharu Hulu
Tuan Hussin Rahimi, PMIP 14,775
Ismail bin Ibrahim, Alliance 3,749
PMIP majority 11,026
Pasir Mas Hilir
Nik Man bin Nile Mohamed, PMIP 12,422
Che Omar Haji Ali, Alliance 3,130
PMIP majority 9,292
Pasir Mas Hulu
Dato Raja Hanifar bin Haji Abdul Ghani, PMIP 9,518
Yaacob bin Awang, Alliance 3,559
PMIP majority 5,959
Bachok
Zulkifii bin Mohamed, PMIP 13,880
Nik Mohamed bin Ali, Alliance 3,761
PMIP majority 10,119
Tanah Merah
Othman bin Abdullah, PMIP 12,752
Ustaz Azhari bin Abdul Rahman, Alliance 6,744
PMIP majority 5,978
Pasir Puteh
Ustaz Mohamed Asri, PMIP 12,284
Mohamed Idris, Alliance 6,630
PMIP majority 5,644
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TTiu Kelantan
Tengku Indra Petra, Alliance 8,770
Amaluddin bin Darus, PMIP 8,306
Haji Mohamed Yatim bin Haji Sharasuddin, Negara 292
Alliance Majority 464
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APPENDIX IX
Definition of a "Native of Kelantan*1
(as appended to The Malay Reservations Enactment, 1930; The Sultanate Lands 
Enactment, 1934; and all subsequent amendments and consolidations of the 
Kelantan land laws, including the National Land Code, 1965)
1 "Native of Kelantan" means a person who falls within any of the following 
classes:
(a) Any person born in Kelantan whose father was a Malay;
(b) Any person born in Kelantan whose mother was a Malay and whose
father was a Muslim;
(c) Any person wherever bom whose father was a Malay bom in Kelantan;
(d) Any person wherever born both of whose parents were Malays and who 
has resided at least 15 years in Kelantan;
(e) Any person who was bom in Kelantan and whose father was also born 
in Kelantan.'
The definition of a Malay in operation in Kelantan (see Malay Reservations 
Enactment, 1930; 3 (i)) is as follows;
'"Malay" means a person belonging to any Malayan race who speaks any Malayan 
language and professes the Mohammedan religion; and shall include (a) the
Majlis Ugama Islam; (b) the official Administrator when acting as adminis­
trator or trustee of the estate of a deceased Malay.'
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APPENDIX X
The 1964 State Elections 
(source: The Straits Times, 27 April, 1964)
Each group of three seats represents the area of one parliamentary constituency. 
The equivalent parliamentary seat is indicated in brackets beside the name 
of the state seat. c.p. map, p.117.
Map Reference No.
Tumpat Barat (Turnpat) 1
Haji Daud, PMIP 4,084
Mohamed bin Musa, Alliance 2,041
PMIP majority 2,043
Turnpat Tengah (Tumpat) 2
Mahmood bin Mat .Amin, Alliance 4,217
Haji Abdul Rahman, PMIP 2,948
Alliance majority 1,269
Tumpat Timor (Tumpat) 3
Omar bin Awang Kechik, Alliance 3,786
I shale bin Mustapha, PMIP 3,133
Alliance majority 653
Kuala Kelantan (Kelantan .Hilir) 4
Wan Yusoff Haji Yaacob, PMIP 3,071
Abdul Majid bin Abu Bakar 2,428
PMIP majority 643
Kota Bharu Utara (Kelantan Hilir) 5
Abdullah bin Ahmad, PMIP 5,025
Yusoff bin Otliman, Alliance 1,893
PMIP majority 3,132
Kota Bharu Pantai (Kelantan Hilir) 6
Nik Abdullah bin Haji Arshad, PMIP 4,631
Nik Hassan bin Ibrahim, Alliance 2,124
PMIP maj ority 2,507
Meranti (Pasir Mas Hilir) 7
Nik Man bin Nik Mohamed, PMIP 5,198
Wan Mohamed Zain, Alliance 432
PMIP majority 4,766
Tendong (Pasir Mas Hilir) 8
Haji Che Hassan, PMIP 4,416
Jaafar bin Idris, Alliance 2,245
PMIP majority 2,171
Bandar Pasir Mas (Pasir Mas Hilir) 9
Haji Omar bin Awang, PMIP 3,776
Abdullah bin Che Sim, Alliance 2,588
PMIP maj ority 1,188
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Bandar Hilir (Kota Bharu Hilir) 10
]?oo Chow Yong, Alliance 4,654
Tengku Jaffar bin Tengku Ahmad, PMIP 2,213
Alliance majority 2,441
Bandar Hulu (Kota Bharu Hilir) 11
Ibrahim bin Ismail, Alliance 4,159
Haji Che Muda, PMIP 4,096
Alliance majority 63
Kota Bharu Tengah (Kota Bharu Hilir) 12
Mohamed Asri bin Haji Muda, PMIP 4,724
Haji Ibrahim bin Mohamed, Alliance 2,488
PMIP majority 2,236
Bachok Utara (Bachok) 13
Shafei bin Ahmad, PMIP 4,535
Ismail bin Yahaya, Alliance 2,811
PMIP majority 1,724
Bachok Tengah (Bachok) 14
Mohamed Amin bin Yaakub, PMIP 4,308
Yusof bin Salleh, Alliance 2,459
PMIP ma j ority 1,849
Bachok S el at an (Bachok) 15
Haji Othman bin Haji Ismail, PMIP 3,760
Mohamed Zain bin Abdullah, Alliance 2,905
PMIP majority 855
Kota Bharu Timor (Kota Bharu Hulu) 16
Saufi bin Idris, PMIP 4,743
Wan Aziz bin Haji Wan Omar, Alliance 2,859
PMIP majority 1,884
Kota Bharu Barat (Kota Bharu Hulu) 17
Abdul Rahman bin Awang Sulong, PMIP 5,787
Ahmad bin Yusoff, Alliance 1,713
PMIP majority 4,074
Kota Bharu Selatan (Kota Bharu Hulu) 18
Haji Ishak Lofti, PMIP 4,956
Meor Abdullah bin Meor Ahmad, Alliance 3,405
PMIP maj ori ty 1,551
Rantau Panjang (Pasir Mas Hulu) 19
Ahmad bin Yatim, PMIP 2,857
Wan Mahmood bin Wan Konok, Alliance 1,757
PMIP majority 1,100
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Lemal (pasir Mas Hulu) 20
Haji Haron bin Haji Sulong, PMIP 3,293
Mohamed Zain Haji Awang, Alliance 1,626
PMIP majority 1,667
Tok Uban (Pasir Mas Hulu) 21W lM ,1 Pim l»IMWl,« ' r
Abdullah bin Haji Yusoff, PMIP 3,676
Hamzah bin Haji Ismail, Alliance 2,008
PMIP majority 1,668
Pasir Puteh Utara (Pasir Puteh) 22
Abdul Kadir bin Mohamed Saad, PMIP 4,074
Wan Muhammed bin Wan Abu Bakar, Alliance 2,912
PMIP majority 1,162
Pasir Puteh Tengah (Pasir Puteh) 23
Haji Muhammad bin Haji Ismail, Alliance 3,959
Wan Sulaiman bin Haji Ibrahim, PMIP 3,499
Alliance majority 460
Pasir Puteh Tenggara (Pasir Puteh) 24
Abdul Rahman bin Mohamed 8alleh, PMIP 4,091
Raja Mahmud, Alliance 3,501
PMIP maj ority 590
Machang Utara (Tanah Merah) 25
Mohyiddin bin Tengah, Alliance 4,283
Haji Mohamed bin JSTasir, PMIP 4,150
Alliance majority 133
Tanah Merah Timor (Tanali Merah) 26
Omar bin Muhamed alias Mamat, PMIP 4,418
Ismail bin Abdul Samad, Alliance 4,028
PMIP majority 390
Tanah Merah Barat (Tanah Merah) 27
Yusoff bin Abdul Latiff, PMIP 3,756
Mohamed Zin bin Ismail, Alliance 3,273
PMIP majority 483
Machang Selatan (Ulu Kelantan) 28
Yaacob bin Ismail, Alliance 4,587
Haji Mohamed Noor bin Haji Yusoff, PMIP 4,481
Alliance majority 106
Ulu Kelantan Timor (Ulu Kelantan) 29
Yusoff bin Haji Mohamed Salleh, Alliance 5,253
Haji Wan Ismail bin Wan Ahmad, PMIP 2,928
Alliance majority 2,325
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Ulu Kelantan Bar at (Ulu Kelantan) 30
Ismail bin Daud, Alliance 2,982
Khaidir bin Khatib, PMIP 1,871
Alliance majority 1,111
APPENDIX XI
Parliamentary Elections 11964 
(source: The Straits Times, 27 April 1964)
Tumnat
Wan Hassan, PMIP 10,248
Ghe Lat bin Kassim, Alliance 10,056
PMIP majority 192
Kelantan Hilir
Haji Ahmad bin Abdullah, PMIP 12,721
Tengku Abdullah Ahmad, Alliance 6,496
PMIP majority 6,225
Kota Bharu Hilir
Dato Nik Ahmed Kamil, Alliance 11,585
Wan Mustapha, PMIP 10,929
Alliance majority 656
Kota Bharu Hulu
Haji Hussein Rahimi, PMIP 15,656
Haji Ibrahim bin Haji Mat, Alliance 7,915
PMIP majority 7,741
Pasir Mas Hilir
Muhammad Fakhruddin, PMIP 13,476
Haji Mokhtar bin Haji Ahmed, Alliance 5,261
PMIP majority 8,215
Pasir Mas Hulu
Abdul Samad Ahmad, PMIP 9,857
Husein bin Ahmad, Alliance 5,496
PMIP majority 4,361
Bachok
Zulkifli Muhammad, PMIP 12,659
Hassan Haji Mohamed, Alliance 8,278
PMIP majority 4,381
Tanah Merah
Mustap£ia bin Ahmad, PMIP 12,318
Isahak Abdul Hamid, Alliance 11,549
PMIP majority 769
Pasir Puteh
Mohamed Asri, PMIP 11,798
Haji Idris bin Ismail, Alliance 10,393
PMIP majority 1,405
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Ulu Kelantan
Hussein bin Sulaiman, Alliance 12,681
Haji Wan Yusoff, PMIP 9,108
Abdullah bin Mat Arif, S.F. 414
Alliance Majority 3,573
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APPENDIX XII 
Thai Medicine and Noraa in a Malay Society
This note forms a postscript or final commentary on the argument, devel­
oped in Chapters III and V, that what the Thais' integration owes to the his­
torical experience of the pre-British era is only a sense that Kelantan is 
their rightful home (by a kind of .ius soli), plus an acceptance of the hege­
mony of a Malay ruling class (with its negative corollary, a lack of political 
expectations from Thailand.) The growth of identification with a part of the 
Malay peasant population - the acquisition of the common values of neighbour­
liness and a shared sense of being Kelantanese peasants - we attributed to a 
period of change in Malay peasant society, the period after 1909. The Thai 
attitude to the Malay peasantry and its religious leadership before 1909 we 
postulated to have been wholly one of hostility and suspicion. But there is 
one more facet of primordial Thai-Malay relations that should be mentioned, 
because its significance is potentially in contradiction to the posited non­
identification and non-integration with Malay peasant society before the 
British era. This facet is the quite wide-spread Malay confidence in Siamese 
medicine and charms (cited in Chapter II, p. 61 as a possible factor preventing 
Muslim intimidation of Thais). Today, increasingly, Kelantan Malays will buy 
patent medicines with Thai labels, imported - or supposedly so - from Thailand 
itself. But the old habit of reliance upon the Kelantan Siamese is still met 
in the Icampongs. At SamBBrag during the author's stay, Malay women often 
bought love salves made from coconut oil; a Malay teacher had been persuaded 
by local advice to seek a Buddhist talisman for good luck on the road; another 
Malay was bathed in water in which some of the N9raa master's theatrical props 
had been immersed, to cure him of a malignant eczema; and Thai 11199 with skill 
in treating such maladies as post-puerperal hysteria and malarial fevers would 
be called from quite great distances to attend a case. Certain monks are re­
nowned for their efficacious charms and cures.
Such Malay dependence predicates a long-established tolerance of 'Siamese' 
custom and the Thai presence, which indeed manifests itself at times outside 
aristocratic or bureaucratic circles and in
the form of sentiments which seem to betray a rural tradition of tolerance 
(tolerance of primodial diversity) rather than the new, brotherly familiarity 
of workmates and UMNO enthusiasts (with the paradoxically intolerant dimension 
that we project in Chapter VIII), The problem of interpretation here posed 
is; whether Thai-Malay interdependence a century ago lent subjective security 
and an embryonic, reciprocal identification (with the Malays as fellow peasants), 
which the new 20th Century identification could take as its natural starting 
point; or was the provision of medical care merely an insurance against Malay 
intolerance? Can we go beyond Kunstaedter's identification of traditional 
structural integration ("...the press of present day events should not blind 
us to the fact that the existing patterns of relationship are the results of 
many centuries of development. The groups in question have never been com­
pletely isolated nor have they been entirely independent of the dominant 
political and economic structures of their regions," P. Kunstaedter, op.cit., 
pp. 3 and 5) and talk of the beginnings of common identity and nationality in 
an earlier epoch than the present one?
There are forms of Thai-Malay interaction (c.p. Chapter XI, pp 74-76) 
which in fact bear of two interpretations; either as 'positive, outgoing', 
or as 'defensive, cautious, suspicious, etc.', however valiant the observer's 
attempts to categorise one way or the other. In the case of the traditional 
Malay use of Thai medicine, there is no need for doubt that the 11199 involved 
then were personally motivated, as now, by a combination of material induce­
ments and compassion for the sick, rather than the motive of keeping the 
Malays at bay (though a m99 who is tired, or doesn't need money, will still 
respond to a call on the grounds of fearing to anger the Malays who sought 
his services). An intelligent man who travelled in the Malay kampongs and 
got to know the Malays would not harbour excessive fears and superstitions 
about them. However, we must remember that the number of Thais involved in 
these contacts with the Malay peasantry might be ohly 3 or 4 in 200. While 
it is quite common for a Thai man to learn a medical speciality, fame outside 
their own village comes to a rare minority. Therefore while Malay society 
might have been more tolerant in practice towards the Thais than the Thais 
realised, their embattled universe would take no note of the opinions of one 
or two doctors with contacts in the Malay world. In any case, a man with 
outside experience has no motive to challenge a village myth which he himself 
subscribes to at one level of consciousness (even today, with many Thais having 
favourable experiences of Malay society, contrary perceptions are common in 
the same individuals and are often the only ones expressed publicly). As the 
equipment of a traveller 70 years ago included a spear, along with the indis- 
pensible betel set and a supply of rice, those who saw him depart or return 
could not but be confirmed in their belief that journeys in the Malay country­
side were a hazardous business, even though the greater danger of attack might 
be from wild animals and not Malays. The general view of medical service may 
easily have been that it was a necessary function, performed by the few to 
guarantee the security of the many from molestation.
Still today, in the midst of much socially integrative behaviour, defensive 
traits are apparent. It may be objected that when statements go contrary to 
manifest behaviour they are fulfilling the function simply of asserting Thai 
identity in a symbolic way...yet individual phenomena (as well as individual 
attitudes) often reveal a genuine inner ambiguity. This discussion of the 
function of Thai medicine and magic in Thai-Malay relations can suitably be 
concluded with a reference to N9raa. Its decline was set on foot by the lack 
of interest among young men and boys in becoming disciples of a Noraa master 
for many years. But the decline is accelerated by the decline of the Thai 
audience. And this has come about because in this century the N9raa drama in 
Kelantan (the enacted scenes and narration of the story, not the invocations 
and choruses) has come to be performed in Malay to please the Malays who flock 
uninvited to the entertainments at ordination time, or who may commission a 
Noraa to be performed in a Malay village in fulfilment of a vow. (The Sul- 
tan's Birthday celebrations are another occasion when the audience is 10Q$> 
Malay; and now the Yang di-Pertuan Agong and the National Museum have com­
missioned performances at Kuala Lumpur by the Maalaj troupe.) The most enter­
taining part of the drama is thus incomprehensible to Thai women and children
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and not a few Thai men. But no one would like to frustrate Malay expectations 
by cancelling the Noraa and other spectacles at ordinations, even if the great 
'invasion' of Malays on this occasion both suffocates the Npraa and tends to 
breach the calm and security of the village at the most precious moment in 
several of the participants' lives.
A casual observer might classify this assimilation of Npraa to the require­
ments of Malay society as an example of social integration. He might point, 
too, to the presence of two or three Malay players in the Maalaj N9raa orchestra. 
But these Malay friends were invited to join because of a shortage of Thai 
players, consequent upon decline. And analysis shows that decline to be con­
nected with a persistent Thai desire to placate Malay society, not to assimi­
late to it. It is true that the increasing Malay attendance at ordination 
entertainments in the wats stems from modernisation - a decline of taboos - 
in Malay society, not rampant Islam. But we must be prepared to consider the 
possibility (and this is done in political terms at Chapter VIII) that it is 
less traditional Islam (which even in its new nationalist guise has been 
willing in practice to live-and-let-live culturally) than modernised Malay 
society, which may present Thai society with its most serious challenges.
